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Abstract 
 
The field of experimental philosophy has received considerable attention, essentially for 
producing results that seem highly counter-intuitive and at the same time question some of 
the fundamental methods used in philosophy.   
 
A substantial part of this attention has focused on the role of intuitions in philosophical 
methodology.  One of the major contributions of experimental philosophy on this topic has 
been concrete evidence in support of intuitional diversity; the idea that intuitions vary 
systematically depending on variables such as ethnicity, socioeconomic background, or 
gender.  
 
Because of the important implications, these findings have been the subject of extensive 
debate.  Despite the seeming significance of the findings and despite all the debates that the 
experimental philosophy movement has prompted, what has not been examined 
systematically is the reproducibility of the results.  Instead, the reported findings have been 
simply accepted as established facts.   
 
We set out to replicate a wide range of experiments and surprisingly failed to reproduce 
many of the reported findings, some of which are from the most cited and attention 
grabbing papers of the field.  
  
We draw two conclusions from our findings.  The first is that the instability of intuitions 
has been exaggerated by experimental philosophers.  Intuitions appear to be more uniform 
across different demographic groups.  The argument that intuitions need to be discarded 
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because they depend on arbitrary factors such as ethnicity, socioeconomic background, or 
gender does not seem tenable anymore.  The second conclusion is that experimental 
philosophy needs a better system to ensure the reproducibility of published findings.  The 
current research-publication system of various empirical fields, especially those employing 
statistical methods, leads to an overproduction of false-positive findings in the published 
literature.  Unless changes are made to the current research-publication system, this 
overproduction is likely to continue, in experimental philosophy as well as other disciplines.  
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Introduction 
  
Recently, philosophers have started using the tools of experimental psychology to study 
philosophical questions; this movement has been termed experimental philosophy.  
Experimental philosophy has attracted great attention, essentially for producing results that 
seem highly counter-intuitive and at the same time question some of the fundamental 
methods used in philosophy.  For example, one of the earlier papers reported that 
individuals from different ethnic as well as socioeconomic backgrounds displayed different 
epistemic intuitions (Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich, 2001).  More recently, differences in 
women’s and men’s responses have been reported for a host of scenarios, including Gettier-
type questions, compatibilism cases, as well as some classical scenarios such as Putnam’s 
Twin-Earth and Searle’s Chinese Room thought experiment (Buckwalter & Stich, 2013).  
Researchers have also claimed that simple manipulations can influence moral judgments on 
decisions as grave as whether to sacrifice an innocent bystander in order to save the lives of 
a greater number of individuals (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006).  
 
One of the main branches of experimental philosophy is concerned with the role of 
intuitions in philosophy and in particular examines intuitional diversity (Nadelhoffer & 
Nahmias, 2007), i.e. the idea that intuitions vary systematically depending on variables 
such as ethnicity, socioeconomic status, gender, or age (Buckwalter & Stich, 2013; Colaço, 
Buckwalter, Stich, & Machery, 2014; Machery, Mallon, Nichols, & Stich, 2004; Weinberg 
et al., 2001; Zamzow & Nichols, 2009).  These are variables that most philosophers agree, 
should not have any bearing on how philosophical questions are evaluated.  Experimental 
philosophers have also taken an interest in manipulations of moral judgments (Tobia, 
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Chapman, & Stich, 2013; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006; Zhong, Strejcek, & Sivanathan, 
2010) as evidence of the instability of intuitions.  One of the major contributions of 
experimental philosophy in the discussion on the role of intuitions has been (supposedly) 
concrete evidence in support of intuitional diversity and intuitional instability.  Some 
prominent philosophers have taken these results to mean that philosophical practice as 
conducted over millennia needs to be changed drastically and that in fact one of the main 
methods (reliance on intuitions) used over the last 2400 years has “been a terrible mistake” 
(Stich, 2001). 
 
The role of intuitions in philosophy had been the subject of extensive debate before the 
emergence of experimental philosophy (Bealer, 1996, 2000; Cummins, 1998; Goldman & 
Pust, 1998; Gopnik & Schwitzgebel, 1998; Gutting, 1998; Kornblith, 1998; Osbeck, 1999; 
Ramsey, 1992; Shafir, 1998; E. Sosa, 1998; Stich, 1988; Wild, 1938; Wisniewski, 1998); 
however, the findings of experimental philosophers have given the debate a new urgency 
(Alexander, 2012; Alexander, Mallon, & Weinberg, 2010; Alexander & Weinberg, 2007; 
Buckwalter & Stich, 2013; Cappelen, 2012; Chudnoff, 2011; Cullen, 2010; Deutsch, 2009, 
2010; Dowell, 2008; Feltz, 2008, 2009a; Gendler, 2007; Goldman, 2007; Ichikawa, 2014; 
Levin, 2005; Liao, 2008; Mallon, Machery, Nichols, & Stich, 2009; Nagel, 2012; Nichols, 
2004; D. Sosa, 2006; E. Sosa, 2007, 2009; Stich, 2001; Symons, 2008; Weinberg et al., 
2001; Williamson, 2004; Wright, 2010). 
 
Intuitions play a unique role in philosophy that is very different from other disciplines.  We 
provide a closer account of the role of intuitions in Paper 1.  Briefly, intuitions are used as 
data points in philosophical theorizing.  There are numerous descriptions of this method 
and although these vary somewhat, an account of intuitions as data or evidence lies at the 
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core.  We will refer to this approach to philosophy as the Intuition as Evidence approach 
(IAE), following Liao (2008). 
 
A degree of uniformity of intuitions is of special importance for IAE because without it the 
practice would be on extremely unstable grounds.  The findings on intuitional diversity, 
many philosophers believe, would make it problematic for philosophers to rely on 
intuitions as a source of evidence.  If intuitions were to vary in this way, they would merely 
be reflective of cultural or socioeconomic background or gender rather than be informative 
on details of philosophical scenarios; this is the suggestion that a branch of experimental 
philosophy advances, following Weinberg et al. (2001).  
 
Given the important implications of the results and given all the debate that the 
experimental philosophy movement has prompted, we believed, when we started this 
project, that a careful examination of the findings was appropriate.  It is not that there had 
been a lack of engagement by philosophers with the findings of the experimental 
philosophy literature (Bengson, 2013; Cullen, 2010; Deutsch, 2009, 2010; Grundmann, 
2010; Liao, 2008; Nagel, 2012, 2013; Shieber, 2010; Weatherson, 2003; Williamson, 2004, 
2011).   
 
However, with some exceptions (Cullen, 2010; Nagel, 2013; Nagel, Juan, & Mar, 2013), a 
great majority of these responses had taken the findings as fact and begun their analysis and 
criticism from there.  When we first became interested in this topic in 2007, what had not 
been attempted were systematic replications of the experiments that these philosophers 
engaged with so intensely, to see if the effects actually existed.  We believed that a first 
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step in a close examination of the experimental philosophy literature entailed a test of the 
reproducibility of the reported findings. 
 
We wanted to test the reproducibility of a diverse set of results and so selected the 
following topics for examination: differences in epistemic intuitions cross-culturally and 
socioeconomically (Paper 1); gender differences on a range of intuitions (Paper 2); and 
finally, the instability of moral intuitions (Paper 3).  We were unable to reproduce most of 
these findings.  Concerns regarding the reproducibility of these findings should have been a 
first point of departure.  Replications should have been integral to a careful examination 
that should have taken place many years ago, before all the discussion that the findings 
prompted, before all the back and forth between proponents and opponents of the views 
expressed by some experimental philosophers and before all the lengthy discussions on the 
merits of specific articles as well as the merits of the movement as a whole (Alexander, 
2010; Feltz, 2009b; Ichikawa, 2012; Kauppinen, 2007; Nadelhoffer & Nahmias, 2007; 
Stich, 2013). 
 
When we started this project on the reproducibility of experimental findings, we could not 
find any discussions on replications in the published experimental philosophy literature or 
otherwise in more informal outlets such as blogs.  Replications were of little (or no) 
prominence in psychology and completely absent in experimental philosophy.  When we 
started our endeavor, it was before the current ‘crisis of confidence’ in psychology and 
somewhat ironically, conducting replications constituted a novel pursuit.  Replications in 
themselves are not necessarily original undertakings; however, when we started the work, 
the originality consisted in doing something that others neglected entirely.  As it turned out, 
some of the most cited and attention-grabbing papers in the field turned out to be non-
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reproducible; see Paper 1 (Seyedsayamdost, forthcoming) and Paper 2 (Seyedsayamdost, 
2014). 
 
In the early stages of our work, colleagues advised us against pursuing this project.  This 
advice stemmed from various considerations.  One, just like other researchers who engaged 
with experimental philosophers, these colleagues took the findings as given.  From this 
perspective, replications would have simply reaffirmed the findings and that would have 
been the end of the story without any fruitful outcomes.  Second, replications are 
notoriously difficult to publish.  Many of the most prestigious journals in psychology have 
policies against publishing replications (see Paper 4).  Had our studies successfully 
reproduced the findings of the original articles, it would have been impossible to publish 
this work and we would have simply ‘wasted’ an enormous amount of time and resources.  
When we started this project, it entailed a great amount of risk in terms of investing 
resources in something that was likely to be a ‘non-result’. 
 
Aside from advice from colleagues, we also had our own doubts.  For Paper 1 
(Seyedsayamdost, forthcoming) we examined Weinberg et al. (2001) on differences of 
epistemic intuitions based on cross-cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds.  This article 
had been extremely influential and the foundation on which a whole new subfield of 
philosophy had been built.  When we started data collection, the paper had been public for 
close to ten years and our best guess was that other researchers had already tested the 
robustness of the findings.  To our surprise, we could not find any replication attempts; 
however, it was very likely that any prior replication had been successful and hence had 
had little chance of being published or gaining any further attention in informal outlets such 
as blogs.     
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For Paper 2 (Seyedsayamdost, 2014) we examined Buckwalter & Stich (2013) on gender 
differences of intuitions.  The data in Buckwalter & Stich (2013) gave no indication that the 
findings may not have been reproducible.  Almost all of their experiments reported 
relatively large samples and the procedures were clearly outlined and seemed to be without 
flaws.  For all we knew, the results were likely to replicate successfully and that would 
have been the end of this pursuit. 
 
For Paper 3 we examined the instability of moral intuitions by attempting replication of 
(Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006) and (Zhong et al., 2010).  These articles were published in 
reputable psychology journals and except for the surprise factor, little else initially hinted at 
the non-reproducibility of the findings.  
 
When we first attained the results of Papers 1-3 (failures of replication), we were very 
surprised.  In fact, our first reaction was that there may have been flaws, either in our 
experimental procedures or our data analysis.  One of the reasons why all our reports, with 
the exception of the first part of Paper 3, are multi-study attempts is to a great extent 
because we did not trust our own initial findings.  After collecting new data and after re-
examining our data analyses multiple times, we made our findings public on the Social 
Science Research Network (SSRN) in 2012 (Seyedsayamdost, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c), 
always including a word of caution that our studies should not be taken as definitive and 
that our hope was that other researchers would attempt to independently replicate the 
findings in order to attain further verification.
1
 
 
                                                 
1
 Not all of our replication attempts failed; see results sections of Papers 1-3 and the thesis conclusion. 
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Since we uploaded our papers to SSRN in 2012, presented the work at conferences, and 
journals published our papers (Seyedsayamdost, 2014, forthcoming), a trend in replications 
has started in experimental philosophy; three examples that emerged in 2014 are (Adleberg, 
Thompson, & Nahmias, 2014; Kvanvig, 2014; Minsun & Yuan, ms).  We discuss the 
significance of this trend in some more detail in the thesis conclusion.  Furthermore, some 
of these groups attempted to independently replicate the papers we examined and have 
reproduced our findings (Adleberg et al., 2014; Minsun & Yuan, ms).  As further evidence 
of the reliability of our findings, Nagel and colleagues also report no effect of ethnicity and 
gender on epistemic intuitions (Nagel et al., 2013).
2
  There is now growing evidence that 
our findings are robust and that indeed some of the most cited and attention-grabbing 
papers in the field of experimental philosophy are not reproducible.  
 
To some extent the failures of replication should not have been completely unexpected and 
the fact that we were greatly surprised is at least partly because we were not familiar with 
the historical literature on the reproducibility of findings in psychology and certain other 
empirical fields.  It is not that we were carelessly neglectful of this literature.  This 
literature is simply not part of the basic training psychologists (or perhaps more generally, 
empirical scientists) receive.  The author of this thesis completed a two year fellowship in a 
psychology department and issues surrounding reproducibility were (and perhaps still are) 
just not a major concern, or a concern at all.  The current literature on reproducibility (some 
of which is addressed in the following papers) emerged in response to the current crisis, 
that is, after we embarked on our project and was not available to us when we conducted 
most of the work for Papers 1-3.  Any references in Papers 1-3 to the literature on 
                                                 
2
 In contrast to the other studies, this work was conducted independently of our efforts; Nagel and colleagues 
had not seen our findings before starting their work. 
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reproducibility (historical and current) in empirical fields was added in the later stages of 
manuscript submissions, close to two years after we made the findings public.   
 
Experimental philosophy is often described as the study of philosophical questions, using 
the tools of experimental psychology (Alexander, 2012; Knobe & Nichols, 2008; 
Nadelhoffer & Nahmias, 2007).  By importing the methods of experimental psychology, 
philosophers will likely import the problems of that field and one of the problems that has 
afflicted experimental psychology for some time is the high rate of false-positive results in 
the published literature (Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012; Ioannidis, 2005, 2012; 
Pashler & Harris, 2012).  As one researcher contends, in “several fields of investigation, 
including many areas of psychological science, perpetuated and unchallenged fallacies may 
comprise the majority of the circulating evidence” (Ioannidis, 2012, p. 645).   
 
In Paper 4 we review the literature on the problems of reproducibility in empirical fields 
with an emphasis on psychology, as it is the methods of this field that experimental 
philosophers have adopted.  In light of the shortcomings discussed in Paper 4, many 
researchers have suggested solutions to alleviate these problems.  Paper 5 provides a review 
of this literature and concludes with what we believe to be important components of any 
sustainable solution. 
 
We are presenting our papers in chronological order of time of composition and hence the 
literature review (typically presented first) is presented last in Papers 4 and 5 after the 
original findings are presented in Papers 1-3.  For one, this captures the development of our 
project better.  Our approach may have been somewhat different had we been familiar with 
the historical literature on reproducibility before conducting the work presented in Papers 
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1-3.  We have also decided to present the papers in chronological order because we believe 
that presenting the concrete findings of Papers 1-3 first, makes the materials of Papers 4 
and 5 more accessible.   
 
As our research progressed, we came to hold two objectives.  One, the initial aim, was to 
test the effects reported in the experimental philosophy literature: do people from different 
ethnic backgrounds really have different epistemic intuitions; do women and men really 
have different intuitions on common scenarios such as the Brain in the Vat and the Twin-
Earth cases?  The other objective was to demonstrate that replications are an important part 
of the scientific process and that without replications false positives are likely to persist and 
flourish in the published literature.  We hope that the trend of replication studies in 
experimental philosophy can persist and that this trend can prevent experimental 
philosophy from going down a similar path to some areas of psychology where false-
positive results likely make up the majority of published findings. 
 
We draw two conclusions from our work.  The first is that the instability of intuitions has 
been exaggerated by experimental philosophers.  Intuitions appear to be more uniform 
across different demographic groups and are generally more stable than the experimental 
philosophy literature indicates.  Whether intuitions should be considered legitimate data 
points in philosophical theorizing is a different question (which we will not engage with in 
this thesis); however, the argument that intuitions need to be discarded because they depend 
on ‘arbitrary’ factors such as ethnicity, socioeconomic background, or gender does not 
seem tenable anymore.   
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The second conclusion is that experimental philosophy, like some other empirical fields, 
needs a better system to test for the reproducibility of published findings.  As it stands, 
current research practices lead to an overproduction of false positives; be it simply as a 
result of standard statistical procedures (Ioannidis, 2005; Pashler & Harris, 2012) or 
questionable research practices (Fanelli, 2009; John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012; 
Martinson, Anderson, & De Vries, 2005).  Unless changes are made to the current research-
publication system, this overproduction is likely to continue, in experimental philosophy as 
well as other disciplines. 
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Paper 1: On Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions3 
Failure of Replication 
Abstract 
The field of experimental philosophy has received considerable attention, essentially for 
producing results that seem highly counter-intuitive and at the same time question some of 
the fundamental methods used in philosophy.  One of the earlier influential papers that gave 
rise to the experimental philosophy movement titled “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions” 
by Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich (2001), reported that 
respondents displayed different epistemic intuitions depending on their ethnic background 
as well as socioeconomic status.  These findings, if robust, would have important 
implications for philosophical methodology in general and epistemology in particular.  
Because of the important implication of its findings, Weinberg et al. (2001) has been very 
influential – currently with more than four hundred citations – and the subject of extensive 
debate.  Despite the paper’s significance and despite all the debates this paper has generated, 
there has not been a replication attempt of its results.  We collected data from four different 
sources (two on-line and two in-person) to replicate the experiments.  Despite several 
different data sets and in various cases larger sample sizes, we failed to detect significant 
differences between the above-mentioned groups.  Our results suggest that epistemic 
intuitions are more uniform across ethnic and socioeconomic groups than Weinberg et al. 
(2001) indicates.  Given our data, we believe that the notion of differences in epistemic 
intuitions among different ethnic and socioeconomic groups advanced by Weinberg et al. 
(2001) and accepted by many researchers needs to be corrected.  
                                                 
3
 The author would like to thank Susan Carey, Donal Cahill, all of the class teachers at the LSE who allocated 
class time for data collection, and all of the students who participated.  This paper is forthcoming in Episteme 
(Cambridge University Press) with some minor changes.   
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The field of experimental philosophy has received considerable attention, essentially for 
producing results that seem highly counter-intuitive and at the same time question some of 
the fundamental methods used in philosophy.  Much of the debate that this field has 
generated focuses on the role of intuitions in philosophy.  This debate predates the 
emergence of experimental philosophy; however, the findings of experimental philosophers 
have given the debate a new urgency.  One of the major contributions of experimental 
philosophy in the discussion on the role of intuitions in philosophy has been concrete 
evidence in support of intuitional diversity, i.e. the idea that intuitions vary systematically 
depending on variables such as ethnicity, socioeconomic status, gender, or age (Buckwalter 
& Stich, 2013; Colaço et al., 2014; Weinberg et al., 2001).  
 
The paper by Weinberg and colleagues titled “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions” 
published in 2001, in large part gave rise to the movement now known as experimental 
philosophy.  The authors of the paper presented data showing that the epistemic intuitions 
of East and South Asian individuals differed significantly from that of their ‘Western’ 
counterparts on a host of scenarios.  Since publication of this paper, “one of the most 
widely discussed kinds of intuitional diversity has been cultural diversity,” namely the 
hypothesis that “our philosophical intuitions seem to be sensitive to our own cultural 
background” (Alexander, 2012, p. 72).  In addition to data on cultural diversity, Weinberg 
et al. also provided data indicating that individuals from different socioeconomic 
backgrounds have differing epistemic intuitions.   
 
Weinberg et al. (2001) has been very influential and the topic of extensive discussion.  
However, despite its influence and reach, the findings presented in the paper have not been 
tested for their reproducibility but typically simply accepted as given.  We collected data 
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through four different sources, two on-line and two in-person where we presented 
individuals with scenarios identical in wording to those asked by Weinberg et al. (2001).  
Our results strongly suggest that epistemic intuitions are not significantly different among 
individuals from different ethnic or socioeconomic backgrounds.  Given our findings, we 
have to conclude that the results of Weinberg et al. (2001) are not reproducible and hence 
the notion of intuitional diversity for these cases among different ethnic and socioeconomic 
groups needs to be corrected. 
 
We will advance as follows.  The next section gives an introduction on the role of intuitions 
in philosophy.  We keep this section somewhat brief.  Given the central role that intuitions 
play in philosophy, this issue has been the subject of extensive debate and any attempt at 
providing a comprehensive review here would not do the topic justice.  For some of the 
discussions that took place before the emergence of experimental philosophy, see (Bealer, 
1996, 2000; Cummins, 1998; Goldman & Pust, 1998; Gopnik & Schwitzgebel, 1998; 
Gutting, 1998; Kornblith, 1998; Osbeck, 1999; Ramsey, 1992; Shafir, 1998; E. Sosa, 1998; 
Stich, 1988; Wild, 1938; Wisniewski, 1998); and for some of these debates in the context 
of experimental philosophy, see (Alexander, 2012; Alexander et al., 2010; Alexander & 
Weinberg, 2007; Buckwalter & Stich, 2013; Cappelen, 2012; Chudnoff, 2011; Cullen, 
2010; Deutsch, 2009, 2010; Dowell, 2008; Feltz, 2008, 2009a; Gendler, 2007; Goldman, 
2007; Ichikawa, 2014; Levin, 2005; Liao, 2008; Mallon et al., 2009; Nagel, 2012; Nichols, 
2004; D. Sosa, 2006; E. Sosa, 2007, 2009; Stich, 2001; Symons, 2008; Weinberg et al., 
2001; Williamson, 2004; Wright, 2010).  Section 1.2 examines ethnic differences.  
Subsection 1 of Section 1.2 provides a description of our four data sources and the methods 
and materials used in data collection.  In subsection 2 of Section 1.2 we present our results 
for East Asian and Western participants and compare these to the outcomes of Weinberg et 
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al. (2001).  In the third subsection of Section 1.2 we present the results for South Asian and 
Western participants and again compare these to the relevant data from Weinberg et al. 
(2001).  Section 1.3 examines intuitional differences based on socioeconomic status.  
Section 1.4 briefly discusses statistical power and Section 1.5 concludes with a discussion. 
 
1.1: Intuitions and Philosophy 
 
Intuitions play a unique role in philosophy that is very different from other disciplines.  
Levin (2005), for example, writes that the use of intuitions “has been characteristic, perhaps 
definitive, of philosophical argumentation throughout its history” (Levin, 2005, p. 194).  
Goldman (2007) explains that “one thing that distinguishes philosophical methodology 
from the methodology of the sciences is its extensive and avowed reliance on intuition” 
(Goldman, 2007, p. 1).  In the philosophical literature, intuitions are (broadly understood) 
simply “spontaneous judgments” to philosophical questions (Stich, 2001).  For example, 
when presented with a scenario, a reader’s direct reaction as to whether something was 
morally permissible or not counts as an intuition.  Often, individuals do not immediately 
have an explanation for these reactions.  For example, a person may judge one action as 
permissible and another as impermissible, without being able to point out the relevant 
features (e.g. intention) that led to differences in judgments.  A common description of the 
use of intuitions in philosophy is as follows:  philosophers construct thought experiments 
and test their intuitive responses.  These intuitions serve as data points that are used to 
substantiate or challenge theories.  Within this framework “the role and corresponding 
epistemic status of intuitional evidence in philosophy is similar to the role and 
corresponding epistemic status of perceptual evidence in science” (Alexander, 2012, p. 11).  
There are numerous descriptions of this method and although these vary somewhat, an 
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account of intuition as data or evidence lies at the core.  We will refer to this approach to 
philosophy as the Intuition as Evidence approach (IAE), following Liao (2008). 
 
To fill in IAE further, consider the following two descriptions.  Stich (2001), who traces 
this methodology to Plato, writes that philosophers proceed 
 
to test normative claims against people’s spontaneous judgments about real and 
hypothetical cases. Contemporary philosophers often call these spontaneous 
judgments “intuitions.” If the normative claim and people’s intuitions agree, the 
claim is vindicated. But if […] a normative principle conflicts with people’s 
intuitions, then something has to give. Sometimes we may hold on to the normative 
claim and ignore a recalcitrant intuition. But if a normative principle conflicts with 
lots of intuitions or […] if it conflicts with an intuition that we would be very 
reluctant to give up, then Plato’s method requires that we reject the principle and try 
to come up with another one. (Stich, 2001, p. 36) 
 
Goldman (2007) describes. 
 
To decide what is knowledge, reference, identity, or causation […], philosophers 
routinely consider actual and hypothetical examples and ask whether these examples 
provide instances of the target category or concept. People’s mental responses to 
these examples are often called “intuitions” and these intuitions are treated as 
evidence for the correct answer. At a minimum, they are evidence for the examples’ 
being instances or non-instances of knowledge, references, causation, etc. Thus, 
intuitions play a particularly critical role in a certain sector of philosophical activity. 
(Goldman, 2007, p. 1) 
 
An exemplary instance of IAE often cited is Gettier’s 1963 paper titled “Is Justified True 
Belief Knowledge?” (Gettier, 1963).  At the time of Gettier’s writing – and further back to 
Plato (Burnyeat, 1990) – typical accounts equated knowledge with justified true belief.  
Gettier provided two thought experiments wherein although an individual was described to 
have justified true belief, readers did not have the intuition that this individual actually had 
knowledge.  Bealer (1996) summarizes that “at one time many people accepted the doctrine 
that knowledge is justified true belief. But today we have good evidence to the contrary, 
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namely, our intuitions that situations like those described in the Gettier literature are 
possible and that the relevant people in those situations would not know the things at issue” 
(Bealer, 1996, p. 122). 
 
What made Gettier’s examples convincing was that the intuitions they elicited were shared 
widely.  Goldman (2007) notes that it “was the fact that almost everybody who read 
Gettier’s examples shared the intuition that these were not instances of knowing. Had their 
intuitions been different, there would have been no discovery” (Goldman, 2007, p. 2).  A 
degree of uniformity of intuitions is of special importance for IAE because without it the 
practice would be on extremely unstable grounds.  The equivalent of this in scientific 
practice would be if data from experiments were to vary depending on who carried out the 
experiments.  Systematically differing intuitions based on individuals’ backgrounds such as 
ethnicity, socioeconomic status or gender, are often referred to as intuitional diversity.  As 
mentioned before, one of the major contributions of experimental philosophy to general 
philosophy has been the (alleged) concrete evidence in support of intuitional diversity.  
These findings, if robust, would make it very problematic for philosophers to rely on 
intuitions as a source of evidence.  If intuitions were to vary in this way, they would merely 
be reflective of cultural or socioeconomic background or gender rather than be informative 
on details of philosophical scenarios; this is the suggestion that Weinberg et al. (2001) 
advance.  
 
Given the important implications of the findings of Weinberg et al. (2001) for philosophical 
methodology, we set out to examine the experiments more closely.  In our paper we focus 
almost exclusively on Weinberg et al. (2001) and carry out an exact replication of its 
experiments.  There are several reasons for focusing on Weinberg et al. (2001).   
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First, at least according to some, Weinberg et al. (2001) gave rise to the movement now 
known as experimental philosophy (Koppl, 2011; Williamson, 2011) and it would be of 
historical interest if the findings that gave rise to this (now very popular) movement were 
non-reproducible.   
 
Secondly, and more importantly, Weinberg et al. (2001) has been very influential, currently 
with a citation count of 434.
4
  In addition to references in philosophy journals, the paper has 
also been cited in economics, law, and mathematics journals (Koppl, 2011; Löwe, Müller, 
& Müller-Hill, 2009; Pardo, 2005).  The paper also appeared in the edited volume 
Experimental Philosophy which is itself a popular and influential outlet.  To give a sense of 
the status this paper enjoys, Knobe (2007) in discussing intuitional diversity writes that 
“perhaps the most celebrated work in this vein is Weinberg, Nichols and Stich’s paper on 
intuitions about knowledge” (Knobe, 2007, p. 82).  As another example, Doris (2005) 
writes that “"Experimental philosophy" pertaining to various topics is now–happily–
appearing with increasing frequency […] The locus classicus is Weinberg, Nichols, and 
Stich (2001)” (Doris, 2005, p. 674).   
 
Because of this wide exposure, there are numerous instances in published papers and books 
citing Weinberg et al. (2001) as evidence that East and South Asian individuals have 
different epistemic intuitions from their Western counterparts.  In fact, this difference in 
intuitions is often treated as an established fact.  For example, Bishop & Trout (2005) write 
that “in a fascinating study, Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001) found that people in 
different cultural and socioeconomic groups make significantly different epistemic 
                                                 
4
 http://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=2305777674912570473&as_sdt=2005&sciodt=0,5&hl=en 
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judgments” (Bishop & Trout, 2005, p. 705).  Buckwalter (2010) notes that “famously, 
Weinberg et al. 2001 shows that […] divergence of intuition extends to the epistemic 
domain” (Buckwalter, 2010, p. 396).  Mallon et al. (2009) write that “Weinberg et al. found 
that there are indeed systematic cross-cultural differences in epistemic intuitions” (Mallon 
et al., 2009, p. 340).  There are numerous other examples of papers citing Weinberg et al. 
(2001) as evidence for intuitional diversity; for some of these, see (Alexander, 2012; 
Alexander & Weinberg, 2007; Beebe & Buckwalter, 2010; Feltz, 2009a; Knobe, 2007; 
Knobe & Nichols, 2008; Nadelhoffer & Nahmias, 2007; Zamzow & Nichols, 2009).  
Furthermore, in conversations with colleagues, we have also often heard this supposed 
difference in epistemic intuitions between different ethnic groups being treated as fact. 
 
Aside from this widespread acceptance of the results, many philosophers have engaged 
with the findings of Weinberg et al. (2001) and much effort has been expended in 
attempting to explain why the findings do not bear heavily on IAE or why despite the 
results, IAE is sufficiently robust as an approach to withstand intuitional diversity.  For 
some of these discussions, see (Deutsch, 2009, 2010; Grundmann, 2010; Liao, 2008; Nagel, 
2012; Shieber, 2010; Weatherson, 2003; Williamson, 2004, 2011).  However, responses 
(again, with some exceptions) have typically taken the findings of Weinberg et al. (2001) as 
a given and started their replies from there.   
 
The final reason for carrying out an exact replication of Weinberg et al. (2001) is the 
following.  Experimental philosophy uses the tools of experimental psychology to study 
questions of interest to philosophers.  By adopting these tools, philosophers have inevitably 
adopted some of the shortcomings of psychology as well.  Various fields of psychology 
currently face a ‘crisis of confidence’ which amounts to an overproduction of false-positive 
 28 
results in the published literature (Bakker et al., 2012; Ioannidis, 2005, 2012; Pashler & 
Harris, 2012; Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012).  There are several reasons for this, one of 
them being a lack of interest by researchers to conduct replications and relatedly an 
aversion by journals to publishing this kind of work (Bozarth & Roberts, 1972; Makel, 
Plucker, & Hegarty, 2012; Neuliep & Crandall, 1991; Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 2012).  We 
hope that by providing this data from our exact replication, we can contribute in small part 
to preventing experimental philosophy from going down a path similar to some of the areas 
of psychology.  We hope to show that there is an important role for replications in the 
scientific process.  Theoretical descriptions of the scientific process typically place a high 
value on carrying out replications and consider reproducibility integral to science (Braude, 
1979; Collins, 1992; Francis, 2012; Lamal, 1991; Nosek et al., 2012; Popper, 2002).  
However, this importance granted to replications in theory does not generally translate into 
practice (Amir & Sharon, 1991; Collins, 1992; Hendrick, 1991; Makel et al., 2012; Smith, 
1970).  Many psychologists agree that replications are critical in lowering the rate of false 
positives (Amir & Sharon, 1991; Koole & Lakens, 2012; Nosek et al., 2012; Pashler & 
Harris, 2012; Ritchie, Wiseman, & French, 2012b) and calls for more replications have 
been made frequently during various crises of the past decades.  However, in practice these 
calls have mostly remained unanswered – with some notable exceptions (Nosek, 2012) – 
and in experimental philosophy systematic replications were completely lacking until we 
started some of our efforts. 
 
Aside from what we believe to be the significance of Weinberg et al. (2001) and why we 
believed it warranted a full replication of its experiments, the authors of the paper, 
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themselves, underline the importance of their work by noting that their evidence, if robust,
5
 
shows that “a sizeable group of epistemological projects – a group which includes much of 
what has been done in epistemology in the analytic tradition – would be seriously 
undermined” (Weinberg et al., 2001, p. 429).  Furthermore, one of the co-authors writes 
that  “indeed, in light of these new findings some philosophers – I am one of them – have 
come to think that after 2400 years it may be time for philosophy to stop relying on Plato’s 
method” (Stich, 2001, p. 36).  These are strong claims (by the authors’ own admission) that 
need to be examined carefully.  Our paper is an attempt at a careful examination that we 
believe should have been carried out many years ago, before all the discussion that 
Weinberg et al. (2001) prompted, before all the back and forth between proponents and 
opponents of the views expressed in the paper and before all the effort was spent discussing 
the claims of the paper.   
 
1.2: Ethnicity and Epistemic Intuitions 
 
1.2.1: Methods and Materials 
 
The experiments for this paper were conducted between February 2011 and March 2012.  A 
first draft of this paper was uploaded to SSRN on October 29, 2012 (Seyedsayamdost, 
2012b).  First drafts of this paper were sent to conferences starting in July 2012. 
 
Scenarios 
 
                                                 
5
 Although Weinberg et al. (2001) make some very strong and definitive claims about intuitional diversity, the 
authors also point out in at least three instances that the robustness of their results is not a given.  
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Below are the scenarios as we presented them to participants.  All scenarios were taken 
from Weinberg et al. (2001).    
 
Car Case 
  
Bob has a friend, Jill, who has driven a Buick for many years.  Bob therefore thinks 
that Jill drives an American car.  He is not aware, however, that her Buick has 
recently been stolen, and he is also not aware that Jill has replaced it with a Pontiac, 
which is a different kind of American car.  Does Bob really know that Jill drives an 
American car, or does he only believe it? 
 
   REALLY KNOWS    ONLY BELIEVES 
  
We used the same wording in all of our surveys except for in Data Set 4 where we replaced 
the names of the cars from Buick and Pontiac to Toyota and Honda, respectively and also 
changed the origin of the cars from ‘American’ to ‘Japanese’, accordingly.    
 
Individualistic Truetemp Case 
 
One day Charles is suddenly knocked out by a falling rock, and his brain becomes 
re-wired so that he is always absolutely right whenever he estimates the temperature 
where he is.  Charles is completely unaware that his brain has been altered in this 
way.  A few weeks later, this brain re-wiring leads him to believe that it is 71 
degrees in his room.  Apart from his estimation, he has no other reasons to think that 
it is 71 degrees.  In fact, it is at that time 71 degrees in his room. 
 
Does Charles really know that it was 71 degrees in the room, or does he only 
believe it? 
    
   REALLY KNOWS    ONLY BELIEVES 
 
In addition to the Individualistic Truetemp case, Weinberg et al. (2001) also collected data 
on two variations named “Elders” and “Community Wide Truetemp” scenarios.  We did 
 31 
not collect data on these scenarios as Weinberg and colleagues themselves report no 
significant differences between different ethnic groups on these cases.   
 
Conspiracy Case 
 
It’s clear that smoking cigarettes increases the likelihood of getting cancer.  
However, there is now a great deal of evidence that just using nicotine by itself 
without smoking (for instance, by taking a nicotine pill) does not increase the 
likelihood of getting cancer.  Jim knows about this evidence and as a result, he 
believes that using nicotine does not increase the likelihood of getting cancer.  It is 
possible that the tobacco companies dishonestly made up and publicized this 
evidence that using nicotine does not increase the likelihood of cancer, and that the 
evidence is really false and misleading.  Now, the tobacco companies did not 
actually make up this evidence, but Jim is not aware of this fact. Does Jim really 
know that using nicotine doesn’t increase the likelihood of getting cancer, or does 
he only believe it? 
 
    REALLY KNOWS   ONLY BELIEVES 
 
Zebra Case 
 
Pat is at the zoo with his son, and when they come to the zebra cage, Pat points to 
the animal and says, “that’s a zebra.” Pat is right–it is a zebra. However, given the 
distance the spectators are from the cage, Pat would not be able to tell the difference 
between a real zebra and a mule that is cleverly disguised to look like a zebra. And 
if the animal had really been a cleverly disguised mule, Pat still would have thought 
that it was a zebra. Does Pat really know that the animal is a zebra, or does he only 
believe that it is? 
 
 
    REALLY KNOWS    ONLY BELIEVES 
 
 
Data Sets 
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Throughout the rest of this paper we will use the terms and abbreviations Western (W), 
East Asian (EA) and South Asian or Indian Subcontinent (SC), following the terminology 
in Weinberg et al. (2001) for consistency. 
 
Data Set 1 
 
Procedure 
For this data set we visited undergraduate classes at the London School of Economics 
(LSE).  Participation was voluntary although no one refused.  After a brief introduction, we 
handed out a one-page questionnaire.  Each student only saw one scenario.  We explained 
that there were several different questionnaires and that therefore some would complete the 
questionnaire faster than others.  We did hand out several different surveys but only one of 
them included a scenario surveying epistemic intuitions (the Car case).  In all, the whole 
process took about five minutes. 
 
We mainly visited philosophy classes, but, given the relatively small size of the philosophy 
department, we also visited some classes in the International Relations department to 
complement the data.  About 14 percent of the data came from non-philosophy classes.  We 
will provide a breakdown of the numbers in the results section.  There was no significant 
difference between data collected in philosophy and non-philosophy classes with p-exact = 
0.557 (N = 153). 
   
Participants 
We will provide the number of participants that fell into each one of the categories that we 
analyzed (EA, SC, and W) since this is the focus of our discussion.  Data set 1 consisted of 
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41 EAs, 35 SCs and 79Ws for a total sample of 155.  For the exact criteria used to 
categorize participants for all of the data sets in the current paper, see Appendix A.  
 
Scenarios Presented 
For this data set we only presented the Car case to participants.  
 
Data Set 2 
 
Procedure 
For our second study we used the resources at the London School of Economics’ 
Behavioural Research Lab (BRL).  The BRL compiles a database of individuals interested 
in participating in studies.  Participants then receive email notifications whenever studies 
are being conducted.  Individuals received 5 pounds sterling to participate in a 30-minute 
study that consisted of several different tasks including answering questions from a wide 
variety of different fields in philosophy.  Upon arrival, participants were given a brief 
introduction.  Then they were brought to a workstation in a computer lab where they started 
the survey. 
 
Participants 
This data set consisted of 60 Ws, 60 EAs, and 59 SCs for a total sample of 179. 
 
Scenarios Presented 
We surveyed the Truetemp and Conspiracy cases for this data set.   
   
Data Set 3 
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Procedure 
For the third data set we launched questionnaires on SurveyMonkey (SM) that consisted of 
six questions, the four described in Section 1.2.1 and two on semantic intuitions taken from 
Machery et al. (2004).  Participants sign up with SM and receive links to surveys from time 
to time.  For every survey completed, SM donates $0.50 to a charity of the participant’s 
choice.  In addition, participants are entered into a draw for a chance to win a $100 gift card 
of an online store.
6
  The first page of the survey was a brief introduction giving some 
background information.  This included, for example, that the survey was for an academic 
study and the approximate time the study would take.  After seeing the six questions, 
participants filled out a demographic questionnaire and finally there was also a text box to 
leave comments.    
 
Participants 
This data set consisted of 75 Ws, 36 EAs and 12 SCs for a total of 123. 
  
  
Scenarios Presented 
We tested all four scenarios in this data set.  We did not carry out significance tests for the 
SC samples, as these were too small. 
 
Data Set 4 
 
Procedure 
                                                 
6
 For more information, see https://contribute.surveymonkey.com/how-it-works 
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The data for this study was collected through Harvard University's Moral Sense Test (MST) 
website.
7
  Participants visited the MST website without being solicited and took part in the 
surveys that consisted of several different tasks and the Car scenario was included as a filler 
question.  Some of the tasks included watching video clips or visualizing certain situations.    
 
Participants 
This sample consisted of 193 Ws and 15 SCs.  Given the small sample of SCs, we mainly 
include this data set for completeness, as there was a statistical difference on the Car 
scenario.  
 
Scenarios Presented 
We only tested the Car case here.  We did not have sufficient EAs to carry out a meaningful 
comparison. 
 
1.2.2: Results for East Asians and Westerners 
 
When comparing EAs and Ws, Weinberg and colleagues found statistically significant 
differences for the Car and Truetemp scenarios; however, failed to find differences for the 
other two cases.  In our replication attempts, we did not attain a significant difference for 
any of the scenarios.  A summary table of the results, including the results of Weinberg et 
al. (2001), is presented below.
8
  All tests of the original as well as replication studies are 
two-sided.  In all tables, * denotes p < .05; ** denotes p < .01.
 
 
                                                 
7
 http://moral.wjh.harvard.edu/index2.html 
8
 Given that we did not detect a difference in our samples, we carried out post-hoc power analyses to 
determine whether our samples provided sufficient power.  For all power analyses in this paper, we took the 
original experiments as estimates of the population effect sizes.  Calculations were conducted according to 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). 
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Scenario Study N 
Ethn
icity 
n  
Response (%) 
power p-exact Really 
Knows 
Only 
Believes 
      
 
  
 
     
Car 
Weinberg et al. 89 
EA 23 56.5 43.5 
0.71 0.006
**
 
W 66 25.8 74.2 
Data Set 1 120 
EA 41 26.8 73.1 
0.90 0.146 
W 79 15.2 84.8 
Data Set 1 
(Philosophy Only)
9
 
102 
EA 35 22.9 77.1 
0.83 0.604 
W 67 17.9 82.1 
Data Set 3 111 
EA 36 22.2 77.8 
0.86 1.000 
W 75 22.7 77.3 
         
Ind. 
Truetemp 
  
Weinberg et al. 214 
EA 25 12.0 88.0 
0.55 0.020
*
 
W 189 32.3 67.7 
Data Set 2 60 
EA 31 16.1 83.9 
0.42 0.527 
W 29 24.1 75.9 
Data Set 3 111 
EA 36 27.8 72.2 
0.60 1.000 
W 75 29.3 70.7 
      
 
  
 
  
 
 
Conspiracy 
 
Weinberg et al. 
(Note 1)
      
 no sig. 
Data Set 2 66 
EA 31 9.7 90.3 
n/a
10
 0.713 
W 35  14.3 85.7 
Data Set 3 111 
EA 36 22.2 77.8 
n/a 0.800 
W 75  18.7 81.3 
  
  
   
 
 
 
 
Zebra 
Weinberg et al. 
(Note 1)
 
 
    
 no sig. 
Data Set 3 111 
EA 36 30.6 69.4 
n/a 0.346 
W 75 21.3 78.7 
Table 1.1: Epistemic Intuitions – EA and W 
 
Note 1: Weinberg et al. mention in their section on South Asians that there were no 
differences between EAs and Ws for the Conspiracy and Zebra cases; however, they do not 
provide any further details of sample sizes or p values.  
 
                                                 
9
 Data Set 1 was collected in philosophy as well as political science classes.  This row presents data collected 
in philosophy classes only. 
10
 We do not present power values in instances where Weinberg et al. do not give details of their outcomes 
because this leaves us without estimates of the population effect size.  
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The Car scenario produced the clearest disparity between the original and replication 
studies.  Whereas Weinberg and colleagues report that a majority of East Asian individuals 
had the ‘Really Knows’ intuition, none of the replication studies reproduced this finding.  
In fact, in one of the replication studies (Data Set 3) the percentage of ‘Really Knows’ 
answers was slightly lower for East Asians than for Western participants.  Although the 
percentage of ‘Really Knows’ answers for EAs was higher than for Ws in Data Set 1, the 
difference was nowhere as extreme as the result that Weinberg et al. (2001) report.   
 
With regard to the other scenarios, we did not detect a difference for Truetemp, whereas 
Weinberg et al. did and Weinberg et al. themselves did not detect any differences for the 
last two scenarios (Conspiracy and Zebra) and neither did we; that is, there was no disparity 
between the original and replication studies. 
 
1.2.3: Results for South Asians and Westerners 
 
With the exception of the Truetemp case, Weinberg et al. report significant differences 
between SCs and Ws for all of the four scenarios.  Our findings, again, paint a different 
picture. 
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Scenario Study N Ethnicity n  
Response (%) 
power p-exact Really 
Knows 
Only 
Believes 
         
 
    
Car 
Weinberg et 
al. 
89 
SC 23 60.9  39.1 
0.83 0.002
**
 
W 66 25.8 74.2 
Data Set 1 113 
SC 34 14.7 85.3 
0.93 1.000 
W  79 15.2 84.8 
Data Set 1 
(Philosophy Only) 
96 
SC 29 10.3 89.7 
0.89 0.542 
W 67 17.9 82.1 
Data Set 4 208 
SC 15 46.7 53.3 
0.77 0.011
*
 
W 193 17.1 82.9 
         
Ind. 
Truetemp 
Weinberg et 
al. 
(Note 2)
      
 n/a 
Data Set 2 54 
SC  25 24.0 76.0 
n/a 1.000 
W  29 24.1 75.9 
         
 
 
 
 
Conspiracy 
 
Weinberg et 
al. 
89 
SC  25 28.0 64.0 
0.46 0.025
*
 
W  66  10.6 89.4 
Data Set 2 69 
SC  34 11.8 88.2 
0.42 1.000 
W  35  14.3 85.7 
         
Zebra 
Weinberg et 
al. 
86 
SC  24 50.0 50.0 
0.34 0.05
*
 
W 62 30.6 69.4 
Replication 
(Note 3)
 
 
    
 no data 
Table 1.2: Epistemic Intuitions – SC and W 
 
Note 2: Weinberg and colleagues do not specify whether there was or was not a significant 
difference for this scenario.  
Note 3: We did not have sufficient data for this scenario in any of our data sets to carry out 
a meaningful comparison.  
 
The Car case, again, produced the largest difference between the original and replication 
studies.  The outcome of the Car case Weinberg et al. present for SCs and Ws is similar to 
the sample of EAs and Ws.  In both cases a larger number of non-Western participants 
respond that Bob really knows that Jill drives an American car, whereas this relationship is 
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reversed for Western participants.  Western individuals, as opposed to non-Westerners, 
according to the original paper, predominantly choose the ‘Only believes’ answer choice.  
Data Set 1, where data was collected in classrooms and was closest to the original paper in 
procedures, yielded a very different outcome.  The percentages of South Asian and Western 
participants were almost identical.  We did attain a significant difference between these two 
groups for Data Set 4; however, as mentioned before, the SC sample size was small and the 
outcome may not be very meaningful.  We mainly include this data for completeness. 
 
1.3: Socioeconomic Status and Epistemic Intuitions 
 
In their section on socioeconomic backgrounds, Weinberg et al. (2001) conclude that 
socioeconomic status (SES) has a “major impact on subjects’ epistemic intuitions” 
(Weinberg et al., 2001, p. 453).  As a reason for why individuals from different SES may 
have different epistemic intuitions, Weinberg and colleagues write that a “possibility is that 
high SES subjects accept much weaker knowledge-defeaters than low SES subjects because 
low SES subjects have lower minimum standards for knowledge” (Weinberg et al., 2001, p. 
447).  The authors continue that “whatever the explanation turns out to be, the data we’ve 
reported look to be yet another serious embarrassment for the advocates of [IAE]” 
(Weinberg et al., 2001, p. 447).  Our replication attempts do not support this conclusion.    
 
For this part of the paper, we setup two questionnaires on SurveyMonkey (SM) to test the 
epistemic intuitions of individuals from different socioeconomic backgrounds on the same 
scenarios for which Weinberg et al. (2001) report differences. 
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1.3.1: Methods and Materials 
 
Scenarios 
We used the same wording as in Weinberg et al. (2001) for all of the scenarios with the 
exception of the Car case where we replaced the names of the cars from Buick and Pontiac 
to Ford and Jeep, respectively, in order to make the scenario more current.
11
  For the 
wording of the scenarios, see Section 1.2.1.
 
 
 
Procedure 
The SM procedure was the same as described in Section 1.2.1.  Participants sign up with 
SM and receive links to surveys from time to time.  For every survey completed, SM 
donates $0.50 to a charity of the participant’s choice.  In addition, participants are entered 
into a draw for a chance to win a $100 gift card of an online retailer. 
 
We set up two templates on SM, which we will refer to as Template 1 and Template 2 from 
here on.  The templates were identical with the exception of the order in which the 
scenarios were presented.  Participants first saw a brief introduction stating that we were 
conducting the questionnaire for an academic research project in the field of philosophy.  
Next, participants saw the four scenarios from Section 1.2.1.  For the first template the 
order was Conspiracy, Zebra, Truetemp and Car.  In the second template the order was 
Zebra, Car, Conspiracy, and Truetemp.  The survey concluded with a very short 
                                                 
11
 This may not have been a good choice of car brands, as Jeep became the subject of the U.S. presidential 
campaign, which we were not aware of at the time.  There were some campaign ads circulating about Jeep’s 
purchase by Fiat, an Italian company and that production of Jeep vehicles would be outsourced to China.  
This topic remained an issue after the elections.  For further details, see http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/statements/2012/oct/30/mitt-romney/mitt-romney-obama-chrysler-sold-italians-china-ame/ and 
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2012/dec/12/lie-year-2012-Romney-Jeeps-China/ . 
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demographic section where we asked about ethnic background and education.
12
  SM 
furthermore provided us data on gender, age range, household income
13
 and education.  For 
our data analysis we used data on education that participants submitted in our surveys and 
not data provided by SM.  There was some discrepancy between the two sources, which 
may be partly explained by the fact that the information is not always up to date with SM 
and individuals make progress in their educational attainments.  
 
Weinberg et al. (2001) reported significant differences for the Conspiracy and the Zebra 
cases (from their paper, it appears that the other two scenarios did not yield a difference, 
although this is not mentioned explicitly).  Hence, we chose the specific sequence 
mentioned above in order to have the Conspiracy case as the first scenario in Template 1 
and the Zebra case as the first scenario in Template 2.  
 
Participants 
Weinberg and colleagues used an education proxy to categorize participants as either low 
or high socioeconomic status.
14
  Individuals who indicated that they had never attended 
college were classified as low SES, whereas participants who indicated that they had taken 
one or more courses at the college level were classified as high SES.  We used the same 
criteria in classifying participants. 
 
The survey with the second template was initiated about two weeks after the first survey 
and we asked SM not to send out invitations to any of the individuals who participated in 
                                                 
12
 These SM runs are entirely different from Data Set 3 presented in Section 1.2.  
13
 Data on income was missing for one of the data sets, namely for the low SES data from Template 1. 
14
 In order to maintain continuity with the terminology used in Weinberg et al. (2001), we will use the terms 
low and high SES throughout this paper.  
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the first questionnaire.  For the first template, we asked SM to restrict participation to 
individuals who were 24 years of age or older.  We were concerned that given the criteria 
for distinguishing low and high SES by an education proxy we might get many young 
respondents for the low SES group.  After reviewing the data for the first template, we 
realized that our concern was unfounded and we omitted this requirement for the second 
template. 
 
For Template 1 our sample consisted of 107 participants (38 low SES, 69 high SES).  For 
Template 2 our sample consisted of 134 individuals (47 low SES, 87 high SES). 
 
1.3.2: Results for Socioeconomic Status 
 
A summary table of the results for socioeconomic status is presented below. 
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Scenario Study N SES n  
Response (%) 
power p-exact Really 
Knows 
Only 
Believes 
Car 
Weinberg et al. 
(Note 4)
 
 
    
 n/a 
Template 1 106 
low 38 44.7 55.3 
n/a 0.014
*
 
high 68 20.6 79.4 
Template 2 133 
low 46 23.9 76.1 
n/a 0.177 
high 87 35.6 64.4 
  
  
      
 
 
Truetemp 
 
Weinberg et al. 
(Note 4)
 
 
    
 n/a 
Template 1 106 
low 38 28.9 71.1 
n/a 0.211 
high 68 42.6 57.4 
Template 2 132 
low 45 33.3 66.7 
n/a 0.696 
high 87  29.9 70.1 
  
  
      
 
 
Conspiracy 
Weinberg et al. 59 
low 24 50.0  50.0 
0.74 0.007
**
 
high 35 17.1 82.9 
Template 1 107 
low 38 18.4 81.6 
0.94 0.790 
high 69 15.9 84.1 
Template 2 132 
low 45 22.2 77.8 
0.97 0.476 
high 87 16.1 83.9 
         
Zebra 
  
Weinberg et al. 58 
low 24 33.3 66.7 
0.44 0.038
*
 
high 34 11.8 88.2 
Template 1 106 
low 38 31.6 68.4 
0.72 0.824 
high 68 27.9 72.1 
Template 2 134 
low 47 27.7 72.3 
0.81 0.675 
high 87 23.0 77.0 
Table 1.3: Epistemic Intuitions – SES 
 
Note 4: Weinberg and colleagues do not state explicitly whether the Car and Truetemp 
scenarios yielded a significant difference or whether no data was collected.  The 
implication seems to be that data was collected but no difference was detected. 
 
Template 1 
For Template 1 none of the scenarios yielded a significant difference with the exception of 
the Car case.  
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Template 2 
In creating Template 2, we made some changes to the first template.  First, we changed the 
order in which the scenarios were presented.  Since Weinberg et al., in addition to the 
Conspiracy case also reported a significant difference for the Zebra scenario, we wanted 
this case to be placed at the beginning, so we could rule out order effects.  Second, given 
that there was a significant difference for the Car case in our first template we wanted to 
place this scenario further toward the beginning of the survey in order to rule out 
participation fatigue as one of the reasons for the difference.  
 
There are several things worth pointing out here.  First, the Zebra case, again, did not yield 
a significant difference when presented as the first scenario.  In fact, this time none of the 
scenarios yielded a significant difference.  The Car case produced the closest p value to a 
significant level (p = 0.177); however, this time the direction of the responses was reversed 
when compared to the first template.  This time low SES participants had a lower 
percentage of ‘Really Knows’ responses than high SES participants, which contradicts 
Weinberg et al.’s explanation about the role of socioeconomic status on epistemic 
judgments. 
 
Further Analyses 
There were various other tests we ran to examine the data.  First, we ran an analysis of the 
combined data from the two templates.  Despite the large sample (N = 240), none of the 
scenarios produced a significant outcome or a p value close to 0.10.  We do not think that 
this is merely because of cancelling order effects (the Car case was significant in Template 
1, however, the direction was reversed in Template 2 and these effects could be cancelling 
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each other out when combining the data).  Rather it seems to be that despite the increased 
sample size, we still could not find a difference between the two groups.  We tested for 
order effects by comparing the data of the two templates and the only scenario that 
produced a significant difference was the Car case.  
 
Next, we wanted to see if there would be a significant difference between the two groups if 
we made the difference in educational attainment greater.  So, for the high SES group we 
included in our next analysis only participants who had at least completed their Bachelor’s 
degree.  Low SES was coded as before.  The outcomes (statistical significance) for the four 
scenarios did not change for either one of the templates.    
   
We further ran an analysis excluding participants where the self-reported education level 
and that provided by SM did not match.  None of the outcomes changed.  Finally, we ran 
analyses excluding all participants who fell in the age range 18-29.  This made the Car case 
for the second template significant (again, in the opposite direction of Template 1) but 
otherwise all other outcomes remained unchanged. 
 
1.4 Statistical Power 
 
With one exception (data on Conspiracy for SC/W), in all experiments on ethnicity and 
socioeconomic background, we had at least one sample where we attained greater power
15
 
than Weinberg and colleagues.  If differences actually existed for these conditions, it would 
have been more likely that our data would have revealed it.  In several cases the power we 
attained was above 0.90 and so clearly above the 0.80 conventional mark.  In two instances 
                                                 
15
 Power is the probability of detecting an effect in the sample if an effect exists in the population. 
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(Truetemp for EA/W and Conspiracy for SC/W) we fell short of attaining this conventional 
mark; however, in these cases Weinberg et al. had comparable values.  Overall, if effects 
existed in the population, our data would have been more likely to detect these, yet we still 
failed to find statistical differences.  
 
1.5: Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
 
Discussion 
When discussing our results at conferences or informally with colleagues, we have been 
told on multiple occasions that given that differences between East Asian and Western 
participants have been shown for some cognitive tasks in the Nisbett literature (Nisbett, 
Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001), it should not come as a surprise that these ethnic groups 
may exhibit different epistemic intuitions.  There are two responses that we can offer.  First, 
differences in cognitive tasks in some areas do not necessarily predict differences in other 
areas.  Secondly, and much more importantly, although the work of Nisbett and colleagues 
has been influential, there have been some notable failures of replication in that field 
(Evans, Rotello, Li, & Rayner, 2009; Lu, Daneman, & Reingold; Miellet, Zhou, He, 
Rodger, & Caldara, 2010; Rayner, Castelhano, & Yang, 2009; Rayner, Li, Williams, Cave, 
& Well, 2007; Zhou, Gotch, Zhou, & Liu, 2008).  As it stands, more work is needed to 
attain a better picture.  
 
Additionally, Nagel et al. (2013) report a failed conceptual replication of Weinberg et al. 
(2001) on the effect of ethnicity on epistemic intuitions.
16
  Further, one experiment in Turri 
                                                 
16
 We describe this as a conceptual replication as the procedures in Nagel et al. (2013) differed from those of 
the reference experiment.  The answer options participants could choose from were also different. 
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(2013) can be understood as a failed conceptual replication of Weinberg et al. (2001).
17
  
Finally, at the time of preparing this manuscript’s final changes, we were contacted by a 
group who informed us that they tested the Car scenario (exact replication) in Northeast 
United States and this group, too, was unable to reproduce the effect reported by Weinberg 
and colleagues  (Minsun & Yuan, ms).  In all, there is now increasing evidence that the 
findings of Weinberg et al. (2001) are not reproducible.  The main reason we see for why 
there is a difference between the original and replication studies and hence the failures of 
replication is that the sample sizes in the original study are relatively small; on average the 
sample size of the EA/SC and low SES samples is 24.   
 
Weinberg and colleagues draw some strong conclusions in their article as well as elsewhere.  
For example, one of the co-authors (Stich) writes that “high SES Americans and low SES 
Americans have different epistemic intuitions! Moreover, in many cases these differences 
are quite dramatic.”  Stich continues that a “reasonable conclusion is that philosophy’s 
2400 year long infatuation with Plato’s method has been a terrible mistake” (Stich, 2001, p. 
38).  The simple takeaway from our study is that much more and better evidence is needed 
to make such strong claims.  
 
For the most part of this paper we attempted to remain neutral on the debate concerning the 
role of intuitions in philosophy.  We wanted the focus to be on the findings presented; 
however, our findings and the results of the three groups mentioned above all weaken one 
of the main arguments experimental philosophy has brought against the use of intuitions in 
philosophy, in as far as these arguments relied on Weinberg et al. (2001). 
                                                 
17
 Turri (2013) is not a straightforward conceptual replication of Weinberg et al. (2001) because Turri 
attempts to manipulate participants’ responses.  However, in the context of our work, Turri (2013) suggests 
uniformity of epistemic intuitions among South Asian and Western individuals.   
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It may be the case that had we surveyed individuals born and residing in East and South 
Asia, we may have detected responses different from Westerners.
18
  However, there are 
several things to note in this regard.  Turri (2013) surveyed Indians living in India on a 
Gettier-type
19
 scenario and although the form of presentation and the scenario were 
different from Weinberg et al. (2001), Turri found much lower rates of ‘Really Knows’ 
answer choices (15%) and also no difference when compared to an American population, 
96% of whom indicated English as their native language.  For the exact details, see Turri 
(2013).  Minsun & Yuan (ms) compared EAs and Ws as categorized on the basis of native 
language on the Car scenario and found no significant difference (Minsun & Yuan, ms).  
These studies indicate that there may not be a difference between Ws and East/South 
Asians born and residing in their native countries.  However, strictly speaking, this possible 
difference cannot be ruled out, as we do not have the necessary data. 
 
This discussion, though, is beyond the scope of Weinberg et al. (2001) and consequently 
the current paper.  Weinberg et al. surveyed a population living and studying in the New 
Jersey area; the target-population was ethnic minorities living in the West and for these 
they found big differences when compared to individuals of European descent.  This is 
mainly what makes Weinberg et al.’s results so surprising.  It would not be too surprising if 
surveying a population that is very unlike Ws yielded different outcomes, as one is likely to 
introduce problems of language and task comprehension, amongst others.  What gives 
Weinberg et al. (2001) its surprise factor is that merely surveying participants from 
                                                 
18
 This was pointed out by an anonymous referee. 
19
 For lack of a better term, with Gettier-type or Gettier-style scenarios, we broadly refer to cases involving 
unwarranted or disputed knowledge, including all the cases presented by Weinberg et al. (2001) and discussed 
in this paper.  
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different ethnic backgrounds within the same university yielded different intuitive 
responses.  And demographic variables such as ethnicity, most philosophers believe, should 
not factor into evaluations of philosophical questions.      
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to test the robustness of the results of Weinberg et al. (2001).  
Despite collecting data from various sources and attaining larger samples in several of the 
cases, we failed to detect differences on epistemic intuitions between participants from 
different ethnic backgrounds and socioeconomic statuses.  With regard to socioeconomic 
status, we collected data from 241 individuals on four scenarios surveying epistemic 
intuitions for which Weinberg et al. (2001) report significant differences (on two of the 
cases) but failed to find statistically significant differences.  Given this data, we do not 
believe that socioeconomic status by itself has an impact on epistemic intuitions for the 
cases evaluated in this paper.  With regard to ethnicity and epistemic intuitions, even 
though we collected data in several different settings, we could not replicate the results of 
Weinberg et al. (2001) on differences among individuals from East Asian, South Asian and 
Western backgrounds.  Given this data, we do not believe that ethnic background has a 
significant impact on epistemic intuitions.   
 
As mentioned in the Introduction, Weinberg et al. (2001) has been an influential paper, 
which has received numerous citations.  In discussions with other researchers in the field, it 
often appears that it is an established fact that epistemic intuitions differ among ethnic 
groups.  Our data suggests that this conception needs to be corrected.  Despite the important 
implications of the original paper and despite the debate surrounding the findings of 
Weinberg et al. (2001) for conducting epistemology as well as philosophy in general, there 
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had not been exact replication attempts of Weinberg et al. (2001) to test the robustness of 
the reported results until 2011 when we started out on this project.  As mentioned above, 
since then more work has been done in this area and all studies produced results in line with 
our findings.  One of our initial hopes for sharing our data was that other researchers would 
study the cases, so that the original results could be verified independently.  We further 
hope that other researchers will find it worthwhile to examine these cases and we hope to 
have provided a useful reference point with this paper.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page Intentionally Left Blank   
 52 
Paper 2: On Gender and Philosophical Intuitions20  
Failure of Replication and Other Negative Results 
Abstract 
In their paper titled “Gender and Philosophical Intuition,” Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen 
Stich argue that the intuitions of women and men differ significantly on various types of 
philosophical questions (Buckwalter & Stich, 2013).  Furthermore, men’s intuitions, so the 
authors claim, are more in line with traditionally accepted solutions of classical problems.  
This inherent bias, so the argument goes, is one of the factors that leads more men than 
women to pursue degrees and careers in philosophy.  These findings have received a 
considerable amount of attention and the paper is to appear in the second edition of 
Experimental Philosophy (Knobe & Nichols, 2013), which itself is an influential outlet.  
Given the exposure of these results, we attempted to replicate three of the classes of 
questions that Buckwalter & Stich review in their paper and for which they report 
significant differences.  We failed to replicate the results using several different sources for 
data collection (one being the same as in the original article).  Given our results, we do not 
believe the outcomes from Buckwalter & Stich (2013) that we examined for this paper to 
be robust.  That is, men and women do not seem to differ significantly in their intuitive 
responses to these philosophical scenarios. 
  
                                                 
20
 The author would like to thank Wesley Buckwalter and Stephen Stich for providing the details of the 
procedures and methods of their experiments and answering any questions we had.  We would also like to 
thank Donal Cahill for his help with the Moral Sense Test and all class teachers at the University of London 
who provided us with class time to collect data and all students who participated.  This paper was published in 
Philosophical Psychology (Taylor & Francis) in 2014 with some minor changes. 
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2.1: Introduction and Overview 
 
In their paper titled “Gender and Philosophical Intuition” Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen 
Stich approach the issue of gender disparity in the academic field of philosophy from a 
novel perspective.  The authors argue that women’s and men’s intuitions differ in various 
areas of philosophy and more importantly that men's intuitions are more in line with 
commonly accepted solutions of classical philosophical problems.  This inherent bias, so 
the authors claim, is one of the factors that leads more men than women to pursue degrees 
and careers in philosophy. 
  
In supporting their claims, the authors review some recent findings in experimental 
philosophy (Section 3 of their paper) and also present new data for four classical scenarios 
in which they report men and women to respond differently to survey questions (Section 
3.8).  The thought experiments in this section (3.8) include the Brain in the Vat, Hilary 
Putnam’s Twin Earth, John Searle’s Chinese Room and the Plank of Carneades.  These 
cases are of special interest to Buckwalter & Stich because these are cases that 
undergraduate students typically encounter early on in introductory philosophy classes.  
Hence, so the authors argue, if women’s responses differ from commonly accepted 
solutions of philosophical problems, women could be discouraged from pursuing further 
philosophy courses.  In addition to the scenarios of section 3.8, in section 3.2 Buckwalter & 
Stich present results on compatibilism, physicalism and dualism cases where women and 
men are also reported to answer questions differently.  We attempted direct replications of 
Sections 3.2 and 3.8 of Buckwalter & Stich (2013) and our results indicate that the 
outcomes reported by Buckwalter & Stich are not robust.   
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Furthermore, in Section 3.1 Buckwalter & Stich report differences between men and 
women for two variations of a Gettier style scenario.  We had collected data on four 
Gettier-type scenarios for another study and analyzed the results to see how women and 
men answered the questions.  Although this is a conceptual replication,
21
 we believe the 
results to be relevant for this paper.  Once again, our data showed no difference between the 
two groups of respondents. 
 
Apart from the replication of the scenarios mentioned above, we also wanted to address 
what we believed to be a shortcoming in Buckwalter & Stich’s choices of samples in the 
context of explaining the gender gap in professional philosophy as stemming from 
diverging intuitions among women and men.  For their statistical analyses, Buckwalter & 
Stich restricted their data to respondents who had not taken any philosophy courses before.  
This is because the authors aimed to test unbiased responses.  That is, responses that had 
not been influenced by previous study of the cases, which would have likely been 'male-
centrist'.  However, by filtering in this way Buckwalter & Stich tested samples of 
individuals who had no interest or perhaps possibility to pursue philosophy as a degree or 
career in the first place.  Hence, the sample does not adequately represent the pool of 
students who set out for careers in philosophy.   
 
To address this issue, we wanted to analyze individuals who had taken at least some 
philosophy courses but whose views had not been biased by previous study of the cases.  
We collected information on how many philosophy courses participants had taken and 
                                                 
21
 We distinguish a conceptual replication from a direct replication in that the latter tests a previously reported 
effect by presenting survey participants with scenarios identical in wording to the original study.  By contrast, 
a conceptual replication tests previously reported effects through scenarios of the same type but not 
necessarily by using identical cases.  In this instance, Section 2.4 offers a conceptual replication where we did 
not use identical scenarios to those reported by Starmans and Friedman but instead used Gettier-type 
scenarios that examined similar concepts. 
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whether they had seen the scenarios before.  In this way we could evaluate the answers of 
respondents who had been interested enough to take at least some philosophy classes and 
may have pursued philosophy as a career but had not seen and not been familiar with these 
scenarios.
22
  Here again, we failed to detect a difference between men and women.   
 
We do not necessarily disagree with the general approach Buckwalter & Stich attempt to 
take.  Intuitive responses to survey questions may (or may not) differ among men and 
women for certain problems and this may (or may not) lead more women or men to pursue 
certain fields and careers.  This is an issue that needs to be examined empirically.  
However, if much rests on the results that Buckwalter & Stich present in section 3 of their 
paper, then the failure of replication weakens their argument.  Buckwalter & Stich suggest 
that differences in intuitions may be one factor among many that influence career choices in 
philosophy and if our results are robust, this factor plays a smaller role (if any) than the 
findings in Buckwalter & Stich (2013) suggest. 
 
Our main aim for this paper was to test to the robustness of the results in Buckwalter & 
Stich (2013) and to share our results with others, especially researchers who may want to 
build on the results of Buckwalter & Stich (2013).  It is because of this focus that we will 
keep the discussion on the role and importance of intuitions in philosophical endeavors to a 
minimum.  Furthermore, others have provided a better overview and discussion on the issue 
than we can present here (Alexander, 2012; Buckwalter & Stich, 2013; Kauppinen, 2007; 
Knobe & Nichols, 2008; Nadelhoffer & Nahmias, 2007; Nagel, 2012); also, see Section 1.1 
of Paper 1.   
                                                 
22
 It may be possible to bias individuals in philosophy courses other than through direct exposure of some 
cases.  Nevertheless, by restricting samples as described, we could at least rule out that participants had been 
influenced directly. 
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This paper is structured as follows.  In the next section we will examine the classical 
philosophical scenarios presented in Section 3.8 of Buckwalter & Stich (2013).  
Specifically, in Section 2.2.1 we present the procedures and methods of data collection.  In 
Section 2.2.2 we present the results for the replication experiments and in Section 2.2.3 we 
present data on participants who had taken some philosophy classes but who indicated that 
they had not seen the cases before.  In Section 2.3 we examine the scenarios for 
Compatibilism, Physicalism and Dualism that Buckwalter & Stich describe in their Section 
3.2.  In Section 2.3.1 we present the replication results and in Section 2.3.2 we examine the 
sample of respondents with some philosophy background but who were not familiar with 
the scenarios.  In Section 2.4 we present the data for Gettier-type scenarios.  In the final 
section we provide some concluding remarks and a brief discussion on possible reasons for 
why replication failed. 
 
The data for this paper was collected between April 2011 and June 2012.  A first draft of 
this paper was uploaded to SSRN on October 24, 2012 (Seyedsayamdost, 2012a).  First 
drafts of this paper were sent to conferences starting in July 2012.  
  
2.2: Classical Thought Experiments 
 
For this section we collected data though two different sources.  The first was through 
Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MT) following the methodology in Buckwalter & Stich 
(2013).  For the second data set we ran surveys on SurveyMonkey (SM).  We will describe 
the procedures of data collection for all data sets first and then present the results in the 
subsequent sub-section.  This way we can compare the outcomes more readily. 
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2.2.1: Procedures and Methods of Data Collection 
 
Mechanical Turk 
We tried to follow Buckwalter & Stich’s methodology as closely as possible.  In the 
Human Intelligence Task (HIT) description respondents were given some brief information 
about what the task entailed, the approximate time needed to complete the task and some 
other information required by MT.  Once participants accepted a task, they were shown one 
of the four scenarios presented in section 3.8 of Buckwalter & Stich (2013).  The scenario 
was followed by a comprehension check question (the same that was asked in the original 
paper) and a question asking for a response on a seven-point scale.  The one difference we 
made to Buckwalter & Stich’s outline is the inclusion of another question asking whether 
respondents had seen the scenario before.  We included this question for two reasons.  First, 
as mentioned in the introduction, we wanted to test participants with a background in 
philosophy but who were not familiar with these scenarios.  Second, Buckwalter & Stich 
had run these same scenarios on MT and we wanted to be able to exclude respondents who 
may have had seen these cases in a run conducted by Buckwalter & Stich.   
 
Following these three questions, there was a brief demographic questionnaire where we 
asked about gender, age, education, number of philosophy courses taken, native language, 
ethnic background, level of religiosity and income in this order.  Finally, we also had a 
section where participants could leave comments.   
 
SurveyMonkey 
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Our second data set was collected through SurveyMonkey (SM).  We collected data in two 
different runs that were conducted about six months apart.  We believe the surveys to be 
similar enough that aggregating the data is unproblematic; however, we will also present 
the breakdown for each survey.  The main difference between the two surveys was the 
number of scenarios presented to participants.  In the first survey participants saw eight 
scenarios pseudo-randomized, whereas in the second data set participants only saw four 
scenarios.  With the exception of one case, the questions were the same in both surveys, 
just that in the shorter version the scenarios were split up into two different questionnaires.  
Each question in a survey was shown on a new page and the setup of the questions was the 
same as in MT.  The demographic section was more comprehensive in the first SM survey.  
Survey invitations were sent out to the general population within the United States.  For 
more information of participation details, see https://contribute.surveymonkey.com/how-it-
works.   
 
2.2.2: Results 
  
Before we report our results, we will briefly present summaries of Buckwalter & Stich’s 
outcomes in order to make comparisons easier.   
 
Brain in the Vat: Original Results 
 
The first case that Buckwalter & Stich present in their section 3.8 is the Brain in the Vat 
scenario.  The exact wording is as follows.
 23
 
 
                                                 
23
 All scenarios in this section are taken from Buckwalter & Stich (2013). 
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George and Omar are roommates, and enjoy having late-night ‘philosophical’ 
discussions.  One such night Omar argues, “At some point in time, like, the year 
2300, the medical and computer sciences will be able to simulate the real world 
very convincingly.  They will be able to grow a brain without a body, and hook it up 
to a supercomputer in just the right way so that the brain has experiences exactly as 
if it were a real person walking around in a real world, talking to other people.  The 
brain would believe it was a real person walking around in a real world, except that 
it would be wrong.  Instead it’s just stuck in a virtual world, with no actual legs to 
walk and with no other actual people to talk to.  And here’s the thing: how could 
you ever tell that it isn’t really the year 2300 now, and that you’re not really a 
virtual-reality brain? If you were a virtual-reality brain, after all, everything would 
look and feel exactly the same to you as it does now! George thinks for a minute, 
and then replies: “But, look, here are my legs”.  He points down to his legs.  “If I 
were a virtual-reality brain, I wouldn’t have any legs really, I’d only just be a 
disembodied brain.  But I know I have legs, just look at them! So I must be a real 
person, and not a virtual-reality brain, because only real people have real legs.  So 
I’ll continue to believe that I’m not a virtual-reality brain.” 
George and Omar are actually real humans in the actual real world today, and so 
neither of them are virtual-reality brains, which means that George’s belief is true. 
 
Following the scenario and a comprehension check question, participants were presented 
with the sentence, “George knows that he is not a virtual-reality brain.”  Subsequently, 
participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement/disagreement on a seven-point 
scale, where the leftmost option was marked “Completely Disagree” the midpoint labeled “In 
Between” and the rightmost option marked “Completely Agree” (Completely Disagree = 1, In 
Between = 4, Completely Agree = 7). 
 
Buckwalter & Stich report for N = 63 (Male = 24, Female = 39) a mean male score of 5.62 
(SD = 1.97) and a female mean score of 6.72 (SD = 0.76).  An independent-samples t-test 
comparing men and women yielded t(61) = -3.12 with p < 0.01 and d = 0.81.
24
    
 
Brain in the Vat: Replication Results 
                                                 
24
 Summaries of data for the original outcomes are taken from Buckwalter & Stich (2013).  All tests in the 
original as well as replication studies are two-sided. 
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Mechanical Turk  
For our data analysis we used the same filters as Buckwalter & Stich and excluded 
participants if they 1) answered the comprehension check question incorrectly, 2) finished 
the questionnaire in less than 30 seconds, 3) their native language was not English and 4) 
had taken some philosophy courses.   
 
Our data for a sample of 114 individuals (58 Female and 56 Male) resulted in a mean score 
of 5.25 (SD = 2.24) for men and a mean score of 5.86 (SD = 1.85) for women.  We 
conducted an independent-samples t-test for men’s and women’s responses which yielded: 
t(107) = -1.59 (equal variance not assumed), p = 0.115.
25
  Despite a sample that was close 
to twice as large as that of Buckwalter & Stich, we did not detect a difference at the 10% 
level. 
 
SurveyMonkey 
The overall result for the Brain in the Vat scenario from our SurveyMonkey data is as 
follows.  N = 100 (Male = 51, Female = 49).  Male: M = 5.78, SD = 1.86.  Female: M = 
5.61, SD = 1.82.  An independent-samples t-test comparing men and women yielded: t(98) 
= 0.455), p = 0.650.
26
 
 
                                                 
25
 We will refer to the groups as women/men and female/male interchangeably as female/male is how we 
asked for gender in the demographic part of our surveys. 
26
 See Appendix B for the breakdown of the individual surveys. 
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What stands out from the three data sets is the high value for women’s mean response 
(6.72) in Buckwalter & Stich (2013).  Following is a visual presentation for the outcomes 
of the three procedures.
27
  
 
 
Figure 2.1a: Brain in the Vat – Original
28
 
 
 
Figure 2.1b: Brain in the Vat – MT 
 
Figure 2.1c: Brain in the Vat – SM 
 
 
Statistical Power 
The statistical power of the Brain in the Vat data set from Buckwalter & Stich (2013) with 
a sample of 63 participants, an effect size of d = 0.81 and an alpha level of 0.05 came out to 
                                                 
27
 We used the same scale ranges for the charts as in Buckwalter & Stich (2013) for better comparison.  Also 
in keeping with Buckwalter & Stich’s layout, our error bars represent S.E. +/- 1. 
28
 All charts of the original outcomes in this paper are taken from Buckwalter & Stich (2013).  The charts 
have been adapted for clarity and to match the style of the replication charts. 
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0.87.
29
  Using d = 0.81 as the population effect size, the replication attempt from the MT 
and SM datasets achieved a power of 0.99 and 0.98, respectively.  Although Buckwalter & 
Stich attain an adequate power according to the conventional 0.80 mark, our data sets had 
considerably greater power to detect a difference between men and women, if one existed.  
If a difference existed between women and men at the 5% level (given a population effect 
size as drawn from Buckwalter & Stich (2013)), our data would have had a 99% (or 98%) 
likelihood of detecting it, yet in both data sets replication failed.   
 
Twin Earth 
 
Next, Buckwalter & Stich present results for the Twin Earth scenario.  The exact wording 
reads as follows. 
 
Suppose that elsewhere in the universe there is a planet called “Twin-Earth”.  Twin-
Earth looks exactly like our Earth in virtually all respects.  It is populated by twin 
equivalents to every person and thing here on our Earth, and even revolves around a 
star that appears to be exactly like our sun. 
Oscar grows up here on our Earth, while someone exactly like Oscar, who we can call 
“Twin-Oscar”, lives on Twin-Earth.  Oscar and Twin-Oscar both go through life having 
the same experiences, and both perceive their environment in exactly the same way.  
They look and act completely alike, and even experience the same emotions. 
In fact, there is only one difference between these two planets.  The difference is 
that on Earth the stuff that fills the lakes and rivers and that people and animals 
drink is H2O, while on Twin Earth, the stuff that fills the lakes and rivers and that 
people and animals drink is another chemical compound, XYZ, that to the naked 
eye looks completely indistinguishable from the H2O on Earth.  H2O and XYZ also 
taste exactly the same, and both have the ability to quench thirst and to sustain life. 
However, Oscar and Twin-Oscar both live before the development of modern 
science, and they have no idea about chemistry or molecular composition.  When 
they go for a swim, both Oscar and Twin-Oscar point to the liquid in the lake and 
                                                 
29
 Power analyses were conducted following (Faul et al., 2007). 
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call it “water” even though on Earth that liquid is made up of H2O, and on Twin- 
Earth it is made up of XYZ. 
 
After reading the scenario and answering a comprehension check question, participants 
were asked the following question: 
 
When Oscar and Twin-Oscar say "water" do they mean the same thing, or different 
things? 
 
Participants then entered their response on a seven-point scale where the leftmost option 
was marked “they mean different things,” the midpoint labeled “in between” and the 
rightmost option marked “they mean the same thing” (they mean different things = 1, in 
between = 4, they mean the same thing = 7).   
 
Twin Earth: Original Results 
 
The outcome reported by Buckwalter & Stich is the following: N = 84 (Male = 35, Female 
= 49).  Male: M = 5.63, SD = 2.21.  Female: M = 4.49, SD = 2.42.  Independent-samples t-
test: t(82) = 2.21, p < 0.05, d = 0.49. 
 
Twin Earth: Replication Results 
 
Mechanical Turk 
In our MT sample there was no significant difference among men and women, and in fact 
women had a higher average mean than men.
30
  We used the same criteria as in the Brain in 
                                                 
30
 It should be noted that in the original study, women, more than men, tended to give the ‘standard’ or ‘male-
centrist’ response.  Buckwalter & Stich do not comment on whether this undermines their overall hypothesis 
to a degree. 
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the Vat case to exclude participants from analysis: N = 117 (Male = 65, Female = 52).  
Male: M = 5.22, SD = 2.35.  Female: M = 5.46, SD = 2.11.  Independent-samples t-test: 
t(115) = -0.589, p = 0.557.   
 
SurveyMonkey 
The sample we collected through SurveyMonkey also did not yield a significant difference 
on the standard cut off points: N = 85 (Male = 40, Female = 45).  Male: M = 5.88, SD = 
2.07.  Female: M = 5.22, SD = 2.57.  Independent-samples t-test: t(82) = 1.30 (equal 
variances not assumed), p = 0.20.  Below is a graphical presentation for the outcomes of the 
Twin Earth procedures.  
 
 
Figure 2.2a: Twin Earth – Original 
 
 
Figure 2.2b: Twin Earth – MT 
  
Figure 2.2c: Twin Earth – SM 
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Statistical Power 
The power achieved by Buckwalter & Stich for their Twin-Earth data set equals 0.59.  
Taking Buckwalter & Stich’s effect size as that of the population, our MT and SM samples 
yielded power values of 0.74 and 0.60, respectively.  The MT sample comes close to the 
0.80 convention and both of the replication samples achieve a greater power, although the 
SM sample does so only marginally.  The MT sample had considerably greater power than 
the original study to detect a difference, yet again replication failed.     
 
Chinese Room 
 
The Chinese Room scenario was presented to individuals in the following way. 
Jenny is a native English speaker who can only speak English.  She is locked in a 
room full of boxes of Chinese symbols, together with an instruction manual written 
in English for manipulating the symbols.  People from outside the room send in 
notes on pieces of paper with Chinese symbols written on them, which unknown to 
Jenny, are questions in Chinese.  Jenny’s job is to look through her manual until she 
finds the symbols that look exactly like the ones written on the pieces of paper.  
When she finds that string of symbols, the manual will tell her what new string of 
symbols to write down, and send to the people outside the room. 
By following the instructions in the manual, Jenny is able to give the correct 
answers to the questions.  The system consisting of Jenny and the instruction 
manual that she is using can be thought of as an unusual sort of computer.  Jenny 
gets so good at following the instructions in the manual, that from the point of view 
of any one outside the room who speaks Chinese, her responses are absolutely 
indistinguishable from those of Chinese speakers. 
 
After reading the scenario and answering a comprehension check question, participants saw 
the statement 
The computational system consisting of Jenny and her instruction manual 
understands the Chinese written on the notes. 
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Respondents were then asked to indicate their level of agreement/disagreement on a seven-
point scale identical to the one displayed in the Brain in the Vat scenario where the leftmost 
choice was labeled “Completely Disagree,” the midpoint was marked “In Between” and the 
rightmost option was labeled “Completely Agree” (Completely Disagree = 1, In Between = 
4, Completely Agree = 7).   
 
Chinese Room: Original Results 
Buckwalter & Stich report for N = 127 (Male = 54, Female = 73) Male: M = 4.13, SD = 
2.47.  Female: M = 3.25, SD = 2.36 (d = 0.37).  Independent-samples t-test: t(125) = 2.05, p 
< 0.05 
 
Chinese Room: Replication Results 
 
Mechanical Turk 
There was no difference in our MT sample for the Chinese Room thought experiment.  In 
fact, both group means were identical to two decimals at 3.31.  The details are as follows:  
N = 103 (Male = 48, Female = 55).  Male: M = 3.31, SD = 2.19.  Female: M = 3.31, SD = 
2.02.  Independent-samples t-test: t(101) = 0.008, p = 0.993.   
 
SurveyMonkey 
There was no significant difference in our SurveyMonkey sample either:  N = 80 (Male = 
35, Female = 45).  Male: M = 3.66, SD = 2.59.  Female: M = 3.82, SD = 2.38.  Independent-
samples t-test: t(78) = -0.296, p = 0.768.  For a graphical presentation of the outcomes, see 
below.   
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Figure 2.3a: Chinese Room – Original
 
 
Figure 2.3b: Chinese Room – MT 
 
Figure 2.3c: Chinese Room – SM 
 
 
Statistical Power 
The original data set by Buckwalter & Stich achieved a power of 0.53.  The replication 
experiments from MT and SM achieved power values of 0.46 and 0.37, respectively.  All 
three studies were underpowered in this instance. 
 
Plank of Carneades 
 
The Plank of Carneades scenario participants were asked to consider was as follows.  
There are two shipwrecked sailors, Jamie and Ricki.  They both see a small plank 
that can only support one of them and both of them swim desperately towards it.  
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Jamie gets to the plank first.  Ricki, who is stronger and is going to drown, pushes 
Jamie off and away from the plank and, thus, ultimately, causes Jamie to drown.  
Ricki gets on the plank and is later saved by a rescue team. 
 
After responding to a comprehension question, participants were asked, “How morally 
blameworthy is Ricki for what he did?” 
 
Participants answered on a seven-item scale, with the leftmost anchor labeled “not at all 
blameworthy” the midpoint labeled “in between” and the rightmost anchor labeled 
“extremely blameworthy” (not at all blameworthy = 1, in between = 4, extremely 
blameworthy = 7).   
 
Plank of Carneades: Original Results 
 
Buckwalter & Stich report for N = 110 (Male = 37, Female = 73).  Male: M = 4.95, SD = 
2.07.  Female: M = 5.64, SD = 1.35 (d = 0.42).  Independent-samples t-test: t(108) = -
2.13, p < 0.05.   
 
Plank of Carneades: Replication Results 
 
Mechanical Turk 
Our MT data yielded no significant difference for N = 156 (Male = 70, Female = 86).  
Male: M = 5.20, SD = 1.55.  Female: M = 5.51, SD = 1.44.  Independent-samples t-test: 
t(154) = -1.302, p = 0.195. 
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SurveyMonkey  
Similarly with the SurveyMonkey data, our sample showed no significant difference:  N 
= 98 (Male = 48, Female = 50).  Male: M = 5.85, SD = 1.46.  Female: M = 5.62, SD = 
1.71.  Independent Samples t-test: t(96) = 0.727, p = 0.469.  For a graphical presentation, 
see below. 
 
 
Figure 2.4a: Plank of Carneades – Original 
 
 
  
Figure 2.4b: Plank of Carneades – MT 
  
Figure 2.4c: Plank of Carneades – SM 
 
Statistical Power 
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The statistical power achieved by Buckwalter & Stich was 0.54.  The replication samples 
from MT and SM attained power values of 0.74 and 0.54, respectively.  Here again, the 
MT sample achieved a much higher power than the original study and would have been 
much more likely to detect a difference, if one existed. 
  
Leaving aside the Brain in the Vat scenario, the average power achieved by Buckwalter 
& Stich for the other cases was relatively low at 0.55.  Given this value, even if an effect 
actually existed for all three scenarios, the likelihood of having detected all of them with 
the samples of the original study would have been just somewhat better than 12%.  In the 
great majority of runs we would expect at least one out of the three scenarios to yield a 
false negative (failure to detect an effect where one exists).  Others have pointed out that 
there is some evidence that Buckwalter & Stich selectively reported experiments that 
yielded positive results but neglected to mention conditions where women and men 
showed no differences (Nahmias, 2013).  This could explain the somewhat unexpected 
findings, despite low power values.    
 
Further Analyses 
Given that we had collected data on whether respondents had seen the scenarios before, 
we also carried out statistical analyses excluding participants who had seen the scenarios 
prior to participating in our surveys.  An independent-samples t-test for the two groups 
yielded a significant difference for the Brain in the Vat scenario only.  The other 
scenarios remained non-significant.  For the details of the tests, see Appendix C.   
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2.2.3: Some Philosophy Background but Cases Not Seen Before 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, we believe that the respondents Buckwalter & Stich 
selected for their analysis is not quite adequate for the purpose of examining the gender 
gap in professional philosophy.  The reason is that anyone who had taken at least one or 
more philosophy courses was excluded from analysis.  This leaves a sample of 
respondents who never had an interest or perhaps possibility to pursue philosophy in an 
academic setting.  
 
In the context of Buckwalter & Stich’s discussion on who chooses to pursue philosophy 
as a degree or career, we thought it useful to examine those respondents who had taken 
some philosophy classes but indicated that they had not seen the scenarios before.  This 
way we wanted to attain a sample of individuals who had been interested and had the 
possibility to pursue philosophy in an academic setting but who were unbiased by 
previous (possibly ‘male-centrist’) discussions of the cases.  Filtering in this way would 
also reduce some amount of noise given that now respondents had more in common in 
terms of their educational background.   
 
To summarize, the criteria that had to be met for participants to be included in the 
analysis here were 1) comprehension check was answered correctly, 2) time spent to 
complete the task was not less than 30 seconds, 3) native language was English, 4) 
indicated that they had not seen the scenarios before and 5) indicated number of classes 
were between one and three.  In specific, in the demographic section of the surveys we 
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asked how many philosophy courses respondents had taken and the answer choices 
provided were ‘0’, ‘1 to 3’, ‘4 to 6’ and ‘> 6’.  This was the same for all surveys with the 
exception of the Chinese Room scenario where we asked whether participants had taken 
any philosophy courses and the answer choices were ‘Yes’ and ‘No’.  Respondents had to 
have chosen ‘Yes’ (in addition to fulfilling the other criteria) to be included in the 
analysis provided below. 
 
For this group of respondents, again, there were no statistically significant differences 
between women and men.  The data in this section is drawn from the Mechanical Turk 
data sets.  The samples for the SurveyMonkey data were relatively small after filtering in 
this way.  None of the scenarios from SM yielded a significant difference and hence we 
will not present the outcomes here.  We present the summary of the outcomes and graphs 
for the Mechanical Turk data below. 
 
Brain in the Vat: One to Three Philosophy Courses (MT) 
N = 126 (Male = 85, Female = 41).  Male: M = 4.95, SD = 2.37.  Female: M = 5.68, SD = 
1.82.  Independent Samples t-test: t(124) = -1.74, p = 0.085.   
 
Twin-Earth: One to Three Philosophy Courses (MT) 
N = 88 (Male = 57, Female = 31).  Male: M = 5.23, SD = 2.13.  Female: M = 5.29, SD = 
1.99.  Independent-samples t-test: t(86) = -0.134, p = 0.894. 
 
Chinese Room: More than One Philosophy Course (MT) 
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N = 77 (Male = 32, Female = 45).  Male: M = 3.22, SD = 2.00.  Female: M = 3.33, SD = 
1.78.  Independent-samples t-test: t(75) = -0.264, p = 0.792. 
 
Plank of Carneades: One to three Philosophy Courses (MT) 
N = 190 (Male = 99, Female = 91).  Male: M = 5.39, SD = 1.60.  Female: M = 5.71, SD = 
1.46.  Independent-samples t-test: t(188) = -1.438, p = 0.152. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5a: Brain in the Vat - One to Three 
Philosophy Courses (MT) 
 
 
Figure 2.5b: Twin Earth – One to Three 
Philosophy Courses (MT) 
 
 
Figure 2.5c: Chinese Room – One to Three 
Philosophy Courses (MT) 
 
 
Figure 2.5d: Plank of Carneades – One to 
Three Philosophy Courses (MT) 
 
 
Statistical Power 
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Lacking a better estimate of the population effect sizes, we used the sample effect sizes 
from Buckwalter & Stich (2013) as presented in section 2.2.2 above.  The power values 
for Brain in the Vat, Twin Earth, Chinese Room and Plank of Carneades came out to 
0.99, 0.58, 0.35, and 0.82, respectively.  The Twin Earth and especially the Chinese 
Room samples were underpowered when using the indicated effect sizes.  The Plank of 
Carneades sample had adequate power to detect a difference between women and men, 
had one existed.  The power value for the Brain in the Vat scenario was again very high 
at 0.99 and yet again we failed to detect a difference. 
  
We will provide a brief discussion of these results in the concluding section of the paper.  
Next, we will discuss section 3.2 of Buckwalter & Stich (2013) where the authors present 
results taken from Geoffrey Holtzman on compatibilism, materialism and dualism.  
  
2.3: Compatibilism, Materialism, and Dualism 
 
2.3.1 Results 
 
For the scenarios in this section we collected data through SurveyMonkey.  The method 
of data collection is the same as described in section 2.2.1.  
  
Compatibilism 
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The first case presented by Buckwalter & Stich is a scenario eliciting intuitions on a 
compatibilism thought experiment.  The scenario reads as follows. 
 
Suppose Scientists figure out the exact state of the universe during the Big Bang, 
and figure out all the laws of physics as well.  They put this information into a 
computer, and the computer perfectly predicts everything that has ever happened.  
In other words, they prove that everything that happens, has to happen exactly 
that way because of the laws of physics and everything that’s come before.  In this 
case, is a person free to choose whether or not to murder someone? 
 
Respondents could select either answer choice ‘Yes’ or ‘No’.  Holtzman only included 
participants with no prior background in formal philosophy in the data analysis.  The 
outcome Buckwalter & Stich report for Fisher’s exact test comparing women and men is 
p < 0.0005, N = 192 (102 male, 90 female) and d = 0.58.  Sixty-three percent of women 
responded that in this scenario a person is free to choose to murder, whereas only 35% of 
men gave this answer.   
 
Replication Results: SM 
Using the same filter as Holtzman, we failed to attain a significant difference among men 
and women.  Our sample consisted of 92 participants with 50 of those being female and 
42 male.  A chi-square test yielded χ2 = 0.652, p = 0.419.31  
 
                                                 
31
 Throughout this paper we will report the results for chi-square tests when none of the cells have an 
expected count of less than five and will conduct Fisher’s exact tests otherwise. 
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Figure 2.6a: Compatibilism – Original Results 
 
  Figure 2.6b: Compatibilism – Replication 
Results (SM) 
 
In our sample the percentage of men answering yes was also 35; however, the percentage 
of women who answered yes was 45.  That is, women still had a higher percentage of 
‘yes’ responses, though, not by as much as in Holtzman’s data.  Also, for our sample, 
both groups had a majority of ‘no’ responses as opposed to Holtzman’s sample where 
women had a higher percentage of ‘yes’ than ‘no’ responses.   
 
Physicalism 
 
The next case that Buckwalter & Stich discuss reads as follows. 
   
Suppose you meet a man from the future who knows everything there is to know 
about science.  He tells you that he doesn’t like apples, and says that though he 
has never eaten one, he has figured out what apples taste like just by studying the 
relevant science.  Could he know what apples taste like without ever having eaten 
one? 
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Again, the possible answer choices were ‘Yes’ or ‘No’.  Buckwalter & Stich report a 
Fisher’s exact test with p < 0.005, d = 0.50 and N = 195 (93 women and 102 men).  
Thirty-nine percent of male participants answered ‘Yes’ but only 17% of women 
answered so.  
  
Replication Results: SM 
As before, we excluded from analysis participants who had taken one or more philosophy 
courses.  The data yielded no statistically significant difference among women and men. 
N = 101 (49 Male, 52 Female), Fisher’s exact test yielded p = 0.518 (one cell had 
expected count < 5).  
 
Figure 2.7a: Physicalism – Original Results 
 
Figure 2.7b: Physicalism – Replication Results 
(SM) 
 
Dualism 
 
The dualism scenario Holtzman presented to participants reads as follows.  
Suppose neurologists are able to identify every part and every connection in the 
human brain.  Working with a team of computer scientists, they then build a robot 
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that has a complete electronic replica of the human brain.  Could this robot 
experience love? 
 
The results presented by Buckwalter & Stich are the following: N = 185 (87 women, 98 
men) Fisher’s exact test yielded p = 0.016 (d = 0.37).   
 
Replication Results: SM 
A chi-square test for 137 participants (65 Male, 72 Female) yielded χ2 = 0.090, p = 0.764. 
 
Figure 2.8a: Dualism – Original Results 
  
Figure 2.8b: Dualism – Replication Results 
(SM) 
 
Statistical Power 
The power achieved by Holtzman for the Compatibilism, Physicalism, and Dualism cases 
was 0.97, 0.92, and 0.69, respectively.  Taking the sample proportions from Holtzman as 
the population proportions, the replication samples attained power values of 0.72, 0.65, 
and 0.56 in the same order.  Our samples for all three scenarios were smaller than those 
of Holtzman.  It may be that our data did not provide the necessary power to detect a 
difference.  However, since we shared our results with other researchers, we have been 
informed that others have also been unable to replicate these outcomes (see thesis 
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conclusion).  In this context, we believe the results of this section to be meaningful, 
despite the relatively low power achieved.   
 
2.3.2: Some Philosophy Background but Cases Not Seen Before 
 
We ran a similar analysis as in section 2.2.3 where we filtered for respondents who had 
taken one to three philosophy courses but who indicated that they had not seen the 
scenarios before (and whose native language was English).   
 
Once again there was no significant difference between women and men on any of the 
three scenarios though the samples for the Compatibilism and Physicalism cases were 
relatively small after filtering.  We will omit the power analysis because of the small 
sample sizes.  See summary results below.   
 
Compatibilism 
A chi-square test yielded χ2 = 1.227, p = 0.268; N = 53 (Male = 30, Female = 23) 
 
Physicalism  
N = 58 (24 Male, 34 Female), Fisher’s exact test yielded p = 0.432 (two cells had 
expected count < 5). 
 
Dualism 
N = 111 (54 Male, 57 Female), a chi-square test yielded χ2 = 0.021, p = 0.789. 
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Figure 2.9a: Compatibilism – One to Three 
Philosophy Courses (SM) 
 
Figure 2.9b: Physicalism – One to Three 
Philosophy Courses (SM) 
 
Figure 2.9c: Dualism – One to Three 
Philosophy Courses (SM) 
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2.4. Epistemic Intuitions 
 
In section 3.1 of their paper, Buckwalter & Stich present data for experiments conducted 
by Starmans & Friedman on Gettier-style cases (Starmans & Friedman, 2009).  Although 
we did not collect data on the exact same scenarios, we had conducted surveys on four 
other Gettier-type questions for a different study (Paper 1).  We did not find significant 
differences among women and men in these experiments.  We were interested in 
examining the exact cases that Starmans & Friedman used; however, upon contacting the 
authors, we were told that the authors themselves were unable to replicate the outcomes 
in further studies
32
 and hence we did not see a need to carry out direct replications.  In 
addition to Starmans & Friedman’s own failed attempt to replicate their experiments, the 
results presented below offer strong evidence that women and men do not have different 
epistemic intuitions. 
  
2.4.1: Procedures 
 
For this section we collected data mainly through SurveyMonkey.  However, for one of 
the scenarios (Car) we also collected data in classes at the LSE and online through 
Harvard University’s Moral Sense Test (MST) website.33  The procedures and methods 
for data collection for the SurveyMonkey samples were the same as described in Section 
2.2.1.   
 
                                                 
32
 Personal correspondence with Ori Friedman, 5/1/2012. 
33
 http://moral.wjh.harvard.edu/index2.html 
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The in-class procedure was relatively straightforward.  With the permission of class 
teachers, we visited classes in the departments of Philosophy, Logic & Scientific Method 
and International Relations and after a brief introduction handed out a short one-page 
questionnaire.  Participation was voluntary, although no one refused to answer.  The 
whole procedure took about five minutes.  
 
The procedure for the MST data was as follows.  MST is setup so that people visit the 
site without an invitation or otherwise being solicited.  After some initial instructions 
participants were forwarded to the questionnaires.  The data presented in this section was 
drawn from several different surveys.  The Gettier scenario was used as a filler question 
for surveys where we were testing several different effects.   
 
2.4.2: Results 
 
Original Results 
The scenario that Starmans & Friedman presented to respondents reads as follows. 
 
Peter is in his locked apartment, and is reading.  He decides to have a shower.  He 
puts his book down on the coffee table.  Then he takes off his watch, and also puts 
it on the coffee table.  Then he goes into the bathroom.  As Peter’s shower begins, 
a burglar silently breaks into Peter’s apartment.  The burglar takes Peter’s watch, 
puts a cheap plastic watch in its place, and then leaves.  Peter has only been in the 
shower for two minutes, and he did not hear anything. 
 
Does Peter really know that there is a watch on the table, or does he only believe 
it?
 34
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 Taken from Buckwalter & Stich (2013). 
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The answer choices available were ‘really knows’ and ‘only believes’.  Starmans & 
Friedman report that whereas 71% of women chose ‘really knows’ only 41% of men 
chose this answer (p < 0.05, Fisher’s exact test).35 
 
Starmans & Friedman ran a variation on the above scenario where they changed the 
gender of the protagonist to female out of concern that this detail may have had an effect 
on responses and again attained a significant difference with p < 0.01 for N = 112 (54 
men and 58 women); 75% of women answered ‘really knows’ and only 36% of men 
answered so.  All participants in these experiments were reported to be native English 
speakers; for further details, see Buckwalter & Stich (2013) and Starmans & Friedman 
(2009).   
 
Replication Scenarios
36
 and Results 
 
Car (SM) 
The first scenario we examined was the following.   
 
Bob has a friend, Jill, who has driven a Buick for many years.  Bob therefore thinks 
that Jill drives an American car.  He is not aware, however, that her Buick has 
recently been stolen, and he is also not aware that Jill has replaced it with a Pontiac, 
which is a different kind of American car.  Does Bob really know that Jill drives an 
American car, or does he only believe it? 
 
REALLY KNOWS   ONLY BELIEVES 
 
                                                 
35
 Buckwalter & Stich do not provide the sample size for this experiment. 
36
 All Gettier-style scenarios in this section were taken from Weinberg, Nichols & Stich (2001). 
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For our sample of 105 individuals (54 Male, 51 Female), a chi-square test yielded χ2 = 
0.108, p = 0.742; (minimum expected count 10.9).  
 
Truetemp (SM) 
The next scenario we examined is the Truetemp case, which we presented as follows.  
 
One day Charles is suddenly knocked out by a falling rock, and his brain becomes 
re–wired so that he is always absolutely right whenever he estimates the 
temperature where he is.  Charles is completely unaware that his brain has been 
altered in this way.  A few weeks later, this brain re–wiring leads him to believe 
that it is 71 degrees in his room.  Apart from his estimation, he has no other 
reasons to think that it is 71 degrees.  In fact, it is at that time 71 degrees in his 
room.  Does Charles really know that it was 71 degrees in the room, or does he 
only believe it? 
    
  REALLY KNOWS    ONLY BELIEVES 
 
The statistical analysis for N = 105 (Male = 54, Female = 51) yielded χ2 = 0.382, p = 
0.536; (minimum expected count 13.6).  There were two further Gettier-type questions 
termed Zebra and Smoking Conspiracy for which we had previously collected data.  For 
the exact wording of the cases, see Appendix D.  The summary statistics for these two 
cases are as follows.   
 
Zebra Case: N = 105 (54 Male, 51 Female).  χ2 = 0.654, p = 0.419; (minimum expected 
count 10.7). 
 
Smoking Conspiracy Case: N = 105 (54 Male, 51 Female).  χ2 = 0.153, p = 0.696; 
(minimum expected count 10.2). 
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Below is a graph depicting the outcomes for all the Gettier-style experiments conducted 
on SM. 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Epistemic Intuitions – SM 
 
In addition to the tests above where the only filter used was for English as native 
language, we also ran two further analyses.  In one, we further filtered out respondents 
who were not of a Western background as there has been a question whether individuals 
from Western and non-Western backgrounds answer these scenarios differently 
(Weinberg et al., 2001).  Furthermore, in addition to native language and ethnic 
background filters, we also filtered out individuals whose highest level of education 
attained was below college.  Again, this is because there has been a question whether 
individuals from different socioeconomic statuses (measured by an education proxy) 
answer Gettier-type questions differently (Weinberg et al., 2001).  None of the tests 
yielded a significant difference among men and women. 
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In-Class and MST Data: Car Case  
As mentioned before, for the Car scenario we also collected data in two different ways; 
one in classroom settings and one through the Moral Sense Test (MST) website.  The 
below summaries are for participants whose native language was English.  The in-class 
data yielded a significant difference between men and women, the MST data, however, 
did not.   
 
In-Class Car Case Results 
N = 137 (71 Male, 66 Female).  χ2 = 4.222, p = 0.040; (minimum expected count 9.1), p-
exact = 0.049. 
 
MST Car Case Results 
N = 78 (44 Male, 34 Female).  χ2 = 0.608, p = 0.435; (minimum expected count 7.4), p-
exact = 0.582. 
 
 
Figure 2.11a: Car Case – In Class 
 
Figure 2.11b: Car Case – MST 
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Statistical Power 
When taking the results of the first run from Starmans & Friedman as the population 
proportions, the power values attained are as follows.  Car Case: 0.85; Truetemp: 0.85; 
Zebra; 0.85; Smoking Conspiracy: 0.85; In-Class: 0.93 and MST: 0.73.  When taking the 
outcomes of the second procedure from Starmans & Friedman as the population ratios, 
we attained the following power values.  Car Case: 0.98; Truetemp: 0.98; Zebra; 0.98; 
Smoking Conspiracy: 0.98; In-Class: 0.99 and MST: 0.93.  These power values are open 
to discussion because of the nature of the original experiment; however, they do serve as 
point of comparison to the original outcomes.  These values, together with the fact that 
Starmans & Friedman themselves could not successfully replicate their experiments, give 
a very strong indication that women and men do not have different epistemic intuitions 
on these Gettier-type scenarios.  
 
Miscellaneous Points 
There were several other scenarios for which we had collected data throughout the past 
years and which we examined for differences between women and men that also did not 
yield any statistical differences.  Examples include other compatibilism thought 
experiments and scenarios testing semantic intuitions; however, for the sake of brevity 
we will omit a formal discussion and restrict this paper to the cases that were presented 
by Buckwalter & Stich. 
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2.5: Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
 
Initially, we were very surprised by the outcomes we attained for this paper.  We are not 
too sure about the reasons for the different outcomes in our experiments and those 
reported in Buckwalter & Stich (2013) and it is likely that there are different reasons for 
different studies.  A general point that may be worth making is that to some extent the 
failures of replication presented here are not completely unexpected for the following 
reason.  Experimental philosophy is often described as the study of philosophical 
questions using the tools of experimental psychology (Alexander, 2012; Knobe & 
Nichols, 2008; Nadelhoffer & Nahmias, 2007).  By importing the methods of 
experimental psychology, philosophers will likely import the problems of that field and 
one of the problems that has afflicted experimental psychology for some time is the 
(likely) high rate of false positive results in the published literature (Bakker et al., 2012; 
Ioannidis, 2005, 2012; Pashler & Harris, 2012).  John Ioannidis has contended that in 
“several fields of investigation, including many areas of psychological science, 
perpetuated and unchallenged fallacies may comprise the majority of the circulating 
evidence” (Ioannidis, 2012, p. 645).  Concrete evidence comes from the Reproducibility 
Project which is an initiative that has set out to test the robustness of findings published 
in influential psychology journals. At the time of writing, roughly half the articles that 
were investigated could not be replicated successfully.
37
 
 
The main reasons (although not an exhaustive list) for this low rate of reproducibility are 
publication bias (aversion to publishing negative results) (Bakan, 1966; Bakker et al., 
                                                 
37
 http://openscienceframework.org/project/EZcUj/wiki/home 
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2012; Bozarth & Roberts, 1972; Coursol & Wagner, 1986; Sterling, 1959; Sterling, 
Rosenbaum, & Weinkam, 1995), aversion by journals to publishing replications of 
previously reported effects (Bozarth & Roberts, 1972; Makel et al., 2012; Neuliep & 
Crandall, 1991; Nosek et al., 2012), questionable research practices (QRPs) (Fanelli, 
2009; John et al., 2012; Martinson et al., 2005), and the incentive structures of the current 
research environment (Bakker et al., 2012).  
 
With regard to the specifics, studies that have examined the proportion of positive results 
of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) in the published literature have found that 
between 94% to 97% of articles report positive results (Bozarth & Roberts, 1972; 
Sterling, 1959; Sterling et al., 1995).  These numbers strongly indicate that published 
results in psychology are not representative of all experiments conducted and in fact 
about two-thirds of studies approved by institutional review boards (IRBs) and completed 
go unpublished according to one study (H. Cooper, DeNeve, & Charlton, 1997). 
 
In addition to publication bias, the numbers of direct replications that could serve as a 
check against false positives are remarkably low.  Bozarth & Roberts examined roughly 
one thousand articles published between 1967 and 1970 and found that less than one 
percent were replications of previous findings (Bozarth & Roberts, 1972).  More recently, 
Makel and colleagues examined the top 100 psychology journals (according to a five-
year impact factor) from the year 1900 onward and found that 1.07% of articles were 
replications.  Of these only 14.0% were direct replications.  Close to 82% were 
conceptual replications and 4.1% contained elements of both (Makel et al., 2012). 
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The problem that publication bias and lack of replications lead to was summarized very 
coherently by Sterling already in 1959. 
  
There is some evidence that in fields where statistical tests of significance are 
used, research which yields nonsignificant results is not published. Such research 
being unknown to other investigators may be repeated independently until 
eventually by chance a significant result occurs–an  “error of the first kind”–and  
is published. Significant results published in these fields are seldom verified by 
independent replication. The possibility thus arises that the literature of such a 
field consists in substantial part of false conclusions resulting from errors of the 
first kind in statistical tests of significance. (Sterling, 1959, p. 30) 
 
The issues of QRPs and structural incentives only exacerbate this problem further 
(Bakker et al., 2012).  As mentioned before, given the adoption by philosophers of the 
methods of experimental psychology, the emergence of false positives in this new field 
should not be completely unexpected.         
 
Aside from these general points, any attempts at explaining the different outcomes 
between the original and replication studies would involve speculation and we would like 
to keep this to a minimum.  We have not seen layouts of the surveys that Buckwalter & 
Stich and Holtzman ran and hence cannot comment on any differences in presentation 
that may have led to different outcomes.  However, a general problem with Buckwalter & 
Stich’s approach is that the authors asked many researchers to examine their data and 
naturally those who happened to have differences in their data responded.  Others have 
pointed this out and although true, this explanation is obviously not a satisfactory one for 
the classical scenarios, as Buckwalter & Stich collected the data themselves.  A possible 
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reason for the difference for the Mechanical Turk experiments could be that depending 
on when the HITs were published, female and male respondents could have had different 
motivations for filling out surveys.  For example, after working hours women may 
predominantly complete Mechanical Turk HITs for an alternative source of income and 
men may complete HITs to pass time, or vice versa.  However, given that we collected 
data through several sources, which yielded similar outcomes, this also may not be a 
satisfactory explanation.   
 
Buckwalter & Stich, themselves, point out that the robustness of the cases they discuss 
needs further investigation.  For example, for the Holtzman cases, Buckwalter & Stich 
note that Holtzman examined nine scenarios for which three yielded significant 
differences.  Furthermore, as mentioned before, Ori Friedman let us know via email that 
they themselves have been unable to replicate the results of their Gettier scenario and that 
the make-up of that particular sample may have been unusual. 
 
Our main aim for this paper was to test the robustness of the findings in Buckwalter & 
Stich (2013) and to share our results with other researchers, especially those who may 
want to build on the reported findings.  We believe that we have provided strong 
evidence that women and men do not differ significantly in their intuitions on the cases 
examined in this study.  Given that Buckwalter & Stich (2013) has already been widely 
circulated, we hope that this paper can correct some of the misconceptions that may have 
spread as a result and that readers at the very least view the original findings with some 
caution.  Naturally, we do not believe that our data gives a definitive answer on whether 
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women and men have different intuitions on the cases examined in Buckwalter & Stich 
(2013).  However, we do hope that our findings will encourage other researchers to carry 
out independent replications in order to attain a better picture. The importance of the 
subject matter certainly merits further investigation. 
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Paper 3: Instability of Moral Intuitions 
Abstract 
We examined two papers from the psychology literature that have attracted the attention 
of experimental philosophers because the findings show moral intuitions to be unstable; 
hence casting doubt on the usefulness of intuitions for conducting philosophy.  These 
papers are Valdesolo & DeSteno (2006) titled “Manipulations of Emotional Context 
Shape Moral Judgment” and Zhong, Strejcek, & Sivanathan (2010), titled “A Clean Self 
Can Render Harsh Moral Judgment.”   
 
Both papers report to manipulate moral judgments with relative ease.  Valdesolo & 
DeSteno (2006) report that by merely showing a five-minute comedy video, individuals 
were significantly more likely to judge it appropriate to sacrifice an innocent bystander to 
save the lives of others in the footbridge trolley dilemma.  Zhong et al. (2010) report that 
a simple cleanliness prime induced individuals to make harsher moral judgments on a 
host of social and moral issues.   
 
These findings have several implications; however, the immediate one for philosophers is 
that intuitions are malleable in ways not obvious to them.  That is, when considering 
moral scenarios such as the trolley dilemma, the intuitions that philosophers have may be 
distorted by situational factors.  Furthermore, intuitions may differ for the same person at 
different times, depending on slight changes in circumstances.  
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We attempted to reproduce these findings; however, our replication attempts were 
without success.  This paper is divided in two parts.  Part One examines Zhong et al. 
(2010) and Part Two examines Valdesolo & DeSteno (2006).  Each part is self-contained 
and can be read in isolation from the other without loss of understanding.  
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Part One: Cleanliness and Moral Judgments 
 
In a paper published in 2010 titled “A Clean Self Can Render Harsh Moral Judgment,” 
Zhong, Strejcek & Sivanathan report that an induced sense of cleanliness makes people’s 
moral judgments on a host of issues harsher than they otherwise would be.  Zhong et al. 
(2010) carried out two relatively simple manipulations.  In one experiment participants 
were asked to cleanse their hands using hand wipes.  In another experiment participants 
were asked to visualize a situation where they found themselves in a clean and pristine 
condition.  Zhong and colleagues report that subjects in these experiments judged morally 
and/or socially contested issues such as abortion, use of drugs, or pollution significantly 
more harshly than their counterparts in control conditions.  
 
Because of the surprise factor of the findings, this paper has received attention from 
various widely-read websites and blogs such as The Chronicle of Higher Education and 
Wired with attention grabbing headlines proclaiming that “A clean self is morally 
obnoxious self” (sic) and “Cleanliness Is Next to Priggishness” (Bartlett, 2010; Jarrett, 
2010; Singh, 2012; Solon, 2010).  The article has also been featured in the 2011 edition 
of Issues in Experimental Psychology (Zhong, Strejcek, & Sivanathan, 2011).  
 
Aside from attention from popular outlets, these results have also come to the attention of 
experimental philosophers as further evidence of the instability of intuitions, this time in 
the moral domain.  The argument goes that if intuitive judgments on moral or social 
issues as contested as abortion depend on the cleanliness of the reader’s hands – a 
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variable that should not factor in judgments on important issues – then the use of 
intuitions in philosophy should be viewed with skepticism (Stich, 2010).   
 
As mentioned, we could not reproduce these findings.  We will proceed by first providing 
a background to the work of Zhong et al. (2010) in Section 3.1.1.  In Section 3.1.2 we 
present the results of the original and replication studies and Section 3.1.3 concludes this 
part of the paper.  
 
3.1.1: Background 
 
In setting up their hypothesis, Zhong et al. (2010) draw on previous work demonstrating a 
connection between physical cleanliness and morality (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006).
38
  
 
Zhong & Liljenquist (2006) 
In one of their experiments, Zhong & Liljenquist asked subjects to visualize a fictional 
story in which they committed an unethical act.  Subsequent to the visualization task, 
these subjects, according to the authors, showed a significantly stronger preference for 
cleansing products such as a soap or toothpaste.  Zhong & Liljenquist suggest that the act 
of physical cleansing is a substitute for moral purification.  
 
In another experiment, participants were asked to recall an unethical act they had 
committed in the past.  Following this recall, participants in the experimental condition 
                                                 
38
 The main author of Zhong et al. (2010) was involved in this previous work.  This may be of relevance, as 
discussed in Section 3.1.3. 
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were given a hand wipe to cleanse their hands, whereas participants in the control 
condition skipped this step.  To test whether cleansing had restored participants’ moral 
self-image, toward the end of the study an experimenter asked whether subjects were 
willing to take part in another study without compensation.  This study, participants were 
told, was for a graduate student who was desperate to find subjects.  Zhong & Liljenquist 
report that those in the experimental condition (those who cleansed their hands) were 
significantly less likely to volunteer than participants who had not cleansed their hands.  
The authors reason that those in the control condition chose to volunteer as a means to 
restore their moral self-image.  Participants in the experimental condition saw no need to 
volunteer as their self-image had been restored by cleaning their hands.  
 
Overall, Zhong & Liljenquist show in four different experiments that when participants’ 
moral self-image is threatened, they seek acts of physical cleansing as a proxy for 
clearing their moral sense of self. 
 
Zhong et al. (2010) 
Following this approach, Zhong et al. (2010) hypothesize that induced physical 
cleanliness will increase subjects’ sense of moral virtue and this in turn will lead to 
harsher moral judgments.  In the authors’ own words, “given the association between 
cleanliness and moral purity, we suggest that a clean person may not only feel dirt-free, 
but also morally untainted” and “this elevated sense of moral self can in turn license 
severe moral judgment” (Zhong et al., 2010, p. 859). 
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Zhong et al. argue that a connection between physical purity and moral superiority can be 
observed in real world cases.  The examples the authors mention are India’s caste system 
and Nazi Germany’s “obsession with hygiene” and the portrayal of targeted groups “as 
not only physically filthy but morally corrupt” (Zhong et al., 2010, p. 859).  In Zhong et 
al.’s view, these examples are not merely coincidental but rather reflect an underlying 
psychological connection between moral and physical purity (Zhong et al., 2010).  
 
The authors highlight the importance of their findings in noting that “these results 
provide unique insight to the social significance of cleanliness and may have important 
implications for discrimination and prejudice.”  Furthermore, so the authors, if “members 
of a ‘‘clean” society perceive those who are different as less moral, then separating and 
segregating them is more easily justified.  This may be part of the mechanism behind the 
caste system or other more extreme forms of social cleansing” (Zhong et al., 2010, p. 859 
and 861).  
 
To summarize, there are two components to Zhong et al.’s hypothesis.  The first is that 
individuals with an elevated sense of moral self make harsher judgments on social and/or 
moral issues.  The second component is that acts of cleansing elevate individuals’ sense 
of moral self. 
 
3.1.2: Results 
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Zhong et al. (2010) report in three experiments that cleanliness leads to harsher moral 
judgments.  In what follows, we will introduce each experiment separately, provide the 
results of the original paper and contrast these with our findings.  
 
Experiment 1 
 
Procedures 
In the first experiment, participants were randomly assigned either to the experiment 
(clean) or control condition.  For the cleanliness condition, Zhong et al. advised 
participants that because the equipment in the computer lab was new, participants were 
required to clean their hands with hand wipes before starting the study.  In the control 
condition this instruction was omitted.  The equipment in the lab was in fact new.  
Participants were asked to judge how moral or immoral the following issues were: 
adultery, littering, pornography, profane language, smoking, and using drugs.  Judgments 
were recorded on an eleven point scale where the leftmost option was marked “-5 (very 
immoral)” the midpoint “0” and the rightmost “5 (very moral).”  The total sample 
consisted of 58 individuals who received $5 for their participation.  
 
Our procedures were very similar to those of Zhong et al. (2010).  As it happened, the lab 
where we conducted our experiments – the Behavior Research Lab (BRL) at the London 
School of Economics (LSE) – had just opened and all equipment and everything else was 
new.  We instructed participants as Zhong et al. did.  Fifty-nine participants took part in 
our study for which they received 5 pounds sterling.  We presented the same six 
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moral/social issues in randomized order and participants judged these on the same elven-
point scale that Zhong et al. (2010) used. 
 
Results 
For their analysis, Zhong et al. construct a composite score by averaging
39
 the judgments 
on the six issues (α = 0.77).40  The authors report that, as hypothesized, individuals who 
had cleansed their hands made harsher moral judgments.  The experimental group’s mean 
score was -2.62 (SD = 1.30) and the control group’s mean was -1.85 (SD = 1.46).  
Comparing the control and experimental groups using an independent-samples t-test, the 
authors report t(56) = 2.10, p = 0.04. 
 
For our replication data we carried out the same analysis by averaging the six judgments 
(α = 0.77).  The cleansing condition yielded M = -1.70 (SD = 1.79) and the control 
condition yielded M = -1.82 (SD = 1.12).  An independent-samples t-test produced t(57) 
= -0.28, p = 0.80.
41
 
 
There are several things to point out.  The first is that the judgments in our control 
condition were actually harsher than in the clean condition.  Although we did not detect a 
significant difference, the direction of responses was opposite to that of Zhong and 
colleagues.  Second, the judgments in both conditions of the original study were harsher 
than either condition of the replication.  Finally, the variability in judgments for our data 
                                                 
39
 Zhong et al. mistakenly write that they take the sum of the categories instead of the average. 
40
 Cronbach’s alpha (typically abbreviated as α) is a measure of ‘internal consistency’ of variables.  The 
more correlated several variables are, the higher the value of α.  Aggregating several variables into a single 
measure is considered acceptable for α greater than 0.70. 
41
 Throughout this paper, the reported p values are two-sided for the original as well as the replication tests. 
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was comparable to that of the original experiments.  Although the standard deviation in 
our clean condition (1.79) was higher than in the original study (1.30), the standard 
deviation of our control condition (1.12) was lower than either condition of the original 
study.    
 
Experiment 2 
 
Procedures 
In the second experiment, Zhong et al. used a different prime.  Participants were asked to 
visualize a short paragraph and copy the text in a field on their computers.  Participants 
were told that they would be asked to recall details of the visualized scenario after some 
unrelated tasks.  The paragraphs are presented below.  There was also a control condition 
where participants skipped the visualization task.    
 
Clean  
 
My hair feels clean and light. My breath is fresh. My clothes are pristine and like 
new. My fingernails are freshly clipped and groomed and my shoes are spotless. I 
feel so clean. 
 
Dirty 
 
My hair feels oily and heavy. My breath stinks. I can see oil stains and dirt all 
over my clothes. My fingernails are encrusted with dirt and my shoes are covered 
in mud. I feel so dirty. 
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For this experiment, Zhong and colleagues wanted to test a wider range of issues and so 
in addition to the topics surveyed in Experiment 1, the authors added the following ten: 
abortion, alcoholic, casual sex, wearing animal fur, homosexuality, masturbation, obesity, 
pollution, premarital sex, and prostitution.  The scale used was the same as in the first 
experiment.   
 
Zhong et al. drew their sample from a US database
42
 of 15,000 participants who had 
registered to take part in studies: 323 individuals participated.  
 
Our replication procedures were modeled very closely on the original study.  The main 
difference was that we used the Moral Sense Test (MST) website run by the Cognitive 
Evolution Laboratory at Harvard University to conduct our study.
43
  Participants (mostly 
from the US) visited the website without being solicited and after a brief introduction 
started the visualization task.  
 
Results 
As in their first experiment, Zhong et al. construct a composite variable of the 16 
moral/social issues by taking their average (α = 0.88).  The outcomes are presented in 
summary form below, together with the replication results.  Cronbach’s alpha for the 16 
issues in the replication study was 0.89. 
 
                                                 
42
 The authors do not specify which database. 
43 http://moral.wjh.harvard.edu/ 
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Experiment Condition N Mean SD 
Original 
Clean 
323 
-1.76 1.13 
Dirty -1.42 1.14 
Control -1.49 1.55 
Replication 
Clean 
180 
-1.05 1.16 
Dirty -0.71 1.48 
Control -1.04 1.72 
Table 3.1.1: Results for Experiment 2 
 
Zhong et al. report a statistically significant difference between the clean and dirty 
conditions with t(320) = -2.02, p = 0.045 but no difference between the dirty and control 
conditions with t(320) = 0.42, p = 0.675.
44
   
 
For the replication study an independent-samples t-test yielded no significant difference 
between the clean and dirty conditions with t(93) = -1.24, p = 0.22, nor between the dirty 
and control conditions with t(124) = 1.06, p = 0.29.  We discuss sample sizes and 
statistical power for all three experiments in Section 3.1.3. 
 
What stands out again with these results is that the least severe judgment of the original 
study was harsher than the harshest value of the replication study.  Another detail worth 
noting is that this time the clean condition of the replication study did produce harsher 
judgments than the dirty condition (though not statistically significant).  However, the 
value of the clean condition was almost identical to the control condition.  These 
outcomes are likely simply due to random variation; the data in Experiment 3 
substantiates this.   
 
                                                 
44
 There seems to be a mistake with the degree of freedom the authors report, as they indicate 320 for both 
tests, comparing clean and dirty and dirty and control.  The overall sample size is given as 323. 
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Experiment 3 
 
Procedures 
The procedures of Experiment 3 were identical to Experiment 2 with the exception that 
after being primed (same visualization prime as in Experiment 2), participants were asked 
to rank themselves on the following eight characteristics: Sense of Humor, Intelligence, 
Moral Character, Creativity, Physical Attractiveness, Fitness, Social Sensitivity, and 
Leadership.  Participants were asked to rank themselves compared to others, where 0 
denoted “worse than all others” and 100 denoted “better than all others.”  After ranking 
themselves, the survey proceeded as in Experiment 2 with participants evaluating the 
same 16 moral/social issues as in Experiment 2.   
 
Results 
Zhong et al. surveyed 136 individuals and for the self-ranking task report an effect of 
cleanliness prime on Moral Character; in specific, cleanliness prime yielded mean value 
M = 80.44 (SD = 15.24) whereas dirty prime produced M = 75.03 (SD = 15.70).  An 
independent-samples t-test is reported with t(134) = 2.03, p = 0.045.  Zhong et al. did not 
collect data for a control condition as Dirty and Control yielded no significant difference 
in Experiment 2.  
  
The replication experiments did not reproduce these findings.  For a sample of 166 
participants, priming had no effect on Moral Character ratings.  For the clean condition, 
we attained a mean value for Moral Character of 72.81 (SD = 15.36) and a mean value of 
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70.18 (SD = 18.60) in the dirty condition.  An independent-samples t-test produced t(164) 
= 0.99, p = 0.32. 
  
Zhong et al. report that none of the other measures on which participants ranked 
themselves yielded a difference between clean and dirty conditions (|ts| < .78, ps > .40).  
We attained a similar outcome (|ts| < 1.53, ps > 0.13).
45
  
  
For Experiment 3, Zhong et al. once again report an effect of cleanliness on moral 
judgments.  Their findings, together with our results, are presented in summary form 
below.
46
  
 
In all tables, * denotes p < 0.05. 
 
Experiment Condition N Mean SD t p value 
Original 
Clean 
136 
-2.04 1.28 
-2.13 0.04* 
Dirty -1.59 1.16 
 
Replication 
Clean 
166 
-0.96 1.12 
0.68 0.50 
Dirty -1.09 1.18 
Table 3.1.2: Results for Experiment 3 
 
Once again, the judgments of the original study are both harsher than the least harsh 
judgment in the replication study.  The original experiments were conducted in Toronto, 
whereas the replications of Experiment 1 and 3 were carried out in London (at the BRL).  
The difference in location is unlikely to be the reason for this difference, as data for 
                                                 
45
 We are reporting the greatest absolute t value and the smallest p value attained. 
46 Cronbach’s alpha for our sixteen categories was 0.84.  Zhong et al. do not report this value.  
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Experiment 2 was collected in the U.S. for both the original and replication studies; here, 
again, the same pattern is repeated. 
 
Once again, not only did we not attain a statistically significant effect of cleanliness on 
judgments but in our data the direction of this effect was the reverse of Zhong et al.’s.  
The difference between dirty and clean prime was 0.124 (0.173 when taken in 
combination with moral character) on the average moral judgment.  That is, changing the 
prime from clean to dirty made judgments harsher by 0.124 (0.173) points on the 11-
point scale. 
 
The next analysis Zhong et al. carry out is an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
including moral self-image (Moral Character ratings) and cleanliness prime as 
independent variables and find that when both are included in the analysis, only moral 
self-image explained moral judgments (B = -0.018, SE = 0.007, t = -2.73, p = 0.007) but 
cleanliness prime did not (B = -0.348, SE = 0.208, t = -1.67, p = 0.097).
47
  We will 
provide an explanation of these results below.  We attained a similar outcome.  In our 
data, moral character predicted moral judgments (B = -0.019, SE = 0.005, t = 3.61, p = 
0.000) but cleanliness did not (B = -0.173, SE = 0.177, t = -0.98, p = 0.327). 
 
Finally, Zhong et al. present data from 1000 bootstrap resamples and arrive at the same 
conclusion.  When mediated for the effect of cleanliness on moral self-image, moral self-
image had a significant effect on judgments at 95% confidence level (confidence interval 
                                                 
47
 The standard error is mistakenly given as 208 instead of 0.208 in Zhong et al. (2010).  
 108 
-0.24 and -0.01).  We attained a similar outcome for our replication data with 1000 
resamples (confidence interval -0.03 and -0.01).  
 
In addition to the analyses that Zhong et al. provide, we want to present some further 
details to fill in the picture more on the relationships just discussed.   
 
In an OLS regression with two independent variables, say A and B, when the significance 
test determines that A did not significantly predict the variability of the dependent 
variable, this means that in combination with variable B, A does not significantly predict 
variability of the dependent variable.  That is, if B’s effect is very strong that 
comparatively A does not predict much of the variability, A will be determined to be an 
insignificant predictor.  However, since this could be due to the strength of variable B 
(relative to A), it is not so much telling about A in itself but rather about A in 
combination with B.   
 
In our case, although in an OLS regression cleanliness prime in combination with moral 
self-image (Moral Character) did not significantly predict variability of judgments, this 
does not mean that cleanliness did not significantly predict the dependent variable.  To 
get a better picture, we ran a correlation analysis to test for the effect of cleanliness on 
judgments in the absence of moral self-image and still cleanliness did not predict 
judgments significantly (p = 0.32).  Cleanliness prime by itself only predicted 0.3% of the 
variability in moral judgments.  When including cleanliness and moral character as 
independent variables, R
2 
value equals 0.077 (adjusted R
2
 value is 0.065); that is, only 
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about 8% of the variation in moral judgments can be predicted by the combination of 
cleanliness prime and moral character.   
 
In Section 3.1.1 we highlighted that there were two components to Zhong et al.’s 
hypothesis.  One was that individuals with an elevated sense of moral self make harsher 
judgments and the second was that acts of cleansing lead to an elevated sense of moral 
self.  While our data confirms the former, our experiments do not reproduce the latter 
effect.  That is, cleanliness prime had no effect on either moral self-image or moralization 
(moral judgments).  On the other hand, our data confirms that individuals who consider 
themselves as having an elevated moral character compared to others (regardless of 
cleanliness prime), make harsher judgments on the social and/or moral issues surveyed in 
this paper.  
 
3.1.3: Concluding Remarks 
 
Zhong et al. (2010) report in three experiments an effect of cleanliness on moralization.  
We failed to reproduce all three experiments.  In the beginning of this paper we referred 
to Zhong & Liljenquist (2006) as the basis on which Zhong et al. (2010) built their 
hypothesis and we pointed out that Zhong was the main author of both papers.  Two 
independent groups had previously attempted to reproduce two of the experiments in 
Zhong & Liljenquist (2006), but failed to do so (Fayard, Bassi, Bernstein, & Roberts, 
2009).  In the final remarks to their failed replication, Fayard et al. (2009) conclude. 
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Contrary to our expectations, neither Study 1 nor Study 2 replicated Zhong and 
Liljenquist’s (2006) finding that physical cleansing, specifically washing one’s 
hands, contributes to the absolution of guilt. Participants who recalled an 
unethical deed in Study 1 were no more likely than participants who recalled an 
ethical deed to choose the antibacterial hand wipe as a free gift, indicating that 
moral emotions may not induce people to cleanse themselves as a reparative 
strategy. Furthermore, as Study 2 showed, cleansing did not reduce moral 
emotions such as guilt in participants who recalled unethical deeds, and it did not 
significantly reduce volunteerism among participants. (Fayard et al., 2009, p. 27)  
 
These failed replication attempts may point to procedural flaws the main author may have 
had in conducting the experiments discussed here.  It should, nevertheless, also be noted 
that several other papers have reported a connection between physical cleanliness and 
morality (Cramwinckel, De Cremer, & van Dijke, 2013; Cramwinckel, van Dijk, 
Scheepers, & van den Bos, 2013; Gollwitzer & Melzer, 2012; Helzer & Pizarro, 2011; 
Lee & Schwarz, 2010, 2011).  Having noted these studies (failure of replication as well as 
other reports of the cleanliness-morality connection), we want to point out some of the 
shortcomings of our study.   
 
Experiment 1 involved the use of hand wipes and we did not use the same brand and type 
as Zhong et al. (2010).  We carried out our experiments in the UK and did not have 
access to North American brands that Zhong and colleagues used.  This may or may not 
pose a problem.  The hand wipes we used, even the supposed non-scented ones, carried a 
scent and this could have influenced participants.  Researchers have reported that scents 
associated with cleanliness influence moral judgments (Liljenquist, Zhong, & Galinsky, 
2010; Tobia et al., 2013).  We tried to minimize this effect by wiping the desks and 
equipment participants used before experimental runs so that any effect of scent that 
participants in the experimental condition had would also be present in the control 
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condition.  The study for Experiment 3 was conducted following a survey where 
participants answered questions from various fields of philosophy and completed 
different kinds of tasks.  This could have had an effect on participants.  
 
Statistical Power 
Taking the effect sizes of the original study as estimates of the population effect sizes, we 
calculate power values for Experiments 1, 2, 3, and effect of cleanliness on self-ranking 
of Moral Character as presented in Table 3.1.3 below.  
 
Experiment 
Power 
Zhong et al. Replication 
1 0.55 0.56 
2 0.59 0.30 
3 0.68 0.72 
3 (Moral Char.) 0.58 0.59 
Table 3.1.3: Statistical Power 
 
The statistical power for the replication of Experiment 2 was well below that of the 
original study and these replication results should be considered with caution.  However, 
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 3 with the exception of the self-ranking and 
here the replication had the highest statistical power of any of the studies (original and 
replication) and our results still point to null findings. 
 
In three of the four studies the replication attempts had greater power than the original 
studies, yet we still did not detect a statistical difference.  However, with the exception of 
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the replication of Experiment 3 (effect of cleanliness on judgment), none of the studies 
attained statistical power close to the 0.80 convention.   
 
For our replication we aimed to attain larger sample sizes than the original study and we 
did this in three of the four studies; however, for a more conclusive result we would have 
attained larger samples to realize power above 0.80.  Although, ideally our statistical 
power would have been closer to the 0.80 convention, Zhong et al.’s studies are below 
that mark as well.  In fact, given the power of the four original experiments, even if an 
effect existed in all four cases, Zhong et al. would be expected to detect all effects in only 
about 13% of cases (product of statistical power of each experiment).  Either, Zhong et al. 
were somewhat lucky or there may be studies that the authors do not report (see Paper 4 
for a discussion of this practice), or something else may be the case. 
 
In conclusion to this part of our paper, we would like to quote Fayard et al. (2009) whom 
we mentioned earlier as the authors who attempted to replicate Zhong & Liljenquist 
(2006), without success.  Their conclusion further captures our own sentiments why we 
thought the replications reported here to be worthwhile and why we decided to conduct a 
formal replication.  Fayard et al. note.    
 
Given the notorious “file drawer phenomenon” in which researchers file away 
null results and non-replications instead of publishing their results, we cannot 
know how many others have also attempted and failed to replicate Zhong and 
Liljenquist’s (2006) surprising results. Here we report two such attempts and 
failures, both conducted independently of one another for different reasons. 
Zhong and Liljenquist’s (2006) results carry important theoretical implications, so 
it is important to publish failed replications such as these so that researchers can 
 113 
have a clearer picture of the plausibility of research findings. (Fayard et al., 2009, 
p. 27) 
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Part Two: Affective State and Moral Judgments 
 
In their paper titled “Manipulations of Emotional Context Shape Moral Judgment,” 
Picarlo Valdesolo and David DeSteno report that participants’ moral judgments on the 
footbridge trolley problem are relatively easily manipulated by merely showing a five-
minute Saturday Night Live (SNL) video clip before presenting the moral dilemma. 
 
These results have attained some attention with experimental philosophers because of the 
ease with which moral intuitions are manipulated.  It is not that any intuitions are 
manipulated but intuitions on a question as grave as killing an innocent bystander by 
physically pushing him off a bridge in order to save the lives of others.    
 
Some experimental philosophers have taken these findings as yet more evidence that 
intuitions are not reliable and so should be reduced to a minimum in philosophical 
practice (Carruthers, Stich, & Laurence, 2008; Stich, 2010).  The argument is that if 
intuitive responses to such important questions are dependent on the affective state of the 
reader, then intuitions cannot be relied on in getting philosophers to the right answers. 
 
Aside from interest from experimental philosophers, the paper has received wider 
attention for its implications (discussed in Section 3.2.1).  At the time of writing, 
Valdesolo & DeSteno (2006) has received 276 citations
48
 and at least one other paper has 
modeled its approach on it (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). 
 
                                                 
48
 http://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=8009255644369793974&as_sdt=2005&sciodt=0,5&hl=en 
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We attempted to replicate this experiment using several different video clips; however, 
we did not succeed.  Our findings suggest that individuals’ moral judgments on an 
important question about sacrificing a bystander in order to save the lives of others are 
more stable than the findings of Valdesolo & DeSteno (2006) imply.  We will proceed as 
follows.  In Section 3.2.1 we provide a background to the work of Valdesolo & DeSteno 
(2006).  Section 3.2.2 provides an overview of the experimental procedures of the 
original and the replication studies.  Section 3.2.3 reports the results for mood indicators 
used in the study.  Section 3.2.4 reports the judgments participants made on the moral 
dilemmas.  Section 3.2.5 closes with concluding remarks. 
 
3.2.1: Background 
 
Valdesolo & DeSteno (2006) build on the work of Greene and colleagues (Greene, 
Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & 
Cohen, 2001) who studied brain activity in fMRI procedures while individuals evaluated 
moral dilemmas such as the footbridge trolley scenario.  
 
Greene and colleagues set out to examine the psychological bases as to why people 
generally consider it acceptable to sacrifice one person to save the lives of five others in 
the standard trolley case but consider this outcome unacceptable in the footbridge 
dilemma.  In both cases one person is sacrificed to save the lives of five.  To take away 
Greene et al.’s conclusion, the short answer (although incomplete49) is that the 
                                                 
49
 Incomplete, because the activity of brain areas associated with processing emotions is more nuanced.  
See, Greene et al. (2004) for details.  
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“emotional response is likely to be the crucial difference between these two cases” 
(Greene et al., 2001, p. 2107).  
 
Greene and colleagues present several findings that Valdesolo & DeSteno draw on.  The 
first is that brain areas associated with emotions (Brodmann’s Areas (BA) 9, 10, 31 and 
39) showed heightened activity in personal moral dilemmas (e.g. footbridge trolley) as 
compared to impersonal moral (e.g. bystander trolley) and non-moral scenarios.  On the 
other hand, brain areas associated with cognitive processes (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC)) that include abstract reasoning and problem solving showed heightened 
activity when considering impersonal moral scenarios.   
 
Among participants who gave the deontological response in personal moral dilemmas 
such as the footbridge case, areas associated with social-emotional processing (BA) 
showed more activity when compared to participants who gave the utilitarian response.  
For these latter participants, areas of the brain associated with cognitive control (DLPFC) 
showed a comparatively increased activity.   
 
Finally, when making the utilitarian judgment in personal moral dilemmas, participants 
showed longer reaction times (RT) as compared to when they made the deontological 
judgment.  Greene and colleagues suggest that in order to arrive at the utilitarian response, 
brain regions responsible for abstract reasoning and cognitive control have to override the 
negative emotional response.  In personal moral dilemmas where participants showed 
longer reaction times (this being indicative of more difficult moral cases), the anterior 
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cingulate cortex (ACC) – an area that is activated in cases of cognitive conflict – and the 
DLPFC showed heightened activity.  As before, in cases involving longer reaction times, 
DLPFC activity was correlated with utilitarian judgments. 
 
The overall picture that Greene et al. paint is that when presented with personal moral 
dilemmas such as the footbridge trolley case, individuals show heightened and likely 
competitive activity in different brain regions; one of these brain regions is associated 
with quick reflexive responses (emotional response) and the other associated with higher 
cognitive functions.  The suggested explanation is that in the footbridge scenario a 
moral/social principle has to be violated by pushing the person off the bridge and this 
produces the negative reflexive emotional reaction.  On the other hand, in order to arrive 
at the outcome that maximizes overall wellbeing (saving the five) this reflexive reaction 
has to be overcome and this step requires cognitive processing.  As Greene et al. (2004) 
describe it, their “results suggest that emotional responses drive individuals to disapprove 
of personal moral violations […] cognitive control processes can override these 
emotional responses, favoring personal moral violations when the benefits sufficiently 
outweigh the costs” (Greene et al., 2004, p. 397).  
 
To summarize the most relevant aspect of Greene et al.’s work for Valdesolo & DeSteno: 
different brain regions – cognitive and emotional – compete over the appropriate 
response to personal moral dilemmas.  Areas responsible for emotional processing react 
negatively because of the moral violation that is involved in killing an individual to bring 
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about a greater good.  This negative reaction must be overridden if the utilitarian 
judgment is to win out. 
 
Valdesolo & DeSteno suggest an alternative path whereby the negative emotional 
response can be overridden and hence the utilitarian judgment can come about: and this 
without altering DLPFC activity.  Valdesolo & DeSteno suggest to counteract the 
negative emotional reaction with a positive emotional induction.  The importance of this 
step needs to be highlighted.  Although the negative emotional response stems from a 
moral violation (i.e. pushing the man off the bridge), Valdesolo & DeSteno suggest that a 
positive emotional induction from a completely different source (an SNL clip) can 
override the initial negative response.  If the negative reaction can be overcome or 
alleviated in this way, more individuals will make the utilitarian judgment.  
 
And indeed, Valdesolo & DeSteno report that by showing a comedy clip before 
participants consider the moral dilemma, participants were significantly more likely to 
judge it appropriate to push the bystander off the bridge, sacrificing the bystander in 
order to save the lives of five others. 
 
Valdesolo & DeSteno conclude.  
 
Environment-induced feelings of positivity at the time of judgment might reduce 
the perceived negativity, or aversion ‘‘signal,’’ of any potential moral violation 
and, thereby, increase utilitarian responding […]  These findings demonstrate that 
the causal efficacy of emotion in guiding moral judgment does not reside solely in 
responses evoked by the considered dilemma, but also resides in the affective 
characteristics of the environment. […] What is clear, however, is that a skilled 
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manipulation of individuals’ affective states can shape their moral judgments. 
(Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006, p. 476 and 477) 
 
3.2.2: Experimental Procedures 
 
Original Study 
 
Although Valdesolo & DeSteno do note that they took the scenario from Thomson 
(Thomson, 1986), they do not specify exactly what the wording of the footbridge 
scenario was that they presented to participants; however, the outlines of the scenario are 
familiar by now.  An out of control trolley is headed toward five individuals who do not 
realize they are in danger.  If the trolley is not stopped, these five individuals will 
certainly die.  The only way to stop the trolley is to throw a heavy weight in its path.  You 
are standing on a footbridge under which the trolley will pass.  As it happens, there is a 
large man standing next to you.  The only way to stop the trolley is to push this man in 
front of the trolley, thereby killing him to save the five.  The question participants were 
asked was whether it was appropriate or inappropriate to push the man off the bridge. 
 
Valdesolo & DeSteno tested 79 individuals (38 in control condition).  Participants were 
either shown a five-minute SNL clip in the experimental condition or a five-minute 
documentary on a Spanish village in the control condition.  After watching the clip, 
participants were presented with the footbridge trolley dilemma, which was embedded in 
non-moral filler questions.  The trolley scenario was presented in three parts and each 
part was shown on the screen for 15 seconds.  This was to ensure that the induction of 
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positive emotions would not fade and the affective state of participants return to their 
baseline levels if participants contemplated for too long. 
 
After the trolley scenario, participants saw a mood indicator that was designed to capture 
affective states.  Participants were asked to rate themselves on the variables of Happy, 
Content, Pleasant and Good on a seven-point scale, ranging from 1 to 7 where 1 was 
marked “not at all” (happy) and 7 marked “very” (happy).   
 
Replication Study 
 
We faced several difficulties in our replication attempts.  The details of the experimental 
procedures in Valdesolo & DeSteno (2006) are very limited.  An exact replication would 
require much more information than the authors provide.  For example, the authors do not 
mention which video clips they used; they merely state that an SNL clip was used for the 
experimental condition and a documentary about a Spanish village for the control 
condition.  People familiar with SNL know how wide in scope the sketches can be and 
how different sketches can be in eliciting one emotion over another.  A documentary 
about a Spanish village may be idyllic and elicit some emotions.  This was definitely our 
concern for our video about Spain as some great landmarks, tourist attractions, and a lot 
of sun were shown.  Furthermore, the original paper does not state under what conditions 
the experiments were carried out and who the participants were.  It would have been 
useful to know whether the experiment was conducted in a lab setting or whether it was 
carried out online.  It is not indicated whether the participants were students or from the 
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general population.  There are no details about the distractor questions.  All of these make 
it very difficult to replicate the experiment in an exact manner.   
 
We contacted the authors on five occasions; however, only received one response from 
one of the authors saying that the other author had the details and that we would need to 
contact him.  We used email addresses that were current; both authors had recently 
signed up for a mailing list of a neighboring laboratory. 
 
The solution we saw was to try several different clips and follow the details of 
experimental procedures in Greene et al. (2001) and (2004) since Valdesolo & DeSteno 
make frequent references to these articles. 
 
Replication Procedures 
We used two different moral dilemmas in our studies.  Out of concern that over the years 
many individuals may have become familiar with the trolley dilemma, we used a 
different scenario for some of the studies.  We will refer to these scenarios as the Train 
and Tiger
50
 scenarios.  The exact wording of these cases as presented to participants is 
shown below. 
 
Train 
 
An out of control train is running down a track toward five people who will die if 
the train is not stopped. You are on a bridge under which the train will pass. 
 
                                                 
50
 We thank Donal Cahill for providing us with this scenario. 
 122 
You can stop the train by dropping a heavy weight in front of it. As it happens, 
there is a very large man next to you. Your only way to stop the train is to push 
the man off the bridge and onto the tracks, killing him to save the five. 
 
Pushing the man off the bridge to stop the train would be 
 
    Appropriate  Inappropriate 
 
In one of the studies (we will point out which one) the question asked was “Would you 
push the man off the bridge?” and the answer choices where “Yes” or “No” in that order.  
 
Tiger 
 
You are on a visit to a zoo when you see that the barrier between the tiger 
enclosure and the viewing deck falls over. There are currently five people 
standing on the deck and they will undoubtedly be killed by the tiger unless 
something happens. There is another person standing beside you. Your only 
option is to push the person into the enclosure. While the tiger is devouring that 
person, the five others will have time to escape.  
 
Would you push the person into the tiger enclosure? 
 
Yes    No. 
 
Data Sets 
 
We collected data through two different sources.  The descriptions of the data sets are as 
follows.  
 
Data Set 1 
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For the first experimental runs we used the Moral Sense Test (MST) website.  
Participants visited the site without being solicited and started the survey after some 
initial instructions and explanations.    
 
These surveys were pilot studies and somewhat exploratory.  For these surveys we 
changed the order of the experimental procedure from Valdesolo & DeSteno (2006).  We 
had some concerns about the mood values that Valdesolo & DeSteno report and wanted 
to investigate this issue first.  Instead of showing the comedy clip first, then presenting 
the scenario, and subsequently presenting the mood indicator, we presented the mood 
indicator right after the video clip.  We wanted to test what the affective states would be 
right after the video clip, that is, when in the main experimental runs participants would 
be answering the trolley question.  Since our main focus here was on the mood indicator, 
we did not time the moral dilemmas to 15s per screen but allowed participants to answer 
in their own time.  
 
We ran three different positive (comedy) video clips and a neutral one.  Two of the 
comedy clips were from SNL and one was a standup comedy routine by a comedian who 
had been nominated for several awards.
51
  One of the SNL clips was titled “Celebrity 
Jeopardy: Nicolas Cage, Calista Flockhart and Sean Connery” and the other SNL clip 
was titled “Marble Columns.”  The standup comedy routine was by Rhod Gilbert titled 
“Luggage.”  The control video clip was a five-minute documentary on Spain that showed 
some of the landmarks of the country. 
 
                                                 
51
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhod_Gilbert 
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We presented the Tiger scenario in some of the surveys in Data Set 1 and in all Train 
scenarios surveyed for this data set we asked, “Would you push the man off the bridge?” 
instead of asking about appropriateness.   
 
Data Set 2 
These experimental runs were much closer in procedure to Valdesolo & DeSteno (2006).  
We ran these experiments at the London School of Economics.  Some of the participants 
signed up through the Behavioral Research Laboratory (BRL) and some responded to 
emails sent out by the philosophy department.  We used the same sequence as Valdesolo 
& DeSteno, i.e. we first presented the video clip, then the moral dilemma (timed to 15s 
per screen) and finally the mood indicator.  We only showed the Train scenario in this 
data set and asked about appropriateness as in the original paper.  We had two positive 
videos and two neutral ones.  One of the positive videos was an SNL clip titled 
“Celebrity Jeopardy: Rock Star Edition” (RSE) and the other clip consisted of two 
comedy sketches from the BBC One series “Come Fly with Me” edited together to show 
as one clip.  These were “Penny’s Royal Visit” followed by “Tommy’s New Job.”  There 
was a screen in between the clips with the text ‘Clip 2’ showing for about two seconds.  
One of the neutral clips – titled “Material World” – was taken from a BBC documentary.  
The topic of the documentary was materials that exist in nature such as wood and silk.  
The other clip was about the effects of deforestation.  This clip was somewhat dark, 
ending with prospects of mass extinction if deforestation was not stopped.  We chose this 
video because none of the other clips yielded as low a mood rating as that reported by 
Valdesolo and DeSteno.    
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3.2.3: Results for Mood Indicators 
 
Before we present the outcomes of the trolley dilemmas, we would like to discuss the 
mood indicators in some detail.  The mean mood measure Valdesolo & DeSteno report 
for their control condition is M = 2.77 (N = 38) and for their experimental condition M = 
4.57 (N = 41). 
 
Data Set 1 
The first experiments we ran were from Data Set 1 and we did not attain a mood rating as 
low as 2.77 in any of our experimental runs.  In fact, we did not come anywhere close to 
this number. 
 
In Data Set 1, the average mood rating for Celebrity Jeopardy, Marbleopolis, Luggage 
and the Spain Documentary were respectively, M = 4.69 (SD = 1.44; N = 99), M = 4.52 
(SD = 1.45; N = 38), M = 4.75 (SD = 1.46; N = 50), M = 4.56 (SD = 1.48; N = 63)
52
.  A 
one-way ANOVA comparing the means yielded no significant difference (p = 0.29). 
   
These results may mean one of two things.  Either the positive videos failed to increase 
mood values or the neutral video was not neutral but instead increased mood ratings.   
 
Data Set 2 
                                                 
52
 In all instances in this paper where we averaged the ratings of the four variables (Happy, Content, 
Pleasant, Good) to construct a composite variable, Cronbach’s alpha was at least 0.7 and typically much 
higher, in the 0.9 region. 
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For Data Set 2, the average mood ratings for BBC Comedy, Deforestation, SNL RSE, 
and Material World were respectively, M = 5.00 (SD = 1.15; N = 28), M = 4.16 (SD = 
1.63; N = 27), M = 4.57 (SD = 1.34; N = 53), M = 4.57 (SD = 1.65; N = 44).  This time a 
one-way ANOVA comparing the means yielded a significant difference (p = 0.00).  Post-
hoc analysis (Bonferroni) showed a significant difference between BBC and 
Deforestation (p = 0.00).  
 
Several other comparisons produced results close to significance: BBC Comedy 
compared to SNL yielded p = 0.069; BBC Comedy compared to Material World yielded 
p = 0.094; Deforestation compared to SNL yielded p = 0.100 and finally  
Deforestation compared to Material World yielded p = 0.117.  
 
Conclusion on Mood Indicator 
Some preliminary conclusions may be in place at this point.  The lowest mean rating we 
attained for any of the video clips was 4.16 (Deforestation), which was not necessarily a 
neutral clip but rather disheartening.  
 
If we took 4.16 and 1.63 as estimates of the population mean and standard deviation 
respectively, we would expect to attain a value of 2.77 on the mood indicator in less than 
0.1% of cases.  The mood value of 2.77 that Valdesolo & DeSteno report is simply not 
within the range of values we would expect in such a study.  And this follows from a 
comparison to the darkest clip we ran, which produced the lowest mood value we 
attained.      
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The next thing we conclude is that it is not trivial to increase mood ratings of participants 
and any comedy video clip will not do.  We chose clips that were described as funny on 
various websites and listed in rankings of the funniest SNL clips.  In other instances we 
sent clips to students and colleagues and chose the ones that received the best feedback.  
In all, however, our choices for SNL clips were very limited because of copyright 
restrictions. 
  
We will provide an analysis of the responses on the trolley cases for both data sets, 
despite failing to elicit differences on mood values in Data Set 1.  The various brain 
regions (ACC, BA, and DLPFC ) that are activated when considering moral dilemmas 
may nevertheless be affected by the video clips even though it is not captured by the 
mood indicator.  
 
3.2.4: Results for Trolley Dilemma 
 
We will divide this results section in two parts.  The first set of results are presented in 
Section 3.2.4.1 where we compare the original findings to Data Set 2.  These were the 
closest in procedure and in our data set we also managed to produce statistically 
significant differences in mood ratings.  In Section 3.2.4.2 we present the findings from 
Data Set 1.  
 
3.2.4.1: Results for Trolley Dilemma – Data Set 2 
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A summary table of the findings is presented below.  In all tables, * denotes p < 0.05. 
 
Experiment N n 
Response 
χ2 p-exact 
Appropriate Inappropriate 
Original SNL 
79 
41 10 24.4% 31 75.6% 
3.90 < 0.05* 
Original Spain 38 3 7.9% 35 92.1% 
         
BBC Comedy 
51 
26 5 19.2% 21 80.8% 
0.17 0.74 
Deforestation 25 6 24.0% 19 76.0% 
         
SNL (RSE) 
95 
53 12 22.6% 41 77.4% 
0.18 0.80 
Material World 42 8 19.0% 34 81.0% 
Table 3.2.1: Judgments for Original and Replication Study (Data Set 2) 
 
An independent-samples t-test comparing mood values of BBC Comedy and 
Deforestation produced t(49) = 4.46, p = 0.00.  Comparing SNL (RSE) to Material World 
with an independent-samples t-test produced t(93) = 0.034, p = 0.97. 
 
The main comparison we present in Table 3.2.1 is between BBC Comedy versus 
Deforestation and SNL versus Material World because the data for these scenarios was 
collected in the same procedures.  That is, in one experimental run participants were 
randomly assigned to BBC Comedy or Deforestation and in a procedure that was run at a 
different time, participants were randomly assigned to SNL or Material World.   
 
Nevertheless, given that BBC Comedy produced mood ratings significantly different at 
the 10% level from the other two clips (SNL and Material World), we also want to report 
comparisons between these clips, the assumption being that SNL and Material World did 
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not have an effect on affective state and only functioned as control conditions.  
Comparing the BBC Comedy and SNL conditions yielded p-exact = 1.000 (χ2 = 0.120; p 
= 0.729) and comparing BBC Comedy with Material World yielded p-exact = 1.000 (χ2 = 
0.000; p = 0.985). 
 
There are several things we want to highlight at this point.  What stands out in Table 
3.2.1 is the low value of ‘Appropriate’ answer choices for Valdesolo & DeSteno’s control 
condition.  This value stands out when compared to all other conditions run in the 
original as well as replication studies.  The next thing that stands out is that the 
proportion of ‘Appropriate’ answers is around the 20% mark for all of the other 
conditions (replication as well as original).  Finally, the percentage of participants giving 
the ‘Appropriate’ answer was higher for Deforestation than for BBC Comedy.  The 
reason could be that watching a negative clip discussing prospects of mass extinction 
may lower inhibitions against actively bringing about the death of a stranger.  This is 
speculation and the difference could simply be due to chance variation; however, we 
want to point this out in case the Deforestation clip (due to its negative nature) may not 
have tested the effect that Valdesolo & DeSteno investigated.  It should also be noted that 
with this line of reasoning we now have the hypothesis that both negative as well as 
positive clips can induce more participants to choose the ‘Appropriate’ answer choice.     
  
3.2.4.2: Results for Trolley Dilemma – Data Set 1 
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Although we did not attain significant differences for the mood indicators in Data Set 1, 
we will present the outcomes here for completeness.  As a reminder, the mood indicator 
was presented before the moral dilemmas and the dilemmas were not timed.  There were 
also some differences in other aspects of the surveys.  For example, in one of the SNL 
surveys the train scenario was not randomized in a series of non-moral filler questions but 
instead always presented as the second question.  There were some other differences 
among the surveys but these were not major and we provide the results below with this 
qualification in mind. 
 
For data analysis, we will separate the data of all surveys where we presented the Train 
scenario and all surveys where we presented the Tiger scenario. 
 
Results for Train Scenario 
We used all of the clips (Marbleopolis, Celebrity Jeopardy, Luggage, and Spain 
Documentary) in testing the Train scenario.  Comparing the positive to the control 
conditions yielded no difference on judgments (here judging the question “Would you 
push the man off the bridge?”: Yes/No) with p-exact = 0.33 (N = 348).  For the full 
details, see Table 3.2.2 below.  Averaging the mood variables, for the comedy clips we 
attained a mean mood value of M = 4.54 (SD = 1.37; N = 246) and for the neutral clips 
mean equaled M = 4.25 (SD = 1.38; N = 56).
53
  An independent-samples t-test comparing 
the two conditions yielded no difference with t(300) = 1.42, p = 0.16. 
 
                                                 
53
 One of the surveys did not collect data on mood indicators, therefore the number of 302 for N in the 
mood comparison instead of 348 that is indicated in the moral judgment comparison. 
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Results for Tiger Scenario 
We presented the Tiger scenario only in two conditions – one experimental and one 
control – and the video clips used for the experimental and control conditions 
respectively were Celebrity Jeopardy and Spain Documentary.  A comparison between 
the two conditions yielded no statistical significance on judgments with p-exact = 0.35 (N 
= 104).  For the full details, see Table 3.2.2 below.  The mood rating for the positive clip 
was M = 4.76 (SD = 1.41; N = 43) and for the neutral clip mean was M = 4.49 (SD = 
1.34; N = 64).  An independent-samples t-test comparing the two conditions yielded no 
difference with t(105) = 1.00, p = 0.32.  
 
The summary results of the Train and Tiger scenarios are presented below. 
 
Scenario Condition N n 
Response 
χ2 p-exact 
Yes No 
Train 
Experiment 
348 
294 66 22.4% 228 77.6% 
0.41 0.33 
Control 54 10 18.5% 44 81.5% 
         
Tiger 
Experiment  
104 
39 3 7.7% 36 92.3% 
0.55 0.35 
Control 65 8 12.3% 57 87.7% 
Table 3.2.2: Judgments on Train and Tiger Scenarios (Data Set 1) 
 
For the train scenario the proportion of ‘Yes’ answers to the question ‘Would you push 
the man off the bridge?’ was around the 20% mark.  In the Tiger scenario this number 
was considerably lower.  Being attacked and devoured by a tiger is likely imagined by 
participants as more painful than being hit by a train and this likely created a stronger 
emotional reaction.  The imagery of the Tiger case is also more vivid and concrete than 
the Train case.  
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3.2.5: Concluding Remarks 
 
For all of the replication studies that used the Train scenario, we were somewhat 
surprised by the high percentages of the ‘Appropriate’ answer choices and we were 
especially surprised by the high percentage of the ‘Yes’ answer choices when the 
question asked was whether participants would push the stranger off the bridge.  We 
looked at Greene et al. (2001) for a comparison; however, the sample was too small in 
that article (N = 9) to be a good reference point. 
 
For an approximation, we examined Hauser et al. (2007) who ran a large-scale study 
online, surveying over 5000 participants from 120 different countries on several trolley 
type scenarios, including the standard bystander case as well as the footbridge dilemma 
(Hauser, Cushman, Young, Kang-Xing Jin, & Mikhail, 2007).   
 
The procedures in Hauser et al. (2007) differed in several ways from Valdesolo & 
DeSteno (2006).  First, Hauser and colleagues asked about permissibility, whereas 
Valdesolo & DeSteno asked about appropriateness. Second, Hauser et al. asked whether 
the course of action was permissible for a third party (the name of the protagonist in the 
footbridge dilemma was Frank), whereas Valdesolo & DeSteno asked about 
appropriateness in a neutral way.  Finally, the scenarios in Hauser et al. (2007) were not 
timed, whereas participants in Valdesolo & DeSteno (2006) had 15 seconds to make their 
choice.    
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These differences make comparison between the two studies somewhat difficult.  With 
this in mind, overall, in Hauser et al. (2007) twelve percent of respondents said that it was 
permissible to push the person off the bridge in order to derail the trolley.   
 
Our first thought for the high percentages of approving answers in the experimental 
condition of Valdesolo & DeSteno (2006) and in the replication studies was that being 
timed to 15 seconds may have rushed participants into making a choice and given that 
‘Appropriate’ was on the left and given the convention of reading English from left to 
right, we suspected that some participants may have selected the first choice they came 
across (at least a larger proportion than if the question was not timed).  However, the 
percentages from Data Set 1 of the replication study where we did not set a time limit 
were similar to the timed procedures.   
 
We also expected to have much lower approving answer choices when the question asked 
participants whether they personally would push the man off the bridge as in Data Set 1.  
However, the percentages were again comparable to responses in Data Set 2, where we 
asked about appropriateness in a neutral.  We do not have a good explanation for these 
outcomes.  
 
Sample Size 
The study that was closest in procedures and that also produced differences in mood 
ratings was the comparison between BBC Comedy and Deforestation in Data Set 2.  
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However, as discussed before, Deforestation may not qualify as a neutral clip but rather 
be a negative one (although the mood ratings still did not remotely approach the low 
mood ratings of Valdesolo & DeSteno) and furthermore the sample size was relatively 
small at N = 51 as compared to Valdesolo & DeSteno’s N = 79.  It is possible that we did 
not have sufficient power to detect a difference; however, this does not seem very likely 
as the direction of the responses was in reverse of those reported by Valdesolo & 
DeSteno.  That is, the neutral clip had a higher percentage of ‘Appropriate’ answer 
choices than the comedy clip.  We will not present power calculations here because we 
did not have the details of procedures for the original study and hence comparison may 
not be straightforward. 
 
Trolley Problem 
One of the problems in conducting a replication of this kind is that the trolley problem 
has been treated in popular media such as newspapers and blogs (Bakewell, 2013; Brean, 
2010; Weiss, 2008).  Participants in our surveys may have been more familiar with the 
dilemma than individuals surveyed by Valdesolo & DeSteno; this is especially the case 
for participants who voluntarily visit sites like the MST.  A trend search for the term 
“trolley problem” on Google shows an increase in frequency since 2008.   
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Figure 3.1: Trend Search for Term “Trolley Problem” 
Note: The chart depicts relative search volume.  The highest volume is designated 100 and 
subsequently any period that had half that search volume is denoted with 50. 
 
Previous exposure to the scenario may make manipulation of judgments more difficult as 
individuals may have contemplated on the problem and made up their mind.  
 
Related Studies 
As mentioned in the introduction, one paper has modeled its line of investigation on 
Valdesolo & DeSteno (2006).  In a similar way to how Valdesolo & DeSteno (2006) 
attempt to manipulate brain regions responsible for emotional processing, Greene et al. 
(2008) attempt to manipulate brain areas responsible for cognitive tasks while 
participants consider the trolley dilemma.   
 
Greene et al. (2008) gave participants a digit search task where a sequence of numbers 
scrolled across the screen and every time the number 5 appeared, participants had to press 
a specific button.  This was supposed to increase the cognitive load on areas processing 
cognitive tasks and hence interfere with moral judgments.  Greene et al. (2008) 
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hypothesized that this would interfere with judgments (lower the frequency of utilitarian 
judgments) as well as reaction times.
54
  
 
As the authors note,  
 
utilitarian moral judgments (favoring the sacrifice of one life to save several 
others) are supported by cognitive control processes, and therefore we predicted 
that increasing cognitive load by imposing another control-demanding task would 
interfere with utilitarian moral judgments, yielding increased RT and/or decreased 
frequency for utilitarian moral judgment.” (Greene et al., 2008, p. 1147) 
 
The data did not confirm the hypothesis entirely.  While reaction times increased, the 
frequency of the ‘Appropriate’ response did not.  Greene et al. (2008) conclude that 
“while load impacted RT, it did not reduce the proportion of utilitarian judgments, as one 
might have expected based on our theory” (Greene et al., 2008, p. 1151). 
 
The interpretation of these outcomes is not straightforward for Valdesolo & DeSteno’s 
study.  On the one hand, Greene et al. (2008) suggests that participants’ judgments are 
not easily manipulated.  On the other hand, the findings may be of little relevance to 
Valdesolo & DeSteno (2006) because the focus is on cognitive and not emotional 
processes.  If one were to assume the reproducibility of Valdesolo & DeSteno (2006), 
these two papers in combination could weakly suggest that cognitive processes are less 
open to manipulation than emotional processes. 
 
Conclusion 
                                                 
54
 Reaction time was hypothesized to increase for participants making the utilitarian judgment only, not for 
those making the deontological judgment. 
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Although the exact details of the original study were not available to us, following all 
published procedures and using several different positive as well as control conditions, 
we could not replicate Valdesolo & DeSteno’s (2006) finding.  We believe that there are 
two strong indications that the findings of the original paper are not reliable.  First, the 
mean mood value Valdesolo & DeSteno provide for their control condition (M = 2.77) is 
an extreme outlier when compared to all other mood ratings and even compared to the 
lowest value we attained.  A rating of 2.77 is extremely unlikely.  In a similar way, the 
percentage of ‘Appropriate’ answer choices for Valdesolo & DeSteno’s control condition 
also stands out.  The only study where this number came about in the replication runs was 
where we used a different scenario (Tiger), which was much more graphic.  Ideally, we 
would like to obtain the exact details of the original experimental procedures and conduct 
another replication.  Given that this is unlikely, we believe that the effect reported by 
Valdesolo & DeSteno (2006) needs to be viewed with caution.    
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Paper 4: Prevalence of False-Positive Results 
 
After failing to reproduce many of the most cited findings in the experimental philosophy 
literature (Papers 1 and 2) as well as two papers published in psychology journals (Paper 
3), we started to examine the literature – historical as well as current – on the 
reproducibility of published findings in experimental sciences in general, with a strong 
focus on psychology.  The focus is on psychology because it is the methods of this field 
that experimental philosophers have adopted to study philosophical questions.  The 
present paper reviews this literature. 
 
Aside from gaining a better understanding of this topic through a literature review, we 
had another motivation for this study.  A straightforward way of assessing the 
reproducibility of findings in the experimental philosophy literature would be to attempt 
replication of a representative sample of results.  This task lies beyond our resources.  
However, experimental philosophy is often described as the study of philosophical 
questions, using the methods of experimental psychology (Alexander, 2012; Knobe & 
Nichols, 2008; Nadelhoffer & Nahmias, 2007) and by importing the methods of 
experimental psychology, philosophers will inevitably import some of the problems of 
that field.  The problems of experimental psychology have been discussed for decades 
and examining these debates will reveal the problems that experimental philosophy is 
likely to face.  There is currently a ‘crisis of confidence’ in psychology and various other 
empirical disciplines.  By examining the crisis in psychology, it may be possible to 
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evaluate the state of experimental philosophy as it is practiced today and the likely course 
it will take (unless changes are made). 
 
The current crisis of confidence in psychology was triggered by two seemingly unrelated 
events.  One was the publication of Bem’s paper on extrasensory perception titled 
“Feeling the Future: Experimental Evidence for Anomalous Retroactive Influences on 
Cognition and Affect” (Bem, 2011) and the other was a series of high profile cases of 
fraud involving very esteemed researchers such as Marc Hauser and Diederik Stapel, 
amongst others.   
 
However, neither of the two above mentioned occurrences – the rare highly improbable 
result nor the rare cases of high-profile fraud
55
 – really lie at the heart of the current crisis 
of psychology.  Instead, what is much more endemic and what seems much more 
damaging to the field are the likely high rates of published false-positive results.   
 
Various researchers have argued that false positives possibly make up the majority of 
publications in psychology (Bakker et al., 2012; Ioannidis, 2005, 2012; Pashler & Harris, 
2012).  Ioannidis has contended that in “several fields of investigation, including many 
areas of psychological science, perpetuated and unchallenged fallacies may comprise the 
majority of the circulating evidence.” Even more, Ioannidis claims, “the prevalence of 
unchallenged fallacies may represent even up to 95% (if not more) of the significant 
findings in some areas of the psychological literature” (Ioannidis, 2012, p. 645 and 650). 
                                                 
55
 Although, it is also debatable whether such cases of fraud are rare, see Sovacool (2008) and Stroebe et al. 
(2012). 
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The discipline of psychology is not the only one afflicted with this problem.  The rate of 
reproducible findings is possibly abnormally low in various other empirical fields, most 
notably the biomedical sciences.  Studies such as (Begley & Ellis, 2012b; Diep, 2013; 
Fang & Casadevall, 2012; Osherovich, 2011; Prinz, Schlange, & Asadullah, 2011a, 
2011b; Turner, Matthews, Linardatos, Tell, & Rosenthal, 2008) have led commentators to 
claim that “evidence from diverse fields suggests that when efforts are made to repeat or 
reproduce published research, the repeatability and reproducibility is dismal” (Ioannidis, 
2012, p. 647). 
 
This paper is structured as follows.  Section 4.1 starts by giving some details on the cases 
of Bem and Stapel as a background to the discussion that follows in the rest of the paper.  
Section 4.2 gives a discussion of the ways through which false-positive results can enter 
the literature; the first is through the use of the prevailing statistical and publishing 
practices and the second is through the use of questionable research practices (QRPs).  
Section 4.3 discusses some of the reasons why researchers may use questionable 
practices.  The final section concludes with a discussion. 
 
4.1: The Cases of Stapel and Bem 
 
As a background to this paper, we provide a closer account of the Stapel and Bem cases.  
This is not because these cases are representative of problematic conduct in psychology 
and also not because these are the most damaging to the field.  Instead, the motivation is 
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to show some extreme cases that can pass through the current publication system and also 
persist for years in the literature.  These cases may be the exceptions; however, according 
to some researchers, similar practices although in less blatant forms are widespread and 
possibly the norm in psychology (John et al., 2012).       
 
4.1.1: Stapel – Fraud and Questionable Science 
 
Recently, there have been numerous high profile cases of fraud in psychology (J. Cooper, 
2012; Dahlberg, 2012; Levelt, 2012; Oransky, 2012, 2013; Yong, 2012b).  There are 
several reasons for singling Stapel’s case out here.  First, Stapel was highly regarded by 
his colleagues as a prolific writer who published in the most prestigious international 
journals.  Second, the universities at which Stapel held positions conducted very thorough 
investigations (for cases ranging from 1993 until 2011) and made all results public; the 
main findings being presented by the Levelt committee (Levelt, 2012).  This is in contrast 
to other cases where specific laws prevented universities from making their reports public 
(Dahlberg, 2012; Oransky, 2013).  Furthermore, Stapel himself cooperated with the 
inquiry to a degree.
56
  Third, Stapel’s is likely one of the most extreme cases of recent 
fraud in psychology with some of the most blatant methods used to fabricate results.  
Thus, it may serve as an extreme of how scientific practice can fail and how researchers 
can get away for extended periods of time without being exposed by the current standard 
processes.  Finally, the investigation also touches on broader issues such as the 
                                                 
56
 Stapel initially cooperated with the investigations and supplied many details but later stopped due to 
health concerns (Levelt, 2012). 
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prevalence of questionable research practices, research culture, and carelessness of 
Stapel’s collaborators and co-authors as well as journals.  
 
As briefly pointed out, Stapel was considered an immensely talented psychologist with a 
very promising career ahead.  He was a prolific writer with publications in many 
reputable journals, often publishing work in collaboration with international 
researchers.
57
  In 2009 Stapel received the "Career Trajectory Award" from the Society of 
Experimental Social Psychology which “celebrates scientific contributions made in the 
early-to-mid stages of a research career” (SESP, 2013).  The award has since been 
retracted.  In 2010 Stapel was named dean of the Social and Behavioural Sciences 
Faculty at Tilburg University.  Stapel received more than two million euros in research 
funding from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research. 
 
Stapel used four strategies to falsify data.  The first was to straight-out fabricate response 
sheets to experiments that, although were discussed in group-meetings, were never 
carried out with subjects.  Stapel would tell his students and research assistants that the 
data was collected in a different laboratory.  The second strategy was to carry out 
experiments with participants as discussed in group-meetings.  However, before the data 
was analyzed by research assistants, Stapel would take the material in for ‘inspection’.  
This gave him an opportunity to alter the data before it was passed on to others.  The 
third strategy Stapel used was to contact researchers at other universities and inform them 
that he had collected data in the past on experiments that would be of interest.  Stapel 
would explain that he never had the time to analyze this data.  This alleged raw data was 
                                                 
57
 All collaborators, including Stapel’s PhD students, were cleared of misconduct. 
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never collected in experiments but was entirely fabricated by Stapel.  Stapel would ask 
his collaborators to analyze the data and to author manuscripts.  A final strategy Stapel 
used was to tell his research group that he had contacts in high schools and that these 
would gladly collect data in classroom settings in exchange for computer equipment or 
projectors.  In reality these contacts did not exist and Stapel would once again fabricate 
response sheets. 
 
In many of the cases where research led to publication, Stapel was the only person in 
charge of data collection.  This should have been reason for suspicion, as more senior 
faculty members typically stay away from the tedious and time consuming task of data 
collection.  Nevertheless, according to one evaluation, Stapel could have eluded 
discovery and explained away irregularities as mistakes had he only used the first three 
strategies (Stroebe, Postmes, & Spears, 2012).  What gave him away was the fourth 
approach; after university officials asked to speak with Stapel’s contacts in high schools, 
Stapel had no option but to admit wrongdoing.   
 
On two prior occasions allegations of misconduct had surfaced (brought forth by research 
students as well as faculty members); however, no action was taken.  This time, the 
whistleblowers waited until they had sufficient evidence and only then contacted 
university officials.  One of the irregularities that the whistleblowers noticed was that the 
mean age for data collected in high schools came out to 19.  Another peculiarity the 
whistleblowers noticed was that identical lines of data appeared in multiple studies.  
Furthermore, the effect sizes of Stapel’s data were extremely strong and for every study 
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the data fit the hypothesis perfectly.  Upon being contacted by the whistleblowers, 
university officials this time launched an investigation.   
 
The findings of the investigation were published in 2012 and concluded, amongst other 
things, that Stapel had used questionable practices as early as 1996, including for his PhD 
dissertation.  From 2002 onward, Stapel shared fabricated data with other researchers.  At 
the time of writing, 46 of Stapel’s papers have been retracted and the number is likely to 
increase to 55.  For a full list of articles the committee designated as fraudulent, see 
(Levelt, 2012). 
 
These papers, so the report, were cases of fraud.  However, in addition to fraud, the 
committee also highlights that many questionable practices were used that did not fall 
directly under the committee’s definition of fraud.  The report’s definition of fraud is 
stated as the “fabrication, falsification or unjustified replenishment of data, as well as the 
whole or partial fabrication of analysis results. It also includes the misleading 
presentation of crucial points as far as the organization or nature of the experiment are 
concerned" (Levelt, 2012, p. 17). 
 
In contrast to fraud, some of the examples of questionable research practices highlighted 
by the report are the following.  Experiments were repeated multiple times with minor 
changes until a significant outcome was achieved.  Hereupon the experiment was ended 
and a positive result recorded without mentioning in the manuscript how many runs had 
been conducted in total.  A further practice consisted of comparing experimental groups 
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to control groups from other experiments depending on which one yielded a better 
comparison.  Another practice was the unjustified deletion of data points from analysis.  
This practice can present a gray area, as deleting observations may be legitimate in some 
instances.  For example, an extreme outlier in a reaction time study may be legitimately 
eliminated from analysis.  However, Stapel’s approach was not pre-determined and 
decisions were made on a case-by-case basis.  For a more comprehensive list of 
questionable research practices, see Table 4.2 in Section 4.2.2. 
 
The distinction between fraud and questionable research practices may not be very 
meaningful as the damage caused by the latter to psychology may in fact be greater.  For 
the most part in this paper as well as Paper 5, we will treat the two as the same; fraud and 
misconduct being a subset of questionable research practices.  As the Levelt report 
highlights, questionable research practices may be “in principle, equally unacceptable and 
may, if not identified or corrected, easily lead to more serious breaches of standards of 
integrity” (Levelt, 2012, p. 57). 
 
In addition to finding fault with Stapel and his collaborators, the committees also express 
criticism of the field’s journals.  In interviews the committees conducted, several 
individuals mentioned that “reviewers encouraged irregular practices” (Levelt, 2012, p. 
53).  Such irregular practices included suggestions by referees to omit experimental 
variables in final analyses or to conduct post-hoc pilot studies, which were to be 
designated as preceding the main experimental run.  Furthermore, aesthetic concerns 
were often given higher priority than truthful reporting.  The Levelt report states that “not 
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infrequently reviews were strongly in favour of telling an interesting, elegant, concise and 
compelling story, possibly at the expense of the necessary scientific diligence” (Levelt, 
2012, p. 53).  As a general evaluation, the committees express concern with the entire 
research environment in which Stapel found himself and refer to a “failure of scientific 
criticism in the peer community” and a “failure on all levels of the scientific review 
procedures” (Levelt, 2012, p. 47). 
 
The Levelt report includes some suggestions on how to avoid cases like Stapel’s from 
recurring in the future.  Three main areas are identified: replication, transparency and 
journal standards.  One of the criticisms of the report is that Stapel’s results were not 
replicated systematically and in cases were replication did take place, these could not be 
published because of an aversion by journals to publishing replications.   Levelt urges 
that “far more than is customary in psychology research practice, replication must be 
made part of the basic instruments of the discipline and at least a few journals must 
provide space for the publication of replicated research” (Levelt, 2012, p. 58).  In order to 
facilitate replications, the committees advise for more transparency.  This includes the 
detailed descriptions of experimental conduct, making raw data available online as well 
as experimental materials such as survey sheets and any graphics used.  
  
One worrying conclusion that emerges from the investigation is that Stapel’s case may 
merely be the tip of the iceberg.  The report notes that “the Committees have been made 
aware of several cases of this kind in the Netherlands and abroad, in which much research 
funding and expensive research time has been wasted” (Levelt, 2012, p. 54).   
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Overall, the report finds strong words for the research environment as a whole, 
suggesting that the problems of the field may be systemic.  The report notes.   
  
A byproduct of the Committees’ inquiries is the conclusion that, far more than 
originally assumed, there are certain aspects of the discipline itself that should be 
deemed undesirable or even incorrect from the perspective of academic standards 
and scientific integrity […] the critical function of science has failed on all levels. 
Fundamental principles of scientific method have been ignored, or set aside as 
irrelevant. In the opinion of the Committees this has contributed significantly to 
the delayed discovery of the fraud. It is to the credit of the whistleblowers in 
Tilburg that they did discover these infringements of scientific integrity and took 
the correct action. (Levelt, 2012, p. 54) 
 
4.1.2: Bem – Feeling the Future 
 
In a paper published in 2011 in the prestigious Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, Bem claimed to have evidence for psi or extrasensory perception.  Bem 
presented nine studies with over 1,000 participants to test whether individuals could 
predict future events and eight of these studies yielded statically significant results (Bem, 
2011).  
 
The first experiment of the paper ran as follows.  Two pictures of curtains were shown 
side-by-side on a computer screen.  Participants were asked to guess behind which of the 
curtains there was an object.  However, neither the type of object nor its position was 
determined by the computer program until after individuals made their choice.  
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If participants were more likely than chance to predict the correct position of the object 
(behind the left or right curtain), the experiment would provide evidence of precognition 
or the ability to predict the future.  And in fact, Bem found that for certain classes of 
objects participants were more likely than chance (53.1%; p = 0.01) to predict the correct 
position.  Given that the position of the object was not determined by the computer 
program until after participants made their choice, participants were predicting future 
events.  Bem found effects on classes of objects that were either related to themes of 
procreation or fight-or-flight responses.  Having precognition on these classes of objects, 
so Bem, gives individuals an evolutionary advantage.    
 
The experiment with the largest effect size (d = 0.42) was a recall test (conducted in 
reverse).  Individuals were presented with a list of words and later asked to recall these 
and enter them in a text box at their computer.  After the task was completed, the 
computer program randomly selected a subset of these words and displayed these on the 
monitor to participants.  Bem found that words that were shown to participants after the 
recall task, had a higher likelihood of being correctly remembered (p = 0.002).  That is, 
future events had an effect on recall performance.            
 
To summarize the main findings of Bem’s paper, the results suggest that cause need not 
always precede effect and that humans may have evolved a capacity for predicting future 
events.  These are certainly important findings that warrant further scrutiny, especially 
given the strong evidence that Bem presents with over one thousand participants.  
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Bem’s paper received considerable criticism on methodological grounds in various 
journals (Alcock, 2011; Rouder & Morey, 2011; Shermer, 2011; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, 
Borsboom, Kievit, & van der Maas, ms; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, & van der 
Maas, 2011).  The paper also received criticism in less formal outlets (Carey, 2011; 
Shermer, 2011).  All of these reactions are important; however, our main interest here is 
in what happened when a group of researchers attempted to replicate one of Bem’s 
experiments and submitted their manuscript for publication.  Ritchie, Wiseman, & French 
(2012a) took on the task of replicating one of the nine experiments in Bem (2011).  They 
selected the experiment with the largest effect size (outlined above).  The replications 
were conducted in three different laboratories, each with a sample size as large as the 
original trial.  All three replication attempts failed.  Ritchie, Wiseman, & French 
submitted their manuscript to the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, the same 
journal that had published Bem’s original paper.  The journal responded that as a matter 
of journal policy, replication studies would not be considered for publication.  This is 
very revealing of the priorities of one of the most prestigious psychology journals.  
Hereby, the journal was signaling that it was less concerned about truthful research but 
instead sensational outcomes.  
 
After the first rejection, three further publication attempts failed (Ritchie et al., 2012b).  
Finally, the journal PLOS ONE accepted the manuscript for publication (Ritchie, 
Wiseman, & French, 2012a).  PLOS ONE’s approach is to publish articles on their merit 
and not perceived importance.  As the guidelines state, PLOS ONE will “publish all 
papers that are judged to be technically sound. Judgments about the importance of any 
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particular paper are then made after publication by the readership (who are the most 
qualified to determine what is of interest to them)” (PLOS, 2013).  PLOS ONE is a young 
journal, established in 2006, and represents a novel approach to publishing.   
 
4.2: Sources of False Positives 
 
As previously mentioned, although the cases of Bem and Stapel may be informative, the 
main concern of this paper is the prevalence of false-positive results in the published 
literature.  There are, very broadly speaking, two ways in which false-positive results 
enter the published literature.  One is through fraud and questionable research practices 
and the other is as a by-product of prevailing statistical and publication practices.   
 
4.2.1: Prevailing Statistical and Publication Practices 
 
It is often argued that the 5% alpha level typically used in statistical procedures assures 
that only five percent of positive results in the literature are false positives (Pashler & 
Harris, 2012).  This argument, so Pashler & Harris, is inaccurate because it misses the 
literature-wide alpha level.  Consider the following example as adapted from Pashler & 
Harris (2012).   
 
Assume that for all experiments carried out in psychology research the prior probability 
of an effect existing is 10 percent.  That is, in 90 percent of cases the null hypothesis is 
correct.  Given an alpha level of 5%, we would expect the false rejection of the null 
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hypothesis in 4.5% (0.05 x 0.9) of experiments (Type I error).  Furthermore, consider that 
the discipline-wide power (probability of correctly rejecting the null hypothesis when the 
null is incorrect) of experiments is 0.35.  Then, the null will be rejected correctly in 3.5% 
(0.35 x 0.1) of cases.  If all positive results were published, then false positives would 
make up 56% (
4.5
4.5+3.5
) of published results.  This number is substantially greater than the 
5% alpha level that is supposed to be a stringent safeguard against the introduction of 
false-positive results into the scientific literature.  We provide a closer explanation of 
these numbers below. 
 
The prior selected in the above example is certainly debatable.  What the true prior is in 
psychology research is difficult to assess (and of course, the lower the prior, the more 
exciting the result).  The average statistical power used in published psychology 
experiments is estimated to be 0.35 (Bakker et al., 2012).  This is calculated from a 
median sample size of 40 used in experiments (Marszalek, Barber, Kohlhart, & Holmes, 
2011; Wetzels et al., 2011) and an average effect size of d = 0.50 (Anderson, Lindsay, & 
Bushman, 1999; Lipsey & Wilson, 1993; Meyer et al., 2001; Richard, Bond, & Stokes-
Zoota, 2003; Tett, Meyer, & Roese, 1994).  Generally speaking, there are three 
components that determine the power of a study.  These are the sample size (the greater 
the sample size the greater the likelihood of finding an effect if one existed); effect size 
(the greater the effect size, the more likely an experiment will detect an effect if one 
existed (at a given alpha level and sample size)); and the alpha level (the greater the alpha 
level, the more likely that an experiment will detect an effect (at that level) given a 
certain sample and effect size.  
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Table 4.1 provides different combinations of values of prior and power, as adapted from 
Pashler & Harris (2012).   
 
Prior 
probability 
of effect 
Power  Proportion of 
studies yielding 
true positives  
Proportion of 
studies yielding 
false positives 
Proportion of 
positive results 
that are false 
(%) (%) (%) Calculation (%) Calculation (%) Calculation 
10 80 8 0.1*0.8 4.5 
(1-
0.1)*0.05
58
 
36 
4.5
4.5 + 8
 
10 35 3.5 0.1*0.35 4.5 (1-0.1)*0.05 56 
4.5
4.5 + 3.5
 
50 35 17.5 0.5*0.35 2.5 (1-0.5)*0.05 13 
2.5
2.5 + 17.5
 
75 35 26.3 0.75*0.35 1.3
59
 (1-0.75)*0.05 5 
1.3
1.3 + 26.3
 
Table 4.1: Combination of Values Yielding False Positives – Pashler & Harris (2012) 
 
Explaining the numbers in Table 4.1 in more detail: with a power of 0.8, if an effect 
existed, the procedure will detect it in 80 out of a 100 experimental runs.  The first row 
assumes the prior to be 10% and hence an effect that exists will be correctly detected in 
8% (0.8 * 0.1) of experimental runs.  
 
The proportion of false positives is calculated as follows.  The prior is assumed to be 
10% and so in 90% of cases an effect does not exist.  With an alpha level of 5%, in five 
percent of cases where an effect does not exist, a false positive (Type I error) will be 
recorded.  That is, 4.5% (0.9 * 0.05) of cases will be studies that yield false positives.   
 
                                                 
58
 Alpha level at 5% assumed.  
59
 The original paper mistakenly gives this value as 1.6%.  
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Overall, the proportion of positive results that are false is the percentage of studies that 
yield false positives (given the prior) divided by the percentage of studies that yield false 
positives and studies where the null is rejected correctly.  For the first row this amounts 
to 
0.9∗0.05
(0.9∗0.05)+(0.8∗0.1)
 or 
4.5
4.5+8
 which equates to 36%.  
 
For a 5% false-positive rate to come about, given a power of 0.35, the prior probability of 
an effect would have to be 0.75.  This may be unrealistic, amongst other reasons, because 
of the high number of studies that are exploratory but for which post-hoc explanations are 
constructed once positive results are attained (Pashler & Harris, 2012).  Exploratory 
studies do not test a specific hypothesis but rather approach some issues in general 
strokes and collect data somewhat indiscriminately.  These studies will reduce the value 
of the prior as in most cases there are no effects to be detected.  However, often when an 
effect is detected, researchers will describe their work as having tested a concrete 
hypothesis (Pashler & Harris, 2012). 
 
 
In closing this segment, from their discussion of statistical methods used in psychology, 
Pashler & Harris (2012) conclude that “in summary, our standard statistical practices 
provide no assurance that erroneous findings will occur in the literature at rates even 
close to the nominal alpha level” (Pashler & Harris, 2012, p. 533).  
 
Publication Bias 
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What makes the numbers estimated above likely is the over the years persistent problem 
of publication bias.  Publication bias refers to the preference that positive results receive 
over negative ones in the publication process.  One of the points of contention which has 
been discussed for decades is the high percentage of positive results of null hypothesis 
significance testing (NHST) in published papers (Bakan, 1966; Bakker et al., 2012; 
Bozarth & Roberts, 1972; Sterling, 1959; Sterling et al., 1995).  Researchers who have 
dealt and followed the problem have concluded that “practice leading to publication bias 
have not changed over a period of 30 years” (Sterling et al., 1995, p. 108).   
 
In a paper published in 1959, Sterling examined four journals each in a different area of 
psychology and found that out of 294 published papers that used null hypothesis 
significance testing (81.2 percent of all papers reviewed), 97% of articles achieved 
positive results at the 5% level (Sterling, 1959).  Similarly, in 1972, a study reported a 
94% rate of null hypothesis rejection rate at the 5% level for three psychology journals 
(900 articles reviewed, 86 percent of which used statistical tests) for a three year period 
between 1967 and 1970 (Bozarth & Roberts, 1972).  In 1995, a group of researchers 
investigated eleven journals of which eight were in the field of psychology and three in 
clinical and medical journals.  Out of 563 psychology articles that used statistical tests 
(94.3 percent of all papers reviewed) in 1986 and 1987, 95.6% reported rejections of the 
null hypothesis at the 5% level.  The percentage was lower for the clinical journals at 
85.4% (456 papers reviewed of which 316 or 69.3% used statistical tests) (Sterling et al., 
1995). 
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These numbers strongly indicate that published results in psychology are not 
representative of all experiments conducted.  An estimate is that roughly two-thirds of 
studies that are approved by Institutional Review Boards (IRB) and that are completed 
remain unpublished (H. Cooper et al., 1997).  The reasons cited are not always related to 
publication bias against negative results; however, among studies that attain positive 
results, 74% are submitted for publication in a journal or book chapter and only 4% of the 
studies that find negative results are submitted to similar outlets (Cooper, Deneve, & 
Charlton, 1997).   
 
Another indication that published results are unlikely to be representative of all 
experiments conducted is the following.  As mentioned before, average power in 
psychology research is calculated to be 0.35 (given sample size, effect size, and alpha).  
A power of 0.5 means that the likelihood of finding an effect when one exists is 50%.  
The high percentage of positive results in published papers conflicts with this estimate 
sharply. 
 
Despite objections to publication bias, which was noted many years ago, the trend seems 
to be worsening.  Fanelli (2012) found that the trend was toward an increase in the 
proportion of publication of positive results.  Examining over 4600 articles from different 
disciplines published between 1970 and 2007, Fanelli found that the percentage of 
positive results increased by 22% during this time period. What also stands out is that 
psychological sciences have the highest proportion of positive results, followed in 
descending order by Materials Science, Pharmacology and Toxicology, Clinical 
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Medicine, Biology and Biochemistry, Economics and Business, Molecular Biology and 
Genetics, Engineering, and Immunology (Fanelli, 2010).  
 
Given that there is an aversion to publishing negative results and also replications, which 
has also been noted for decades (Coursol & Wagner, 1986; Sterling, 1959), it is very 
likely that researchers who are not aware of negative results to certain effects will 
independently carry out experiments testing such effects.  Eventually one of these 
research groups will find a positive result, that is obtain a Type I Error, and submit this 
finding for publication.  
 
Sterling summarized the problem already in 1959 very coherently. 
 
There is some evidence that in fields where statistical tests of significance are used, 
research which yields nonsignificant results is not published. Such research being 
unknown to other investigators may be repeated independently until eventually by 
chance a significant result occurs–an  “error of the first kind”–and is published. 
Significant results published in these fields are seldom verified by independent 
replication. The possibility thus arises that the literature of such a field consists in 
substantial part of false conclusions resulting from errors of the first kind in 
statistical tests of significance. (Sterling, 1959, p. 30) 
 
4.2.2: Questionable Research Practices 
 
A common view expressed in academic circles is that although misconduct does occur, it 
is so rare as to be insignificant (Kennedy, 2006; Koshland, 1987; Kraut, 2011; LaFollette, 
2000; Martinson et al., 2005; Reynolds, 2004; Shamoo & Resnik, 2003; Sovacool, 2008).  
We give a closer account of this view in Paper 5.  For here, the question whether this ‘bad 
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apple view’ (Sovacool, 2008) is correct has implications on whether substantial changes 
need to be made in the practice of science or whether minor changes would suffice.  The 
next section explores questionable research practices in detail because many false-
positive results are likely to come about as a result of questionable practices.  
Furthermore, this issue is of importance because much in the current system relies on 
trust (Koshland, 1987; Stroebe et al., 2012) and given recent developments, an 
examination whether this trust is deserved may be appropriate. 
 
Already in 1830 Babbage categorized several different practices that constitute 
questionable research practices and lamented the high prevalence of these practices in his 
book titled “The Decline of Science in England” (Babbage, 1830).  More recently, in 
order to evaluate whether questionable research practices are the acts of a few bad apples 
or whether such practices are more common, researchers have surveyed academics about 
their practices.  There are several surveys on this issue; however, in this paper we would 
like to give a detailed account of John et al. (2012) since this was a study on 
psychologists only.  We will make references to other surveys where appropriate and 
highlight their conclusions.  
 
For their study, John et al. (2012) surveyed 2155 research psychologists on ten different 
behaviors that constitute questionable research practices (see Table 4.2 below).  A total 
5964 researchers were contacted via email of whom 36% responded.  All participants 
received the same questions (in randomized order). 
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The survey ran two conditions.  One was a standard survey asking researchers about their 
practices.  The other condition provided incentives for participants to give truthful 
answers.  This condition is referred to as the Bayesian-truth-serum (BTS) condition.  The 
BTS condition provided incentives for respondents to give accurate answers by making 
donations to a charity of the participant’s choice, if respondents’ answers were close to 
the true outcome as assessed by an algorithm.  Participants were instructed of this 
explicitly.  We will omit a detailed explanation of the BTS algorithm, as it is beyond the 
scope of the current paper and also not too important for our purposes.  The BTS 
condition is simply an effect that the authors report (given the problems of underreporting 
on surveys of this nature).  For more details on BTS, see (Prelec, 2004).  In the control 
condition, a donation was made for each participant regardless of answer choices. 
 
In addition to self-reports, respondents who had engaged in QRPs were also asked to 
evaluate whether those acts were defensible.  The answer choices provided were ‘No’, 
‘Possibly’ and ‘Yes’ which were scored with 0, 1, and 2, respectively. 
 
The outcomes for the self-admission rates for both conditions (BTS and control) are 
presented in Table 4.2 below.  
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Item 
Self-admission 
rate (%) Odds ratio 
(BTS/control) 
Two-sided 
p 
(likelihood 
ratio test) 
Defensibility 
rating 
(across 
groups) 
Control 
group 
BTS 
group 
1. In a paper, failing to report all 
of a study’s dependent measures 
63.4 66.5 1.14 0.23 1.84 (0.39) 
2. Deciding whether to collect 
more data after looking to see 
whether the results were 
significant 
55.9 58.0 1.08 0.46 1.79 (0.44) 
3. In a paper, failing to report all 
of a study’s conditions 
27.7 27.4 0.98 0.90 1.77 (0.49) 
4. Stopping collecting data 
earlier than planned because one 
found the result that one had 
been looking for 
15.6 22.5 1.57 0.00 1.76 (0.48) 
5. In a paper, “rounding off” a p 
value (e.g. reporting that a p 
value of 0.054 is less than 0.05 
22.0 23.3 1.07 0.58 1.68 (0.57) 
6. In a paper, selectively 
reporting studies that “worked” 
45.8 50.0 1.18 0.13 1.66 (0.53) 
7. Deciding whether to exclude 
data after looking at the impact 
of doing so on the results 
38.2 43.4 1.23 0.06 1.61 (0.59) 
8. In a paper, reporting an 
unexpected finding as having 
been predicted from the start 
27.0 35.0 1.45 0.00 1.50 (0.60) 
9. In a paper claiming that results 
are unaffected by demographic 
variables (e.g., gender) when one 
is actually unsure (or knows that 
they do) 
3.0 4.5 1.52 0.16 1.32 (0.60) 
10. Falsifying data 0.6 1.7 2.75 0.07 0.16 (0.38) 
Table 4.2: Questionable Research Practices – John et al. (2012) 
 
Approximately 20% admitted to having stopped data collection prematurely after having 
attained a significant difference (item 4).  Related to this, more than half of respondents 
in both conditions indicated that they had made data collection dependent on finding 
significant differences.  That is, data was collected and evaluated and based on the 
outcome either more data was collected or not (item 2).  This increases the likelihood of 
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finding a statistically significant effect when one does not exist.  By carrying out multiple 
tests, the chances of attaining a Type I error are increased considerably.  
 
Simmons et al. (2011) demonstrate concretely how this practice can be used to attain 
positive results where none exist.  In a simulation, Simmons et al. drew two random 
samples of size n = 10 from a normal distribution.  A t-test comparing these two samples 
was conducted.  If a statistical significance was detected between the two samples, data 
collection stopped and a positive result was reported.  If no statistical difference was 
detected, one more data point was added to each sample.  This data point was randomly 
selected from a normal distribution. Now, with sample sizes of n = 11, again a t-test of 
significance was conducted.  If a significant difference was attained, data collection 
ceased and a positive result recorded.  Otherwise, these steps continued until either a 
significant difference was found or a maximum sample size of n = 50 was reached (for 
each sample).  The likelihood of attaining a significant difference between two samples 
(or two conditions) when testing random samples in this way was 22%, which is more 
than four times the alpha level. 
 
Figure 4.1 displays how p values developed in one of these simulations.  What is worth 
pointing out is that merely adding observations does not ‘linearly’ increase p values 
(when there is no effect).  The p value will vary, especially in small samples, and 
potentially run below the five percent threshold (red dotted line). 
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Figure 4.1: p Values and Additional t-tests – Simmons et al. (2011)60 
 
The authors also ran variations of this simulation where significance was tested after 
increasing the sample sizes by five, ten, or twenty data points and also by starting with an 
initial sample size of twenty per condition.  The results are displayed in Figure 4.2 below.   
 
                                                 
60
 This chart was emailed to us by the original authors and is slightly different from the published version.  
For example, the axes descriptions are different.  We furthermore made minimal changes for style and 
clarity.  This version appeared clearer to us and hence the choice to use it.  The data points are identical to 
the published version.   
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Figure 4.2: False Positives and Additional t-tests – Simmons et al. (2011)61 
  
In the best case scenario of this simulation, where the starting sample size was 20 per 
condition and where significance was tested only one more time after adding 20 data 
points to each condition, the likelihood of attaining a false-positive result was 10%, or 
twice the alpha level. 
 
Continuing with the outcomes of Table 4.2, approximately half of respondents in both 
conditions reported that they had selectively reported studies that worked (item 6).  
Around 40% indicated that they had excluded observations from their datasets in order to 
attain a desired outcome (item 7). Circa 65% answered that they did not report all 
dependent variables of experiments.  Failing to report all of a study’s dependent measures 
is problematic because in principle a researcher can run a study with numerous dependent 
measures and only report those that yield a statistically significant outcome.  Including 
                                                 
61
 This chart was emailed to us by the original authors and is slightly different from the published version.  
For example, the axes descriptions are different.  We furthermore made minimal changes for style and 
clarity.  This version appeared clearer to us and hence the choice to use it.  The data points are identical to 
the published version.   
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many dependent variables increases the likelihood of attaining an effect when one does 
not exist (Type I error) by chance.  This is similar to running an experiment multiple 
times until a statistical difference is detected, which is then reported in a manuscript 
without mentioning how many times the experiment was repeated.  
 
What is also interesting is that the defensibility ratings for the items of Table 4.2 were 
relatively high.  It is not the case that respondents were not aware of the problems of 
these practices.  In a follow-up study John et al. asked respondents to rate the 
defensibility of these practices – without asking whether respondents had engaged in 
these practices – and the scores were significantly lower.  This suggests that researchers 
understand that these practices are not acceptable; however, they still perform them and 
in the context of evaluating their own actions possibly make up post-hoc justifications 
(John et al., 2012). 
 
Finally, respondents were also asked whether they had falsified data and 1.7 percent 
admitted that they had in BTS.  The defensibility rating for this category was low (0.16).  
It is surprising that close to two percent of researchers admit to having straight-out 
falsified data.  
 
In all, 94% of respondents admitted to at least one of the QRPs in the BTS condition and 
91% did so in the control condition. The mean self-admission rate for the ten practices 
listed in Table 4.2 was 37% in the BTS condition and 33% in the control condition.  John 
et al. conclude that “across QRPs, […] raw self-admission rates were surprisingly high, 
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[…] which suggests that these practices may constitute the de facto scientific norm” 
(John et al., 2012, p. 524). 
 
From their own study, Simmons and colleagues conclude that, 
 
despite empirical psychologists’ nominal endorsement of a low rate of false-
positive findings (≤ .05), flexibility in data collection, analysis, and reporting 
dramatically increases actual false-positive rates. In many cases, a researcher is 
more likely to falsely find evidence that an effect exists than to correctly find 
evidence that it does not. […] In fact, it is unacceptably easy to publish 
“statistically significant” evidence consistent with any hypothesis. (Simmons, 
Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011, p. 1359) 
 
There have been several other studies surveying researchers’ practices.  By and large 
these studies confirm the findings of John et al. (2012).  We will highlight four of these 
here: a New Scientist survey, an Office of Research Integrity (ORI) commissioned study 
conducted in 2005, Martinson et al. (2005) and Fanelli (2009).  The reason for 
highlighting these four is as follows.  The New Scientist survey was conducted in 1976 
and is the oldest of this kind that we are aware of.  The second study was commissioned 
by the ORI and hence carries the authority of that institution.  Martinson et al. (2005) is 
described to be one of the first large-scale studies that directly surveyed researchers from 
different fields (Martinson et al., 2005).  Furthermore, the estimates produced are 
considered to be conservative (Fanelli, 2009) and hence this may be a good benchmark 
on practices across disciplines.  Finally, Fanelli (2009) is a meta-analysis of 18 surveys 
similar to those of Martinson et al. (2005) and John et al. (2012). 
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In 1976 , noting that “science has maintained an ostrich-like attitude about intentional 
bias for too long” (St James-Roberts, 1976a, p. 482) the New Scientist asked its 
readership to participate in a survey.  Two hundred and four readers responded and 
amongst these, 92% reported of having directly or indirectly witnessed cases of 
“intentional bias” (St James-Roberts, 1976b).    
 
In the ORI commissioned study, over 2000 principal investigators (PI) of laboratories 
across all disciplines were asked about misconduct as defined by the ORI.
62
  This is a 
more serious offence than ‘intentional bias’.  More than seven percent reported that they 
had suspected cases of misconduct in their own departments alone.  For several 
methodological reasons, the authors of the report consider this number to be a “floor of 
any generalized estimate” (ORI, 2008, p. 39).     
 
Martinson et al. (2005) surveyed 3247 (1768 mid-career and 1479 early-career) NIH 
funded researchers on a host of questionable research practices.  Overall, one-third of 
respondents had engaged in at least one of the questionable behaviors. The authors of the 
study point out that the findings are likely to be conservative estimates.  For one, the 
survey was mailed to researchers and those who had engaged in QRPs are likely to have 
                                                 
62 
The definition of misconduct has not always been straightforward and has changed over time (LaFollette, 
2000; Sovacool, 2008).  Currently, the Office of Research Integrity (ORI) defines misconduct as,  
 
fabrication, falsification, or plagiarism in proposing, performing, or reviewing research, or in 
reporting  research results.      
(a) Fabrication is making up data or results and recording or reporting them.      
(b) Falsification is manipulating research materials, equipment, or processes, or changing or 
omitting data or results such that the research is not accurately represented in the research record.      
(c) Plagiarism is the appropriation of another person's ideas, processes, results, or words without 
giving appropriate credit. (ORI, 2005) 
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refrained from participating (non-response bias) and among those who did return the 
questionnaire, individuals who had conducted QRPs are likely not to have reported all, 
out of fear of repercussions.  Martinson and colleagues conclude from their study that 
their “findings reveal a range of questionable practices that are striking in their breadth 
and prevalence” and furthermore that “with as many as 33% of our survey respondents 
admitting to one or more of the top-ten behaviours, the scientific community can no 
longer remain complacent about such misbehaviour” (Martinson et al., 2005, p. 737 and 
738). 
 
Fanelli (2009) conducted a meta-analysis of 18 surveys on misconduct from various 
different fields published between 1987 and 2008.  The upper bound of the admission 
rate for having committed QRPs was 33.7 percent and the mean rate was 9.54 percent.  
When asked about fabrication, falsification, alteration and modification of data, the 
admission rates ranged from 0.3% to 4.9%, with a mean of 1.97%.  However, when the 
words ‘fabrication’ or ‘falsification’ were used explicitly, the mean admission rate 
dropped to 1.06%.  When asked if respondents had observed others falsify, fabricate, 
alter and modify data, the rates ranged between 5.2% and 33.3% with a mean of 14.12%.  
Between 6.2% and 72% of respondents indicated that they had observed others engage in 
questionable research practices.  The mean value was 28.53%.  When the questions were 
worded in more general terms such as ‘experimental deficiency’,  ‘reporting deficiency’ 
or ‘misrepresentation of data’ the rates ranged between 12% and 92% with a mean of 
46.24%.   
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Fanelli considers these outcomes to be conservative for two reasons; one having to do 
with the methodology of self-reports.  The other reason is that one of the studies 
(Martinson et al., 2005) stood out from the rest in that admission rates were 
uncharacteristically low on some of the questions.  This study was also the largest in the 
sample.  When this study was excluded from analysis, the numbers increased 
considerably.  For example, self-admission rate for misconduct increased from two to 
three percent. Fanelli concludes that “it is likely that, if on average 2% of scientists admit 
to having falsified research at least once and up to 34% admit other questionable research 
practices, the actual frequencies of misconduct could be higher than this.” (Fanelli, 2009, 
p. 10). 
 
Another outcome of the study worth pointing out is that the medical, clinical and 
pharmacological fields had the highest rates of questionable research practices.  There 
may be two reasons for this.  One, the influence of money in such research could have an 
adverse impact; however, at the same time it may be possible that due to increased 
training to detect and raise awareness of research misconduct, researchers in these fields 
were more likely to report such occurrences (Fanelli, 2009).  
 
These studies do need to come with a proviso.  Some practices that are categorized as 
questionable in Table 4.2 may be justified.  A medical treatment may be effective in 
preventing a fatal disease to take its course and in such cases it would not be ethically 
acceptable to continue the study with the knowledge that participants in the control group 
are being denied a possible treatment.  In such instances, premature termination of the 
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study would certainly not constitute a questionable research practice.  In psychology, the 
concern is that researchers may terminate studies prematurely once a statistical difference 
has been found, out of concern that with more data, differences that result from chance 
could disappear. 
  
In cases of inadequate experimental procedures, researchers may not always have the 
necessary means to construct correct procedures; however, researchers may setup 
experiments to the best of their possibilities and report the shortcomings openly in 
manuscripts.   
 
Some observations may justifiably be eliminated from data analysis; an example would 
be extreme outliers in reaction time studies.  However, the criteria for data exclusions 
need to be pre-determined. 
 
Despite these qualifications, the surveys discussed above may be taken as an indication 
that the current system is not functioning flawlessly.  In the most favorable survey 
(Martinson et al., 2005), a third of researchers responded that they had committed 
questionable practices.  On the survey that included psychologists only, questionable 
research practices seemed to be the norm (John et al., 2012; Levelt, 2012).  On this, the 
Stapel Investigation expresses concern by noting that, 
 
when interviewed, several co-authors who did perform the analyses themselves, 
and were not all from Stapel’s ‘school’, defended the serious and less serious 
violations of proper scientific method with the words: that is what I have learned 
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in practice; everyone in my research environment does the same, and so does 
everyone we talk to at international conferences. (Levelt, 2012, p. 48 and 54) 
 
4.3: Reasons for High Prevalence of QRPs 
 
A question that naturally arises is why individuals who dedicate their careers to science, 
which is prototypically the quest for truth, engage in questionable research practices.  As 
Broad & Wade put it. 
 
Fraud in science is of course the abnegation of a researcher’s fundamental 
purpose, the search for truth. It is thus an act of considerable moment, and one 
that is unlikely to be taken without careful consideration of the prevailing 
attitudes and mores in the laboratory, as well as of the chances of getting caught. 
(Broad & Wade, 1982, p. 19) 
 
There are likely different reasons for different individuals.  We attempt to generalize 
these in the categories below, namely, incentives, lack of transparency, and lack of 
accountability.     
 
4.3.1: Incentives 
 
Already in 1961 Reif notes.  
 
The quest for prestige can cause conflict between the goals of science and the 
goals of the scientist. […] These are usually the result of conflicts between the 
requirements of the scientific work proper and the pressure of competition. To the 
individual scientists they may appear as conflicts between the values inherent in 
science and more selfish personal values. (Reif, 1961, p. 1957 and 1961) 
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In a similar vein, Broad & Wade note that,  
 
scientists are not different from other people. In donning the white coat at the 
laboratory door, they do not step aside from the passions, ambitions, and failings 
that animate those in other walks of life […] Not only do careerist pressures exist 
in contemporary science, but the system rewards the appearance of success as 
well as genuine achievement. (Broad & Wade, 1982, p. 19) 
 
More recently Nosek et al. (2012) have commented on the conflicting incentives for 
finding true effects and finding positive effects.  Nosek and colleagues maintain that the 
main problem in the current research environment “is that the incentives for publishable 
results can be at odds with the incentives for accurate results […] to the extent that 
publishing itself is rewarded, then it is in scientists’ personal interests to publish, 
regardless of whether the published findings are true” (Nosek et al., 2012, p. 616). 
 
When the aim of experimental practice is to attain a significant p value, there are several 
ways this can be achieved.  First, researchers can discover true effects.  Second, 
researchers can fabricate data and create significant p values.  The first option is difficult, 
time-consuming, entails uncertainty and can put researchers at a disadvantage to those 
who employ the second strategy.  The second strategy, although it will create many 
results, potentially interesting and attention grabbing, runs the risk of being uncovered 
and ending the career of researchers.  A third strategy, a middle ground between the first 
two, would be to use questionable research practices.  This strategy avoids the risk of 
straight-out fraud but still makes attaining significant p values much more likely and 
gives researchers an advantage over their competition.   
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Researchers who do not engage in such practices are at a disadvantage and so one can 
expect a race to the bottom.  As we showed in Section 4.2, by simply testing for statistical 
significance twice after increasing the sample size from 20 to 40, a researcher increases 
the probability of attaining a (false) positive result by 100% (Simmons et al., 2011).  This 
gives researchers who employ questionable practices a considerable advantage over 
others.   
 
Because of this unfair advantage, commentators have drawn parallels between QRPs in 
research and performance enhancing drugs in sports, noting that “QRPs are the steroids 
of scientific competition, artificially enhancing performance and producing a kind of 
arms race in which researchers who strictly play by the rules are at a competitive 
disadvantage” (John et al., 2012, p. 524).  What further makes QRPs so damaging is that 
“QRPs, by nature of the very fact that they are often questionable as opposed to blatantly 
improper, also offer considerable latitude for rationalization and self-deception” (John et 
al., 2012, p. 524). 
 
Broad & Wade note in 1982. 
 
History shows that deceit in the annals of science is more common than is often 
assumed. Those who improved upon their data to make them more persuasive to 
others doubtless persuaded themselves that they were lying only in order to make 
the truth prevail. But almost invariably the real motive for the various 
misrepresentations in the history of research seems to arise less from a concern 
for truth than from personal ambition and the pursuit, as Darwin put it, of “the 
bauble fame.” (Broad & Wade, 1982, pp. 35-36)  
 
 173 
If false-positive results make up a majority of the published findings in psychology, it is 
to a great extent that competing researchers will use the tools at their disposal to advance 
their careers.  Those who do not engage in QRPs to attain significant p values are at a 
disadvantage and unlikely to persist in their careers.  From this perspective, the blame is 
not to fall exclusively on individual researchers but on the rules of the game (Bakker et 
al., 2012) or the game they find themselves in as “individual scientists have to work and 
survive in the system as it exists. Without systemic, structural changes, individual, 
principled choices . . . may be futile and professionally destructive” (Kerr, 1998, p. 213).   
 
4.3.2: Lack of Accountability and Transparency 
 
Since there are only a few ways of detecting data fabrication (e.g. whistleblowers) 
(Stroebe et al., 2012), statistical anomalies (Simonsohn, 2013) and almost no methods 
(other than replications) for detecting individual false-positive results that come about 
through QRPs, there is very little in the way of holding researchers who use questionable 
research practices accountable.  Stapel himself is to have said that “fraud is too easy, 
because there are too few control mechanisms in science” (as cited in Stroebe et al., 2012, 
p. 681) and Stroebe et al. add to this that “people are tempted to commit fraud when the 
expected rewards are great and punishment is unlikely because the risk of discovery is 
small” (Stroebe et al. 2012, p. 681). 
 
Currently, science is structured around a system of trust and “any trust-based system, as 
science is, is open to exploitation” (Stroebe et al., 2012, p. 683).  There may be unique 
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advantages to organizing an enterprise around trust; however, there are also critical 
shortcomings.  Many successful endeavors do not rely on trust and the onus is on those 
who favor a trust-based system to provide strong reasons why research science should be 
granted a special role. 
 
On the side of transparency, a difficulty that prevents QRPs from being detected is that 
very often experimental procedures and raw data are not made available to other 
researchers.  This prevents close examination of published work.  In Paper 3 we 
described the difficulties we had in attaining details of experiments such as experimental 
designs, stimuli presented, number of questions, and participant population.  This 
prevented us from examining the reference paper more closely and prevented us from 
composing a manuscript for journal submission.  
 
In closing this section, as an answer to why there seems to be a high prevalence of QRPs, 
the simple answer is that currently incentives favor these practices and they are facilitated 
by a lack of accountability and transparency.   
 
4.4: Concluding Remarks 
 
When we started our project there were no good estimates on the reproducibility of 
published findings in psychology or experimental philosophy.  Since then, the efforts by 
the Reproducibility Project, although still in progress, have produced some revealing 
results for the psychology literature (Nosek, 2012).  This project has started to replicate 
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all articles published in three major psychology journals for 2008.  The project is still in 
progress.  At the time of writing, 24 results have been examined of which 13 failed to 
replicate and 11 replicated successfully, a false-positive rate of 54%.  More than half of 
the results published in the most prestigious psychology journals turn out to be non-
reproducible.   
 
Nosek mentions as one of the motivations for the project that if the outcomes were 
encouraging, fears of the state of journal publishing in psychology could be put aside.  
Otherwise, the project would give a better sense of whether changes in the system needed 
to be made.  A very interesting anecdote that Nosek recounts is that after sharing his idea 
for the project “a senior person in the field ask[ed] [Nosek] not to do it, because 
psychology is under threat and this could make us look bad” (Carpenter, 2012, p. 1559).  
Other researchers had also expressed concern that this project may put a bad light on the 
whole discipline (Carpenter, 2012).  These sentiments are very informative.  One, these 
individuals obviously had little confidence in the published results.  If they had been 
confident in the literature, there would have been no need to worry about replication 
outcomes. These sentiments are also interesting because instead of being concerned that 
much of the published literature may be unreliable, these individuals were more 
concerned about the image of the field and by extension their own image. 
 
The issues discussed in this paper are not recent developments and are also not unique to 
the current crisis.  As others have pointed out “crisis is nothing new in psychology” 
(Giner-Sorolla, 2012, p. 563) and there are several parallels to be found between the 
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current and the crises of the past.  The earliest reference we made to a work discussing 
questionable research practices was Babbage (1830) titled “The Decline of Science in 
England.”  To get a sense of how long lasting this notion of crisis in psychology has been, 
one of the earlier papers we found addressing a crisis of psychology was published in 
1966 (Bakan, 1966).  In specific, Bakan refers to the crisis being related to statistical 
methods used and the prevalence of Type I errors.  
 
In 1975, Anthony Greenwald addresses many of the issues that are part of the current 
debate on the problems of experimental psychology.  In his paper titled “Consequences of 
Prejudice Against the Null Hypothesis,” Greenwald examines the issues of publication 
bias, continuation of data collection until a desired significance level is achieved, 
retrospectively declaring findings as hypothesized, including or excluding data from pilot 
studies in accord with desired outcomes, applying different standards of data analysis 
when looking to reject the null hypothesis, amongst other problems of the field 
(Greenwald, 1975). 
 
Greenwald further concludes that “about the only way to demonstrate the existence of 
Type I errors conclusively is to demonstrate that “established” findings cannot be 
replicated and that such failures to replicate cannot easily be regarded as Type II errors” 
(Greenwald, 1975, p. 13).  Greenwald then goes on to give several examples of effects 
that had been so widely accepted in the field that they were presented in many 
psychology textbooks, which, however, after years of acceptance could not be 
successfully replicated. 
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The topic of this paper has been the reproducibility of published findings in the scientific 
literature, with a strong emphasis on psychology.  As we have argued, there is likely to be 
a serious lack of reproducibility and the Reproducibility Project, although still in progress, 
confirms this with concrete numbers.  Simply because of statistical methods and 
publishing practices currently prevailing in scientific research, one can expect an 
overproduction of false-positive results in the published literature.  The high prevalence 
of QRPs exacerbates this problem further. 
 
Given the shortcomings in the current research-publication system, changes in the current 
organization of science may be warranted.  Paper 5 examines this topic.  
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Paper 5: Improving the Research-Publication System 
 
In light of the problems discussed in Paper 4, researchers have made various proposals 
for tackling the shortcomings of the research-publication system – throughout the past 
decades as well as of late in light of recent developments.  This paper reviews some of 
these proposals and in conclusion offers what we believe to be important components of a 
sustainable solution. 
 
Before we begin this review, perhaps just as important as considering solutions to 
shortcomings of the research-publication system, is an emphasis that many researchers 
(in high positions) dismiss the idea of crisis and maintain that the current system is 
adequate in regulating scientific practice.  In Section 5.1, we give an account of these 
views.  This is important in understanding that there is inertia when it comes to reforming 
the research-publication system and that any proposal will face opposition.  Section 5.2 
surveys some solutions that have been suggested over the years.  Section 5.3 examines 
one of these solutions (replications) in detail.  The final section concludes with a 
discussion. 
 
5.1:  Rejection of Criticism 
 
We divide this section in four parts, each discussing one reason why advocates of the 
status quo reject criticism of the current system.  The first is simply a belief that no 
serious flaws exist.  The second is trust in the ‘self-correcting’ nature of science.  The 
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third is confidence in the peer-review publication system. The fourth is the prevalence of 
conceptual replications. 
 
5.1.1:  Refusal to Admit Flaws 
 
A common view expressed is that although misconduct does occur in academic research, 
it is so rare as to be insignificant (Kennedy, 2006; Koshland, 1987; Kraut, 2011; 
LaFollette, 2000; Martinson et al., 2005; Reynolds, 2004; Shamoo & Resnik, 2003; 
Sovacool, 2008).  This view has persisted throughout the past decades.   
 
In 1981 at United States congressional hearings on scientific misconduct that followed 
four high profile cases of fraud in biomedicine, Handler, the then president of the United 
States National Academy of Sciences, professed that misconduct occurred very rarely 
(National Academy of Sciences, 1993). 
 
This sentiment was repeated in 1987 in an editorial published by Koshland, the then 
editor of Science, in which he noted that, “we must recognize that 99.9999 percent of 
reports are accurate and truthful, often in rapidly advancing frontiers where data are hard 
to collect” (Koshland, 1987, p. 141).  Koshland does not provide a reference for the 
“99.9999 percent” statistic but continues that “there is no evidence that the small number 
of cases that have surfaced require a fundamental change in procedures that have 
produced so much good science” (Koshland, 1987, p. 141). 
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In 2006, again in response to a high profile case of research fraud (the Hwang case), the 
editor of Science noted in a published statement that “fraudulent research is a particularly 
disturbing event, because it threatens an enterprise built on trust. Fortunately, such cases 
are rare” (Kennedy, 2006).   
 
The executive director of the Association for Psychological Science published a post in 
The Chronicle of Higher Education in 2011, once again in response to a major case of 
fraud (the Stapel case), stating that “such egregious cases are rare, and they are harmful 
to the scientific enterprise. But it's important that they be recognized as the aberrations 
they are” (Kraut, 2011).  With regard to questionable research practices, Kraut continues 
that “most of these flaws and concerns are undramatic—not the stuff of headlines” (Kraut, 
2011).  In light of the findings discussed in Section 4.2.2 of Paper 4, this is a very 
surprising view for the executive director of the Association for Psychological Science to 
hold. 
 
In response to the Stapel Investigation, the European Association of Social Psychology 
published a statement rejecting the report, amongst other reasons because it draws 
“conclusions about a whole, international field of scientific research” by focusing on the 
“scientific practices and publications associated with one author” (EASP, 2012).  Strack, 
the associate editor of Psychological Science commented on the Stapel Investigation, 
 
if you want an example for "sloppy science", take a closer look at the Levelt 
report [one of the reports comprising the Stapel Investigation], which is full of 
sweeping generalizations without clear documentation while neglecting the 
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scrutiny to which it subjects and holds up social psychology. I doubt that its 
claims would pass peer review and editorial scrutiny. (Strack, 2012) 
 
The statements quoted above all followed high profile cases of misconduct.  In his 
historical account of the changing nature of misconduct, Lafollette describes these 
reactions as common.  
 
When problems have been uncovered, scientists around the world have initially 
tended to act much the same. They have characterized the offender as aberrant, 
argued that the episode is isolated, or attempted to explain it as caused by stress, 
bad judgment, or moral corruption (or all three).” (LaFollette, 2000, p. 212) 
 
Already in 1982, Broad & Wade observe that,  
 
each time a new case of scientific fraud breaks into the headlines, the scientific 
establishment generally responds with one variant or another of the “bad apple” 
theory. The faker was a psychopath, or under great stress, or otherwise mentally 
disturbed, this theory goes. Its unspoken implication is that all blame should be 
put on the erring individual, not on the institutions of science.  […] If every 
smidgeon of fraud can be laid at the door of the poor unhinged, deranged 
psychopaths who nevertheless managed somehow to infiltrate the research 
community, clearly there is no need for any change in the institutional mechanism 
whereby science is said to police itself. (Broad & Wade, 1982, p. 60) 
 
Paper 4 pointed out that whether this bad apple view is accurate has implications on the 
need for major changes to the research system.  Paper 4, furthermore, gave some strong 
indications that this bad apple view is unlikely to be correct. 
  
5.1.2:  Confidence in Scientific Practice – Self-Correction in Science 
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Very closely related to a refusal to admitting serious shortcomings of the research-
publication system is the belief that science is self-correcting.  With self-correction 
commentators broadly mean that published findings are tested by other scientists and 
results that do not hold are eliminated from the scientific literature and only findings that 
are reliable will stand scrutiny.  This idea is often invoked in discussions on whether 
fundamental change of the scientific system is necessary.   
 
For example, as Handler describes, although fraud may take place in science, it “occurs 
in a system that operates in an effective, democratic and self-correcting mode.”  This, so 
the argument, makes revelation of fraudulent cases unavoidable (National Academy of 
Sciences, 1993, p. 91).  Koshland makes similar assertions and emphasizes in discussing 
questionable research that the “cumulative nature of science means inevitable exposure, 
usually in a rather short time” (Koshland, 1987, p. 141).  More recently, the executive 
editor of Cognitive Science and member of the editorial board of Cognitive Psychology 
wrote in response to the fraud committed by Marc Hauser that “science is remarkably 
self-correcting. […] The field is able to separate the good results from the bad fairly 
quickly. And that is reassuring” (Markman, 2010). 
 
Self-correction in science is not as straightforward as the above quoted statements make 
it.  Replications, one of the main tools that could verify previous findings, are scarce 
across various disciplines and especially lacking in psychology.  In the rare cases where 
replications are published in psychology, the median time is four years from date of 
publication of the original results.  Only 10% of replications test effects that are more 
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than 10 years old (Pashler & Harris, 2012).  Since areas of interest change quickly and 
once the field moves on it is very unlikely that old effects are tested, Pashler & Harris 
dismiss confidence in self-correction and conclude that “there is every reason to believe 
that the great majority of errors that do enter the literature will persist uncorrected 
indefinitely, given current practices” (Pashler & Harris, 2012, p. 535).   
 
In a similar way, Nosek et al. note.   
 
The myth of self-correction is recognition that once published, there is no 
systemic ethic of confirming or disconfirming the validity of an effect. False 
effects can remain for decades, slowly fading or continuing to inspire and 
influence new research (Prinz et al., 2011). Further, even when it becomes known 
that an effect is false, retraction of the original result is very rare (Budd, Sievert, 
& Schultz, 1998; Redman, Yarandi, & Merz, 2008). Researchers who do not 
discover the corrective knowledge may continue to be influenced by the original, 
false result. We can agree that the truth will win eventually, but we are not 
content to wait.  (Nosek et al., 2012, p. 619) 
 
As an example from medical publishing (where this issue would seem to be of special 
importance), in one particular case of fraud where the published paper was retracted, the 
paper was still cited as a reliable source after 24 years (Korpela, 2010).  A study on 
retractions in biomedicine concludes that although “retractions are on average occurring 
sooner after publication than in the past, citation analysis shows that they are not being 
recognised by subsequent users of the work” (Redman, Yarandi, & Merz, 2008, p. 807).  
For further details and examples of articles that continue to be cited in medical research 
after retraction, see (Budd, Sievert, & Schultz, 1998; Drury & Karamanou, 2009). 
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Regarding self-correction in psychology, consider a concrete case.  Stapel published 
internationally in the most prestigious journals; however, none of his findings were 
revealed as implausible through the standard scientific processes.  Maintaining his 
confidence in self-correction, Kraut (the executive director of the Association for 
Psychological Science) states that, “it is also worth noting that Stapel was caught. True, 
he did get away with his intellectual crimes for far too long, embarrassingly so, but in the 
end it was the suspicions of his colleagues and students that exposed him” (Kraut, 2011). 
 
What stands out in this quote is that Kraut seems to include whistleblowing as part of the 
scientific method.  It is true that Stapel’s fraud came to light, but it was not because 
science performed its functions correctly.  To make this claim is to stretch the definition 
of scientific practice.   
 
In reviewing numerous cases of misconduct, Stroebe et al. complain that it is 
“disconcerting that hardly any of the fraud cases on our list were uncovered by the […] 
principal mechanisms of self-correction” (Stroebe et al., 2012, p. 677).  Nosek similarly 
points out in discussing the cases of Karen Ruggiero and Marc Hauser that “if the field 
was truly self-correcting, why didn't we correct any single one of them?” emphasizing 
that “like Stapel, they were exposed by internal whistle-blowers (Yong, 2012a). 
 
The Stapel Investigation also expresses concern over the functioning of science.  We 
quoted this passage in Paper 4 and repeat it here because of its relevance. 
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The urgent question that remains is why this fraud and the widespread violations 
of sound scientific methodology were never discovered in the normal monitoring 
procedures in science.  
In the case of the fraud committed by Mr. Stapel, the critical function of science 
has failed on all levels. Fundamental principles of scientific method have been 
ignored, or set aside as irrelevant. In the opinion of the Committees this has 
contributed significantly to the delayed discovery of the fraud. It is to the credit of 
the whistleblowers in Tilburg that they did discover these infringements of 
scientific integrity and took the correct action. (Levelt, 2012, p. 53 and 54) 
 
5.1.3: Peer-reviewed Publication 
 
Another argument proponents of the status quo make as to why current publication 
practices provide sufficient safeguards against the entry of questionable research into the 
scientific literature is that the manuscript review process prevents papers of low quality 
from being published.   
 
Loscalso (2012), for example, states.  
 
The many layers of review a manuscript receives in parallel with and beyond peer 
review, including discussion at [..] editorial board meeting[s], careful review by 
associate editors, and rigorous statistical review […] while not eliminating the 
risk of publishing data that are irreproducible in papers that are later retracted, 
clearly offers the care necessary to minimize this risk. (Loscalzo, 2012, p. 1213) 
 
A first indication that the manuscript review process does not provide sufficient 
safeguards against the publication of fraudulent research, let alone, questionable research 
practices comes from the case of Stapel, who published very prolifically and also in the 
most esteemed journals of his field.  
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The Stapel case showed that peer review and journal procedures certainly do not 
minimize the risk of accepting fabricated findings into the published literature.  As the 
Investigation noted, Stapel “published in nearly all the respected international journals in 
his field. It was extremely rare for his extraordinarily neat findings to be subjected to 
serious doubt” (Levelt, 2012, p. 48). 
 
The Levelt committee (one of the committees that was part of the Stapel Investigation) 
further finds harsh words for the peer review system. 
 
The Committees can reach no conclusion other than that from the bottom to the top 
there was a general neglect of fundamental scientific standards and methodological 
requirements.  
 
This certainly also applies to the editors and reviewers of international journals. 
Furthermore, many journals insist prior to publication on authors filling in forms in 
various variants guaranteeing correct research procedures and availability of data 
and survey material. Authors evidently frequently fail to comply (see among others 
Wicherts et al., 2006). The journals perform no further monitoring of this 
requirement. (Levelt, 2012, p. 53) 
 
These issues are by no means limited to psychology research.  A study of the biomedical 
field concludes that,  
 
reviewers have no time and no resources to reproduce data and to dig deeply into 
the presented work. As a consequence, errors often remain undetected. Adding to 
this problem, many initially rejected papers will subsequently be published in 
other journals without substantial changes or improvements. (Prinz et al., 2011b) 
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In 2006, after a high profile case of fraud on cloning, Science published a statement in 
which it acknowledged that the review process is not designed to detect fraud by stating 
that “fraud is unlikely to be eliminated completely through the process of scientific 
publishing, and truth in science ultimately depends upon confirmation” (Kennedy, 2006). 
 
From a historical perspective, this is not the first time that journal practices have come 
under question.  In the context of the 1980s crisis, “because misconduct had so often 
come to light after publication in a journal, questions also began to be raised about the 
reliability of peer review, accuracy of editorial scrutiny, and integrity of the scientific 
literature overall” (LaFollette, 2000, p. 213). 
 
The manuscript review process is not only insufficient in preventing questionable 
research from entering the published literature, as it currently stands, journals may often 
be part of the problem rather than the solution. 
 
On a general level, among the parties that are involved in the publication process – 
researchers, universities, funding bodies, and journals – the latter seems to be the least 
impacted by false-positive results and fraudulent research.  In cases of fraud, researchers 
face severe sanctions and universities’ reputations suffer.  In cases of false positives, 
funding bodies waste resources that could be allocated to more productive projects.  
Journals, on the other hand, occupy a somewhat special position.  Journals may have 
incentives to publish questionable research as long as it increases readership and impact 
factor.  When it comes to fraud, journals are considered to be victims, although this 
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masks the fact that journals play an active role in reviewing research and making 
publication decisions.  As Simonsohn notes, “journals should be embarrassed when they 
publish fake data, but there’s no stigma. They’re portrayed as the victims, but they’re 
more like the facilitators […]. I’d like journals to take ownership of the problem and start 
working towards stopping it” (Simonsohn, 2012).   
 
There have been various reports of journals encouraging behavior that is questionable at 
best.  The Stapel Investigation, for example, notes. 
 
Co-authors also reported more than once in interviews with the Committees that 
reviewers encouraged irregular practices. For instance, a co-author stated that 
editors and reviewers would sometimes request certain variables to be omitted, 
because doing so would be more consistent with the reasoning and flow of the 
narrative, thereby also omitting unwelcome results. Reviewers have also requested 
that not all executed analyses be reported, for example by simply leaving 
unmentioned any conditions for which no effects had been found, although effects 
were originally expected. Sometimes reviewers insisted on retrospective pilot 
studies, which were then reported as having been performed in advance. In this way 
the experiments and choices of items are justified with the benefit of hindsight. 
 
Not infrequently reviews were strongly in favour of telling an interesting, elegant, 
concise and compelling story, possibly at the expense of the necessary scientific 
diligence. It is clear that the priorities were wrongly placed. It is surely simple to 
post all the information of relevance to an article on a website and to provide an 
explicit reference in the article. (Levelt, 2012, p. 53) 
 
Apart from the Stapel Investigation, others have also expressed dismay over the review 
process.  One researcher has complained that in the submission process reviewers ask for 
results to be “novel” or “interesting” but not necessarily true (Yong, 2012a).  Another 
researcher has in part blamed the crisis of false positives in psychology on the demand by 
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journals to present “slightly freak-show-ish” results and the fact that “high-impact 
journals often regard psychology as a sort of parlour-trick area” (Yong, 2012a). 
 
Given how journals currently operate, it is in their interest to publish papers even if there 
is suspicion about the reliability of findings.  Journals lose little by publishing novel, 
highly unlikely effects that are not replicable but on the other hand stand to lose in 
various ways if they do not publish such papers.  The inclusion of such papers in an issue 
will increase citations received and hence increase journal impact factor, which is 
generally regarded as an (if not the most) important indicator of journal quality.  Since 
replications are scarce and so the likelihood of uncovering non-reproducible findings is 
small (see Paper 4 and Section 5.3.1 below), the best strategy for journals appears to be to 
publish novel and interesting effects regardless of reproducibility.  Journals compete 
amongst each other and a paper that is rejected can always find its way to a competing 
journal that may be willing to publish, regardless of questionable practices (Prinz et al., 
2011b). 
 
Given that there are no strong penalties against journals for publishing papers containing 
questionable research practices but potentially great gains in citations received, it is 
natural for journals to publish such papers.  In light of these incentive problems, it would 
be plausible to include a measure of replicability of articles when ranking journals.  We 
took a closer look to see whether issues of reproducibility enter journal ranking for the 
remainder of this sub-section.  
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The dominant forms of determining journal rank are impact factor and more recently 
Eigenfactor/PageRank.  Impact factor is the average number of citation articles in a 
journal receive in a given period of time.  Eigenfactor assigns scores to journals 
according to incoming citations, giving more weight to citations from journals that have 
higher ratings.  For details on this iterative approach, see (Bergstrom, West, & Wiseman, 
2008).  These two methods of ranking journals do not take reproducibility of findings 
into account.  
 
Aside from purely quantitative methods of journal ranking such as impact factor and 
Eigenfactor, there have also been some attempts at more qualitative forms of evaluation 
using peer-review (Pontille & Torny, 2010).  
 
We examined two recent cases of journal ranking formulations – the Australian Research 
Council (ARC) June 2008 draft ranking and the European Science Foundation (ESF); 
European Reference Index for the Humanities (ERIH) 2007-2008 (Pontille & Torny, 
2010) – and although there are some detailed descriptions of what makes a good journal, 
the issue of reproducibility of published results is absent. 
 
Both formulations have formal set of criteria that need to be met at a minimum to be 
included in the ratings.  For example, the ESF states.  
 
All journals included must fulfil normal international academic standards, i.e. 
selection of articles is based on an objective review policy. [...] The journals must 
fulfil basic publishing standards (i.e. ISSN, timeliness of publication, complete 
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bibliographic information for all cited references, full address information for 
every author (Pontille & Torny, 2010, p. 7) 
 
Apart from minimum standards, the rankings of journals are described in detail. 
 
Typically an A* journal would be one of the best in its field or subfield in which 
to publish and would typically cover the entire field/subfield. Virtually all papers 
they publish will be of a very high quality. These are journals where most of the 
work is important (it will really shape the field) and where researchers boast about 
getting accepted. Acceptance rates would typically be low and the editorial board 
would be dominated by field leaders, including many from top institutions. 
 
[…] 
 
The majority of papers in a Tier A journal will be of very high quality. Publishing 
in an A journal would enhance the author’s standing, showing they have real 
engagement with the global research community and that they have something to 
say about problems of some significance.  Typical signs of an A journal are 
lowish acceptance rates and an editorial board which includes a reasonable 
fraction of well known researchers from top institutions. (ARC, 2010) 
 
We searched the documents for keywords ‘replicability’, ‘reproducibility’, ‘replication’, 
‘retraction’, ‘fabrication’, ‘fraud’, ‘misconduct’ and found none of these included in the 
criteria.  For the full text of these documents, see (ARC, 2010; ERIH, 2007). 
 
There are some criteria that would protect against the publication of fraudulent findings 
or false positives, such as the requirement for a paper of being of “very high quality.”  
However, these descriptions do not address reproducibility explicitly. 
 
Given that reproducibility is considered central to scientific conduct (Cohen, 1994; 
Collins, 1992; Francis, 2012; Lamal, 1991; Nosek et al., 2012; Popper, 2002), these 
ranking formulae (especially the quantitative methods) do not seem to be concerned with 
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the ranking of scientifically qualitative work but in general simply popularity or, more 
generously, impact.  The incentive structures that these measures create are not 
necessarily conducive to publication of true findings but merely publication of findings 
that receive the most attention.  
 
5.1.4: Conceptual Replications 
 
Proponents of the status quo often make the argument that conceptual replications, which 
are more frequent than exact replications, ensure the reliability of published results 
(Pashler & Harris, 2012).   
 
Researchers distinguish between many different kinds of replication studies.  Gomez et 
al., for example, identify 18 different types, which they then narrow down to three 
categories.  These three are direct or exact replications, conceptual replications, and 
replications that use elements of both (Gómez, Juristo, & Vegas, 2010).  Direct 
replications repeat a reference experiment as closely as possible, thereby verifying 
aspects of the original study.  Conceptual replications attempt to reproduce an effect from 
a reference experiment by using different methods, conditions, or stimuli.  What 
conceptual replications test is how generalizable a reference effect is: does the effect still 
hold when an experiment is conducted on a different population, using different stimuli 
of the same type, or by slightly changing the presentation of stimuli?  
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Makel et al. found that roughly 1% of papers in the top 100 psychology journals 
(measured by a five-year impact factor) of the past 100 plus years (from 1900 onward) 
were replications.  Of these, 81.9% were conceptual replications, only 14% were direct 
replications and 4.1% included elements of both.  Conceptual replications were more 
likely than direct replications to succeed (82.8% compared to 72.9%), although this 
difference was not statistically significant (Makel et al., 2012). 
 
There are some strong incentives for researchers to carry out conceptual rather than exact 
replications.  When conceptual replications succeed, that is, when the original experiment 
together with a novel variation succeeds, this is considered by researchers and journals to 
be a novel finding.  This makes successful conceptual replications publishable.  Direct 
replications, regardless of whether they are successful or not, have a much lower chance 
of being published.  
 
However, when a conceptual replication fails, it is not necessarily informative on the 
robustness of the original experiment; the original result may simply not be as general 
and extendable as the conceptual replication attempted (Pashler & Harris, 2012).  An 
effect may be present in some settings but not others and changes in some variables may 
cancel out the effect.  Or the effect may simply not be strong enough to withstand 
additional noise.  A conceptual replication, then, cannot verify the data of a reference 
experiment because differences in outcomes can be attributed to these additional changes 
(Makel et al., 2012).  Nosek and colleagues paraphrase Braude in noting that a 
“successful conceptual replication [is] issued as evidence for the original result; a failed 
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conceptual replication is dismissed as not testing the original phenomenon (Braude, 
1979)” (Nosek et al., 2012, p. 619). 
  
As Pashler & Harris emphasize, “the unavoidable conclusion is that a sound assessment 
of a controversial phenomenon should focus first and foremost on direct replications of 
the original reports and not on novel variations, each of which may introduce independent 
ambiguities” (Pashler & Harris, 2012, p. 534).  Nosek further clarifies that, “psychology 
would suffer if it [conceptual replication] wasn't practised but it doesn't replace direct 
replication. To show that 'A' is true, you don't do 'B'. You do 'A' again.”  Given that 
conceptual replications can only verify and not falsify, “conceptual replication allows 
weak results to support one another” (Yong, 2012a). 
 
5.2:  Solutions to the Problem of False Positives 
 
Many solutions have been suggested and many of these may have to be implemented in 
order to improve the current system.  Most (if not all) of the suggestions are not mutually 
exclusive and hence every point may be considered carefully.  However, we believe that 
various suggestions that have been made will not be sufficient to improve the false 
positive crisis – at least not in isolation.  This follows from a historical view as some of 
the solutions have been suggested for a long time.  Furthermore, the proposals that have 
been made are all plausible, but implementation of sustainable solutions that last longer 
than the current crisis is the more difficult part. 
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Training Programs 
Various commentators have suggested that more researchers be given training in 
recognizing and avoiding questionable research practices.  One of the main responses in a 
2008 ORI survey on how misconduct could be prevented was the proposal to train 
researchers on the subject (ORI, 2008).  This seems like a logical place to start since 
researchers need to be aware that certain practices constitute questionable behavior.  This 
may especially be necessary when procedures that are questionable have become the 
norm, as seems to be the case in some fields of psychology (John et al., 2012).   
 
However, there are questions whether such training programs are effective at all (Funk, 
Barrett, & Macrina, 2007).  Others have noted that such campaigns are not going to be 
effective if the right incentives are not in place (Nosek et al., 2012).  What also speaks 
against this solution is that in surveys researchers show that they understand that certain 
practices are questionable, yet, they still report committing them (John et al., 2012), also, 
see Paper 4. 
 
Transparency 
We described in Paper 3 the difficulties we had in replicating one of the articles because 
the paper did not provide all the necessary details and the authors did not reply to our 
inquiries.  This is one of the reasons why we have not prepared this work for publication.  
Making raw data, processed data, experimental materials, etc. available allows for easier 
examination and proofing of published results.  Online storage is practically free and so 
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all materials could be shared at close to no cost.  Journals whose papers are only accepted 
in these formats could be designated in a specific way and also receive higher ratings.  
 
The Stapel Investigation uncontroversially notes that “it follows from the fundamental 
principles of openness and controllability that research procedures must be described in a 
way that allows for accurate replication of a given experiment” (Levelt, 2012, p. 51).  
The report continues that,   
 
research data that underlie psychology publications must remain archived and be 
made available on request to other scientific practitioners. This not only applies to 
the dataset ultimately used for the analysis, but also the raw laboratory data and 
all the relevant research material, including completed questionnaires, audio and 
video recordings, etc. (Levelt, 2012, p. 58) 
 
Transparency has also been the main focus of the Center for Open Science (COS, 2014; 
Nosek et al., 2012).  In general, there are likely to be few objections to increased 
transparency.    
 
Strengthening the Position of Whistleblowers 
Given that two of the recent prominent cases of misconduct (Hauser and Stapel) were 
uncovered by whistleblowers, some have concluded that the best way to prevent 
misconduct is to strengthen the position of whistleblowers and that “rather than changing 
the incentive system, the most efficient and effective approach is to improve fraud 
detection” (Stroebe et al., 2012, p. 683).   
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With regard to increasing protections for whistleblowers, there is likely to be little 
disagreement.  A survey of 4000 researchers showed that the majority of respondents 
believed that reporting suspected cases of misconduct would be followed by retaliation 
and other negative consequences (Swazey, Anderson, & Louis, 1993).  An ORI 
commissioned study of 68 actual whistleblowers showed that 70 percent faced adverse 
consequences subsequent to blowing the whistle (Frankel, 2000). 
 
Although strengthening the role of whistleblowers may play a role in correcting scientific 
practice, it is unlikely to correct the problem of false positives that come about through 
questionable research practices and the use of prevailing statistical practices.  This 
solution seems mainly directed at cases of obvious fraud.  The blatant cases of 
misconduct that consist of fraud and fabrication that are more likely the targets of 
whistleblowing, probably make up a relatively small contribution to the problem of false 
positives.  Furthermore, relying too much on whistleblowing may create an atmosphere 
that may not only be uncomfortable but at the same time unfavorable to collaboration.  
 
Accountability 
With a view to increasing accountability, some have suggested criminalizing scientific 
misconduct (Goldberg, 2003; Kuzma, 1992; Redman & Caplan, 2005; Sovacool, 2005, 
2008).  An immediate argument against this is that the bar of proof for criminal liability 
is much higher than the research community may be able to set itself (Stroebe et al., 
2012).  A further point that complicates the matter is that there needs to be the right 
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competence for prosecution and hence prosecutors may forgo the more complex cases of 
misconduct (Kuzma, 1992). 
 
We do not want to dismiss this option, especially if the alternative is the “undermining of 
public confidence in an important public institution” (Kuzma, 1992).  To us, however, the 
strongest argument as to why this option should be considered is that there is no reason 
why academic researchers should be held to a different standard from professionals in 
other fields who commit fraud to advance their careers.  However, as with some of the 
other suggested solutions, making misconduct criminally liable will likely be a solution 
for only the most blatant cases. 
 
Professional Associations 
A suggestion we have heard from several colleagues is to have professional associations 
such as the American Psychological Association (APA) play a more active role.  The 
parallel here is with medical or legal associations where doctors or lawyers have to 
defend their conduct before a board.  The power of these associations stems from 
granting licenses that permit professionals such as doctors or lawyers to practice; this 
model could be translated to academic research.    
 
We have doubts about the effectiveness of this solution, or rather about the willingness of 
these associations to play a more active role.  In the 1981 congressional hearings 
previously mentioned, the chairman of the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee of 
the House Science and Technology Committee, stated that “I cannot avoid the conclusion 
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[…] that one reason for the persistence of this type of problem [fraud in science] is the 
reluctance of people high in the science field to take these matters very seriously” (Broad 
& Wade, 1982, p. 11).  A 2008 study by the ORI concluded that “our study calls into 
question the effectiveness of self-regulation” (Titus, Wells, & Rhoades, 2008).  In his 
historical overview of the issue Lafollette writes. 
 
Looking back, we can also see that the scientific associations and organizations 
failed to respond swiftly enough to the calls for development of ethics codes and 
comprehensive ethics training programs […]. Had there been a concerted effort 
by all the major societies, similar to that which the Society for Neuroscience has 
undertaken, many of the harshest provisions of the regulatory apparatus could 
have been avoided. (LaFollette, 2000, p. 214) 
 
Bornstein notes that,  
 
in spite of years worth of criticism and suggestions for improvement (e.g. 
Crandall, 1986; Mahoney, 1987) no commitment to improvement is being made 
by journals and associations. Indeed, direct challenges to associations which 
publish journals have been answered only by “Well, it’s really not so bad.” 
(Crandall, 1987). The fact that the scientific “establishment” has not acted in an 
area as easy and basic as replication simply confirms the unlikelihood that they 
will act about the more difficult flaws in the system. (Bornstein, 1991, p. 89 and 
90) 
 
Given these evaluations, ideally, solutions to the problem of false positives in science 
would be independent of professional associations.  
 
Publication Bias 
As noted in Paper 4, there have been calls for decades to correct the problem of 
publication bias.  Greenwald, in 1975, suggests that “support for the null hypothesis must 
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be regarded as a research outcome that is acceptable as any other” (Greenwald, 1975, p. 
16).  Greenwald’s suggestion is principally that research be evaluated by its quality, 
namely variables such as procedural correctness, sample sizes, statistical methods used 
and the insight the paper conveys and not merely by its outcomes.  This notion is 
highlighted again in 1995 by Sterling in his suggestion that peer review be blind to the 
outcome of studies but instead be judged by the quality of research (Sterling et al., 1995).  
More recent calls along the same lines come from Bakker et al. (2012).  
 
We agree with these views; however, our concern is that making calls for change is not 
sufficient.  Many calls have been made in the past but unless there are ‘structural’ 
changes or changes in incentives, these calls will not be heeded as they have not been in 
the past.  
 
Information 
One aspect that separates the current from all previous crises is that the tools for 
information sharing and more generally information technology has changed 
considerably.  Projects such as the Psych File Drawer (PFD, 2012) aim to take advantage 
by building a platform for sharing information on attempted replications.  The website 
describes itself as an “Archive of Replication Attempts in Experimental Psychology” 
(PFD, 2012) where researchers can log their replication attempts of original articles. 
 
This is a new effort and at the time of writing there are only 19 logged replication 
attempts.  The main problem that concerns us is that replications (like any other study) 
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are very time consuming and perhaps more so than the original experiment.  Without 
receiving credit for such activity as in citation counts, researchers may be reluctant to 
invest time and effort in contributing to this effort.  The logged findings on the Psych File 
Drawer are not part of the published literature and so the value of the credit researchers 
receive is not clear.  
 
We do not want to be negative about this project.  Researchers’ contribution to this 
website may be taken into account in job and grant applications as well as promotion 
considerations.  This (if in fact the case) may provide sufficient incentives for researchers 
to contribute.  We hope that the number of recorded replications on the site increases; 
however, regardless of the future development of this project, we believe that a platform 
for centralizing information is integral to any sustainable solution (see Section 5.4 for 
more details). 
 
Signed Statement 
One proposal we want to present because of its simplicity is merely that authors sign the 
following statement in their articles. 
 
We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all 
manipulations, and all measures in the study. (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 
2012, p. 1) 
 
This assures that authors did not manipulate the sample size with an eye to p values, that 
all experimental conditions were reported and that no variables were excluded; put 
differently, authors assure that they are not mining, cooking or concealing (Fanelli, 2009).  
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Typically, a requirement for proving fraud is to show intent to deceive.  If researchers 
engage in questionable research practices and yet include this statement, intent to deceive 
is obvious.  
 
The shortcomings of this solution are that it is voluntary and despite the solution’s 
simplicity, Simmons and colleagues already report that there has been resistance by 
researchers to adopt this approach (Simmons et al., 2012).  A further downside is that this 
approach is again dependent on trust and as Paper 4 showed, reliance on trust may not be 
warranted, given the incentives of the current research environment.  Finally, the biggest 
weakness we see here is that this solution is not a defense against false positives that 
come about as a result of publication bias, Type I errors, and currently used statistical 
practices. 
 
Further Solutions 
There have been a plethora of other suggestions and it would not be possible to examine 
all of these in detail.  We mention some of them for reference.  An argument that has 
been made is that the aesthetic standards in scientific (specifically psychological) 
research be changed.  Given that currently too many manuscripts are submitted to a 
limited number of journals, it is not sufficient to present well conducted studies but 
articles need to tell a clear and compelling story (Giner-Sorolla, 2012).  This creates 
pressures to attain certain p values (i.e. a p value of 0.051 needs to be amended before 
being submitted to a journal), omit facts about cases where the effect under investigation 
could not be detected, or HARKing, hypothesizing after the results are known (Kerr, 
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1998).  Other suggestions that have been made are that small studies not be considered 
definitive, that reporting conventions be improved, that alternative statistical tests and 
approaches be considered, and that there be a clear distinction between exploratory and 
confirmatory research (Bakker et al., 2012; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, van der 
Maas, & Kievit, 2012). 
 
All of the above suggestions may have their place in correcting the problem of false 
positives in psychological science.  However, among all of these possible solutions, 
replications may have an elevated status.  This elevated status of replications is best 
described by the following description.  
 
Current controversies about professional standards and practices within 
psychological science at first glance involve a hodge-podge of issues, including 
potentially defective statistical methods, publication bias, selective reporting, and 
data fabrication. Nevertheless, these issues are related in a deeper sense: All 
flawed research practices yield findings that cannot be reproduced by studies that 
are specifically designed to repeat an earlier study’s procedures. Such 
“replications” allow researchers to separate findings that are trustworthy from 
findings that are unreliable. A scientific discipline that invests in replication 
research is therefore immunized to a large degree against flawed research 
practices. At present, however, psychological research is rarely explicitly 
confirmed or disconfirmed by replications. (Koole & Lakens, 2012, p. 608) 
 
The next section examines replications more closely.  
 
5.3:  Replications 
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Theoretical descriptions of scientific conduct typically place a high value on the practice 
of replications and reproducibility of findings.  However, this importance granted to 
replications in theory, does not generally translate into practice.   
 
Consider the following descriptions on the role of replications and replicability in science. 
 
Only when certain events recur in accordance with rules or regularities, as is the 
case with repeatable experiments, can our observations be tested – in principle – 
by anyone. We do not take even our own observations quite seriously, or accept 
them as scientific observations, until we have repeated and tested them. Only by 
such repetitions can we convince ourselves that we are not dealing with a mere 
isolated ‘coincidence’, but with events which, on account of their regularity and 
reproducibility, are in principle inter-subjectively testable. (Popper, 2002, p. 23) 
 
How do scientists establish that they have made a discovery that should be a new 
part of the public domain? Press scientists and in the last resort they will defend 
the validity of their claims by reference to the repeatability of their observations 
or the replicability of their experiments. […] Repeatability, or replicability (I will 
use the terms interchangeably), is the touchstone of common sense philosophy of 
science. […] Replicability, in a manner of speaking, is the Supreme Court of the 
scientific system. […] Replication is the scientifically institutionalized 
counterpart of the stability of perception. […] Thus the acceptance of replicability 
can and should act as a demarcation criterion for objective knowledge. (Collins, 
1992, p. 18 and 19) 
 
One characteristic that is commonly said to distinguish the scientific method from 
other approaches to knowledge is its objectivity. Replication has been said by 
textbook writers to be a critical test of objectivity (e.g., Chaplin & Krawiec, 1979) 
and to be “at the heart of any science” (Hersen & Barlow, 1976, p. 317). 
Replication would seem to underlie the self-correction which is presumed to be 
another characteristic of the scientific method. Replication is necessary because 
our knowledge is corrigible. (Lamal, 1991, p. 31) 
 
Throughout all of science and especially for fields that depend on statistical data 
analysis, leading researchers emphasize that experimental replication is the final 
arbiter in determining whether effects are true or false. (Francis, 2012, p. 585) 
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Braude considers replications so important that he designates it as a “demarcation 
criterion between science and nonscience” (as cited in Nosek et al., 2012, p. 618). 
 
These are just some of the examples on the importance of replications to the scientific 
process and many more can be found.  However, at the same time that the extreme 
importance of replications and replicability is professed, one will paradoxically also find 
the following observations.  
 
A field that replicates its work is rigorous and scientifically sound, but researchers 
who conduct those replications are looked down on as bricklayers and not 
advancing knowledge. (Makel et al., 2012) 
 
There is a vague sense of disrespect for someone who is interested in doing 
replications. This sense of vagueness rapidly disappears when one attempts to 
publish the replication. Prime journals will reject it, usually with an explanation 
that the paper is not a contribution to new knowledge. Replications are often 
second-class citizens in the social science literature.  (Hendrick, 1991, p. 42) 
 
One important and ironic support for the common sense view is that replication of 
others’ findings and results is an activity that is rarely practiced! Only in 
exceptional circumstances is there any reward to be gained from repeating 
another’s work. […] Thus, though scientists will cite replicability as their reason 
for adhering to belief in discoveries, they are infrequently uncertain enough to 
need, or to want, to press this idea to its experimental conclusion. For the vast 
majority of science replicability is an axiom rather than a matter of practice.  
(Collins, 1992, p. 19) 
  
There is a reluctance among social scientists in general, and among psychologists 
in particular, to invest time, money and energy in replication studies. This 
reluctance is at least partially based on publication policies of most journals in the 
social sciences. Journal editors clearly prefer to publish reports which show new 
findings. This preference, severely hurts the possibility of publishing studies 
which “merely” replicate results of earlier findings. The outcome is that 
replication research […] is rarely carried out today. Instead, it is assumed that a 
research result once found has continuous validity and generality. (Amir & 
Sharon, 1991, p. 53) 
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It is evident that replication is not an essential ingredient in the cookbook of 
academic science. Certainly, it is added for flavoring every now and then, but that 
is about all. […] Replication in science is a philosophical construct, not an 
everyday reality. (Broad & Wade, 1982, p. 81 and 86) 
 
The lack of interest in replication is striking given its centrality to science. (Nosek 
et al., 2012, p. 618) 
 
Students and academics face tight constraints on time and resources, only a fool 
would spend effort trying to report mistakes rather than burying them or repeating 
someone else’s work rather than promoting one’s own. (Giner-Sorolla, 2012, p. 
564) 
 
Considering that theoretical descriptions of the scientific process put a high value on 
replications, yet in practice this activity is relegated as inferior in psychology, one is led 
to draw the conclusion that psychology, as it currently stands, is not concerned about 
proper scientific practice but something else.  An (uncharitable) interpretation may be 
that some fields of psychology may instead be concerned about entertainment value.  
This view matches the previously cited comment that journals expect “slightly freak-
show-ish” results and that top journals consider psychology a “parlour-trick area” (Yong, 
2012a). 
 
This sentiment of the supposed inferiority of replications has led to an extreme scarcity of 
publication of replications, which is one of the main factors leading to the likely high rate 
of false-positive results in psychology.  
 
5.3.1:  Scarcity of Replications 
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The scarcity of published replications has been pointed out over many years.  Bornstein 
concludes in a 1991 essay that “in light of the fact that valid, replicable empirical findings 
are the basis of any field of science, it is – to say the least – somewhat disturbing to learn 
that replication studies are rarely published in the social science journals” (Bornstein, 
1991, p. 72).   
 
A study published in 1972 examined three psychology journals covering 1334 articles 
over a time period of close to four years (1967 to 1970) and found that fewer than one 
percent of the articles published were replications of previous work (Bozarth & Roberts, 
1972).  As referred to earlier, Makel et al. (2012) analyzed the rate of replication studies 
in the 100 top rated journals according to a five-year impact factor.  As mentioned, 1.07% 
of articles were replications.  Of these, close to 82% were conceptual replications, 14% 
were exact replications and the remaining contained elements of both.  More than half of 
the replications (52.9%) were conducted by the team of researchers that published the 
original article; this poses clear problems of incentives and conflicts of interest.  And 
indeed, the success rate of replications varied considerably depending on overlap of 
authorship.  Specifically, the rate of successful replications was 91.7% when there was an 
overlap of authorship as compared to 64.6% when there was no overlap.
63
  
 
The problem of lack of replications has persisted for so long that authors have even 
pointed out that discussion on the topic surfaces periodically, however, little changes.  
                                                 
63
 A reason for this discrepancy could be that the original researchers are more familiar with experimental 
procedures (some of which may not be explicit in published articles) and so the original group is more 
likely to succeed in replicating the reference effect.  However, the published procedures are the ones that 
are relevant for the scientific record and if a group following the published procedures cannot replicate the 
reference findings, this is nevertheless a failure of replication as far as the scientific record is concerned. 
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Amir & Sharon highlight in 1991 that “the need for replication research and validation is 
raised every few years in articles published in leading journals, calling for changes in the 
research approach taken by psychologists” (Amir & Sharon, 1991, p. 55).  The authors 
continue that despite these calls, little changes in this regard.  Also in 1991 Lamal writes 
that “the case for replications has been made before (e.g., by Campbell & Jackson, 1979; 
Kazdin, 1982; Sidman, 1960; Smith, 1970; Sommer & Sommer, 1983). Unfortunately, it 
would be difficult to determine whether such exhortation has had much effect. There is 
some evidence that it has not” (Lamal, 1991, p. 31). 
 
Given an aversion to publishing replications, a 1991 study set out to capture the views of 
journal editors on this topic (Neuliep & Crandall, 1991).  In a survey of 288 editors, 94% 
of respondents said that their journals did not encourage replications and 42% said that 
they had never received exact replications.  When these editors were asked whether a 
new effect was more important or a replication of a previously reported effect, 72% said 
that a new effect was more important (answer options included “both equally”).  When 
asked whether a new effect was more important or a failed replication of a previously 
reported effect, 58% opted for new effect and 15% chose failed replication. Twenty-one 
percent indicated that both were equally important and the rest abstained. 
 
Surprisingly, when asked on whom the burden of proof rested when a replication attempt 
failed, only 9% said that the burden of proof was with the original researchers and 29% 
answered that the burden lay with the replicators (24% answered both, 6% neither and 
32% provided no answer).  This is an unexpected outcome and hints at the low status that 
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replications are afforded.  A possible justification would be that replicators may not be 
familiar with all the procedures and hence may not have been able to follow the protocol 
closely.  However, this is a post-hoc justification that is not entailed in the survey 
question (also, see Footnote 63).  This view towards failed replications is further 
disincentive for carrying out replications as researchers who fail to replicate will face 
some pressure to explain their results.  
 
Neuliep and Crandall present some of the comments of the survey respondents on 
replications.
64
  It is important when reading the below comments to recall that in 
theoretical descriptions of science, replication and replicability was lauded as one of the 
cornerstones of the scientific enterprise. 
 
“Dull” 
“The worst of the modern science/social science publish or perish mentality. 
People aren’t interested in them.” 
“Referees tend to judge them to have relatively low priority.” 
“They seldom make new contributions to our understanding of the phenomena.” 
“There needs to be a reason (conceptual, methodological, or otherwise) for  
      conducting a replication.” 
“When do you stop? Is one rep enough, or should we let someone build their  
     career replicating the same study?” 
“Readers feel that replications are redundant and don’t reflect cutting edge stuff.” 
“Explicit, direct replications are often unnecessary and add little to the field’s  
     knowledge.” 
“They tend to be boring and not contribute a lot.” 
“Direct replication with positive outcomes and without other additional      
    manipulations provide no new information.” 
“They add little to advance our understanding of the issues.” 
“They are given too much weight.” 
 
                                                 
64
 Reproduced from (Neuliep & Crandall, 1991, p. 88). 
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It would be misplaced to put the sole blame on journal editors.  Editors, to a great extent, 
follow the norms of their fields and their views are largely reflective of existing standards 
(Neuliep & Crandall, 1991).  Once the prevailing opinions change, editor views and 
editorial policies will change as well.  These values, however, will not change by 
themselves.  There need to be changes in incentives and “until new forces come to play 
on editors, attempts to publish replications can expect to continue to meet strong editorial 
resistance” (Neuliep & Crandall, 1991, p. 90). 
 
We want to single out one of the comments from the list provided above by Neuliep & 
Crandall because it possibly represents a legitimate concern.  The comment we are 
referring to is, “When do you stop? Is one rep enough, or should we let someone build 
their career replicating the same study?” (Neuliep & Crandall, 1991, p. 88).  If research, 
regardless of outcome (positive or negative results) and perceived importance were to be 
published (as the journal PLOS has made it its policy), a single study could be replicated 
and published numerous times.  A replication would contribute little if there have been 
ten prior replications all of which were successful.  Earlier replications are more valuable 
than later ones (given equal quality) and so earlier replications would ideally receive 
credit accordingly.  A relative credit system could be worked into co-citation systems, so 
that incentives are low for conducting the, say, eleventh replication when all previous 
ones have been successful.  Furthermore, platforms such as the File Psych Drawer where 
information is aggregated could solve the problem of too much space dedicated to 
replications by presenting summaries of methods, procedures, participants, results, etc.   
 
 212 
The problem of too many replications is not a great concern of this paper and to 
researchers who have looked for solutions to shortcomings of the research-publication 
system because there never has been a situation where there have been too many 
published replications.  Hence, this hypothetical situation will not be a focus of this paper.    
 
5.3.2:  Increasing Replication Rates 
 
Various suggestions have been made on how to increase the rates of replications.  Below, 
we will present some of these. 
 
Student Projects 
Given that there exist little incentives for carrying out replications and researchers face 
constraints on time and resources, one suggestions has been to delegate replications to 
students in training (Frank & Saxe, 2012).  One big problem with this proposal is that it 
designates replications as an insignificant activity to be assigned to individuals low in 
academic rank.  It is also very likely that replications will be even more difficult to 
publish if they are considered merely as training ground for students.   
 
Replications require great attention to detail and when replications by students fail, it will 
be easy to reject these as the work of unskilled researchers.  This justification is already 
used with full-time researchers and established academics (Levelt, 2012), and would be 
invoked even more with student work.  
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Journals Dedicated to Replications 
One of the solutions that emerged from the 1970s crisis was that each discipline set up a 
journal entirely dedicated to replications (Lamal, 1991).  In 1979 a journal named 
Replications in Social Psychology attempted to put this in practice; however, the journal 
ceased activity after three volumes.  
 
We mostly disagree with this solution because it separates (at the very least spatially) 
replications from regular research findings, signaling a difference in status.  Ideally, 
replications would be considered integral to scientific practice and given credit 
accordingly. 
 
Instead of entirely separating replications to specialized journals, another suggestions has 
been for journals to assign space to replications of previously published work.  This 
would signal to researchers that replications are encouraged and also rewarded with 
citations (Bornstein, 1991).  Rewarding researchers with citations may be critical in 
increasing the number of replications. 
   
A system of co-citations may offer sufficient incentives (Koole & Lakens, 2012).  What 
this system entails is that whenever an article is cited, any available replications that exist 
also receive citations.  Additionally, co-citation could provide a summary note of how 
many replications succeeded and how many failed.  For example, this could be as follows, 
OriginalAuthor, Year, Replication: ReplicationAuthor1, ReplicationAuthor2, 
ReplicationSummary: 1:1, where one replication succeeded and one failed.   
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Pre-publication replication 
In 1957 Lubin, noticing the lack of replications, suggested that manuscripts submitted for 
publication already contain replication attempts.  These manuscripts would be regarded 
higher and given priority in publication decisions (Lubin, 1957).  Similarly, in 1968 
Lykken suggests that “ideally, all experiments would be replicated before publication” 
although he continues that “this goal is impractical” (Lykken, 1968, p. 159). 
 
Given the recent problems of false positives, it may be worth considering pre-publication 
replications; or a variation where other laboratories replicate the work.  Upon receiving 
manuscripts, journals could send experiment designs to reviewer labs to run replications.  
This is not an unreasonable suggestion in light of the fact that Stapel had many multi-
study reports, as did Bem (2011).  Researchers who want to find multiple false-positive 
results, will find a way to do so.  This solution does seem somewhat impractical and it 
may slow down the pace of publishing.  It would also likely face strong opposition from 
some researchers, as captured by the statement that “if each researcher had to go back and 
repeat the literature, the enormously productive rush of modern science would slow to a 
snail's pace” (Koshland, 1987, p. 141). 
   
A less strict version would be to randomly select a percentage of manuscripts for pre-
publication replication.  Selecting a small percentage of manuscripts for pre-publication 
replication may introduce enough checks to ensure compliance to better standards by all 
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submitting authors, as no one would know whose manuscripts would be selected for 
replication. 
 
A further advantage of pre-publication replications is that it is pro rather than retroactive.  
The number of retractions would be reduced and researchers would not invest time 
following research paths that later turn out to be non-reproducible.  Finally, there is 
another benefit to pre-publication replications.  With post-publication replication, the 
issue of publication bias re-appears, although in reverse.  Many laboratories may attempt 
to replicate any given study and those that fail to replicate will naturally receive attention 
and be more likely to be published. 
 
Prominent, surprising, controversial, or counter-intuitive results are more likely to be 
replicated, as a failure to replicate such effects would have better chances of being 
published.  Even if the original effect is robust, given that many groups around the world 
are likely to attempt replication, by statistical chance alone, some will fail reproduction.  
Successful replications are likely to be stored away but failures of replication (because of 
the surprise factor) are likely to be submitted for publication.  This is in effect the same as 
publication bias, just in ‘reverse’.  In ‘reverse’ because very often in replication studies, 
negative findings (failure of replication) are noteworthy and positive findings (successful 
replications) are non-results. 
 
We see two objections to instituting pre-publication replications.  One, as briefly 
mentioned, the pace of publishing would be slowed down.  This may be a reasonable cost 
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given the prevalence of questionable research practices, false positives in the literature, 
and cases of fraud.  Such an institution would likely improve the quality of published 
articles and although it may slow down publication, quality would be improved.   
 
Furthermore, although the pace of publishing may be slowed down, the pace of scientific 
discovery may speed up.  Researchers who engaged with Stapel and examined his work 
and attempted to build on those results wasted a lot of time and resources that could have 
been spent on other projects. 
 
The second problem is that researchers will have to share their work prior to publication 
with other labs.  This may not be amenable to all researchers because they lose control 
over information before it is published and other labs could appropriate those ideas and 
an important competitive advantage may be lost in many cases. 
 
5.4:  Concluding Remarks 
 
After discussing many of the problems of the current research-publication system in 
Paper 4, we provided a review of some of the possible solutions in the current paper.   
 
The earliest reference to a discussion of systemic problems we made in Paper 4 was to 
Babbage who highlighted the prevalence of questionable research practices in 1830 
(Babbage, 1830).  In the current paper, we referenced many articles from the 1950s to the 
present in discussing the problems of (psychological) science; not in order to provide a 
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historical account, but as an indication of how long these problems have persisted.  
Without substantial changes, these problems are likely to persist, as they have for decades.  
The literature reviewed here also shows that the problem is unlikely to be with a few bad 
apples or the thinking of a generation.  The problem is more systemic. 
 
Potential solutions need to be long lasting.  In the past, after crises, researchers have 
emphasized replications and have called for improvement of research practices.  Efforts 
were made and researchers spent energy in setting up new journals; however, these 
efforts never lasted and the next crisis always followed.  
 
Summary of Necessary Components of a Sustainable Solution 
We want to highlight what we believe to be necessary elements that any sustainable 
solution will incorporate.  The way we see it in summary is as follows.  Sufficient checks 
on published findings are currently lacking and this keeps the door open for false 
positives to flourish in the literature of various fields, especially those that use statistical 
tests of significance.  Replications would offer an adequate check; however, researchers 
currently do not have the necessary incentives for conducting replications.  Increased 
publication and citation of replication studies would offer such an incentive.  One way to 
increase incentives for replications would be a system of co-citations, where replication 
studies of a reference paper are automatically co-cited whenever the original (reference) 
paper receives citation.  Increased transparency of experimental procedures would reduce 
the difficulty in carrying out replications.  Finally, the outcome of one replication should 
not be taken to be definitive.  It is important to know the outcomes of the second, third, 
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fourth, etc. replication.  So that all replication attempts are recorded – not only those that 
have a surprising outcome or those that come first – a platform where information on 
reproducibility of specific articles and experiments is centralized and archived would also 
be necessary.  In effect, this platform would be a verification system where findings are 
considered preliminary until a certain number of replications have been conducted.   
 
Importance of the Issue 
In concluding this paper, we want to highlight the importance of the issue at hand. 
Bornstein writes in 1991 that the 
 
replication process in social science research leaves much to be desired. Because 
social scientists historically have published relatively few replication studies, the 
social sciences have retained many qualities of a “preparadigmatic” field (see 
Kuhn, 1962; Mahoney, 1985). Consequently, social science research is perceived 
by other scientists (and by members of the public) as being less rigorous, less 
robust, less replicable and less cumulative than research in other branches of 
science. (Bornstein, 1991, p. 80) 
 
With current practices, psychology is at a risk of losing credibility, as “efficient and 
unbiased replication mechanisms are essential for maintaining high levels of scientific 
credibility” (Ioannidis, 2012, p. 645). 
 
Psychology is not the only field affected by this problem.  In pharmaceutical research, 
Amgen attempted to test the robustness of 53 “landmark” published results of pre-clinical 
studies and only 11% of the work was replicated successfully.  The study concludes that 
“some nonreproducible preclinical papers had spawned an entire field, with hundreds of 
secondary publications that expanded on elements of the original observation, but did not 
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actually seek to confirm or falsify its fundamental basis” (Begley & Ellis, p. 532).  
Similarly, Bayer HealthCare tested the reproducibility of 67 findings and reported a 
success rate (fully consistent with the original findings) of replications of only 20-25% 
(Prinz et al., 2011b).   
 
Both of these reports mention that informally the problem of nonreproducibility is known 
and discussed among academics and industry.  Both also specify that this is not a problem 
that comes down to a few bad apples but that the problem is systemic.  On the topic of 
questionable research practices, Begley & Ellis go as far as to say that the “academic 
system and peer-review process tolerates and perhaps even inadvertently encourages such 
conduct” (Begley & Ellis, p. 533).   
 
The papers mention as reasons for non-reproducibility, issues familiar to the experimental 
psychology literature; among these are publication bias, statistical methods, pressure to 
publish, and lack of replications. 
 
One thing that is revealing is that private industry has little confidence in results obtained 
from academic research.  Companies that invest in pharmaceutical projects assume that 
half of the results from academia are not reproducible (Osherovich, 2011). 
 
These problems may be worse in psychology.  Comparing psychology to other fields, a 
Nature article notes.  
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These problems occur throughout the sciences, but psychology has a number of 
deeply entrenched cultural norms that exacerbate them. It has become common 
practice, for example, to tweak experimental designs in ways that practically 
guarantee positive results. And once positive results are published, few 
researchers replicate the experiment exactly, instead carrying out 'conceptual 
replications' that test similar hypotheses using different methods. This practice 
[…] builds a house of cards on potentially shaky foundations. (Yong, 2012a) 
 
We started out this paper discussing views that reject criticism of the current research-
publication system.  We reviewed these sentiments as an indication that any proposed 
changes to the current system will face obstacles.  In light of the discussions of Paper 4, 
we do not have much confidence in these views.  Given the shortcomings of the current 
research-publication system (Paper 4) many proposals for improvement have been made.  
We reviewed some of these in Section 5.2 and highlighted which components we believe 
to be fundamental for any sustainable solutions.  These included transparency, different 
incentives, information sharing and check on published findings.  Central to these 
discussions was replication.  We would like to end this paper by addressing replications 
with a quote, whose importance, we think, cannot be emphasized enough.  
 
The importance of original studies is not their originality per se, but their 
epistemological force. So also with replications, their importance is in terms of 
their epistemological import. (Lamal, 1991, p. 32) 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
Discussion 
 
Reliability of Replication Findings   
Experimental philosophy has gained attention by producing surprising results.  The aim 
of Papers 1-3 of this thesis was to test the reproducibility of some of these results.  Of all 
the studies that we conduct and of all the data that we analyzed, most of the reference 
findings were not reproducible.  As a brief summary, without the replication work, the 
following would be considered genuine effects: individuals of different ethnic 
backgrounds have different epistemic intuitions (discussed in Paper 1); women and men 
have different intuitions on various types of philosophical questions (discussed in Paper 
2); moral intuitions are easily influenced using certain manipulations (discussed in Paper 
3).      
 
The question that naturally arises is whether we could have had flaws in our procedures 
that brought about the null findings.  First, not all of our replication attempts failed and 
not all of our experiments produced null findings.  In Papers 1-3 we reported several 
positive results (significant effects).  We reported all analyses
65
 that we conducted 
(whether in support of our hypotheses or not) for the examined effects and so we are clear 
of omission of reporting.  This made some of the presentations less straightforward and 
perhaps less elegant; luckily, the journal reviewers did not hold this against us.   
                                                 
65
 There are two studies (Beebe & Buckwalter, 2010; Machery et al., 2004) for which we analyzed the 
replication data but which we have not reported so far.  In both cases we did not attain significant p values 
to reproduce the reference findings.  However, we are reluctant to call these failures of replication because 
our samples were relatively small and furthermore, the direction of the data was similar to that of the 
original articles. 
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We collected data on more experiments; however, we have not analyzed these.  The 
reason we have not analyzed all collected data is simply due to time constraints.   
 
One of the problems in experimental psychology that has led to an abundance of false 
positives is that among studies conducted, researchers often selectively report outcomes 
of interest.  In the context of our work, the equivalent of that practice would be to only 
mention studies that yielded negative results.  By reporting all studies, we are staying 
clear of this practice.      
 
Second, we followed the procedures of the original articles as closely as possible.  In 
many cases we attained greater statistical power than the original experiments, yet still 
did not detect the investigated effects.  Given the greater power of our studies, our 
procedures were more likely to reveal effects, had these existed.   
 
Third, the strongest indication that our results are robust is that since we made our work 
public, other groups have attempted to replicate the original effects we examined and 
these groups also could not reproduce the reference findings (Adleberg et al., 2014; 
Minsun & Yuan, ms).  Furthermore, Nagel et al. (2013), independently of our work, 
report a failed conceptual replication of Weinberg et al. (2001) on the effect of ethnicity 
on epistemic intuitions.  Nagel and colleagues also report no gender differences on 
epistemic intuitions (Nagel et al., 2013).  There is another study (Turri, 2013) that can be 
considered a failed conceptual replication of Weinberg et al. (2001) on the effect of 
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ethnicity on epistemic intuitions.
66
  These independent verifications strongly suggest that 
our findings are reliable. 
 
In any instance a single replication should not be considered definitive.  Ideally, any 
effect should be verified by different researchers independently.  This is one of the 
reasons that our reports are multi-studies and why we very early on urged other 
researchers to attempt replications of the original effects (or to replicate the replication 
findings).  Unfortunately, currently replications are only publishable if they have a 
surprise factor, if they are somehow unexpected.  The reason our replications were 
published is because the findings came as a surprise to those familiar with the literature 
and also because before us others had not carried out this kind of work. 
 
Trend in Replications 
We mentioned in the Introduction that since we made our results public in 2012, a trend 
in replications has started in experimental philosophy, with findings of other exact 
replications being made public in 2014 (Adleberg et al., 2014; Kvanvig, 2014; Minsun & 
Yuan, ms).  We would like to show by an example why this has been important.  On 
March 31, 2014 Episteme published a paper by Colaço et al. reporting differences in 
epistemic intuitions depending on age.  The study reports that “the intuition that fake-
barn cases do count as knowledge is negatively correlated with age; older participants are 
less likely than younger participants to attribute knowledge in fake-barn cases” (Colaço et 
al., 2014, p. 199). 
                                                 
66
 As pointed out before, Turri (2013) is not a straightforward conceptual replication of Weinberg et al. 
(2001).  See Footnote 17.     
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Just one week later, Jon Kvanvig posted an entry on a blog with the results of this paper, 
remarking that successful replication was not guaranteed.  Kvanvig ended the post with 
the note “Next: attempts to replicate?” (Kvanvig, 2014).  In the comments section, 
several researchers started discussing how to go about replicating the effect and by June 
24, 2014, Joshua Knobe reported two failed replications with a combined sample size of 
over 500 individuals.  Colaço et al., themselves, submitted a post to a different blog on 
the same day, reporting on the failed replications (Colaço, 2014).   
 
Without the trend in replications and without the swift call to replication of Colaço et al. 
(2014), we would have likely seen much time and space dedicated to explaining why age 
would influence epistemic intuitions, whether intuitions can be trusted and what this 
means for philosophical methodology in general.  We would have seen competing 
theories explain this effect, proponents and opponents of IAE (Intuition as Evidence) 
argue whether this means that IAE needs to be abandoned, and so on.  Luckily, the non-
reproducibility was established quickly and there was no need for these discussions.     
 
Implications of Failed Replications  
The next question we want to address is what the failures of replication that we (as well 
as now others) reported means for the experimental philosophy movement.  For the 
replications that we conducted, the rate of failed replications to successful replications is 
disconcerting; however, we did not select papers for replication randomly.  A note on 
what criteria we used to select papers may be in order.   
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We did not select the weakest papers, that is, papers that were most likely not to 
reproduce.  Our first priority was to test a diverse selection of effects (ethnicity, 
socioeconomic background, gender, moral intuitions).  As discussed in the Introduction, 
we expected many of the studies to replicate successfully.  Buckwalter & Stich (2013) 
appeared without flaws and the sample sizes were relatively large.  Nothing indicated that 
the results were unreliable.  Valdesolo & DeSteno (2006) and Zhong et al. (2010) also 
reported sufficiently large samples and their procedures also did not indicate any apparent 
flaws.  Weinberg et al. (2001) had been the subject of extensive debate and we believed it 
likely that it had been previously replicated successfully.   
 
A further reason for choosing the articles discussed in Papers 1-3 was that these had been 
influential and widely circulated amongst experimental philosophers.  If these effects 
were not reproducible, we believed it important that readers of the literature were aware 
of it.  
 
Nevertheless, we did have some reasons for believing that the reference papers needed 
further scrutiny.  For example, the sample sizes in Weinberg et al. (2001) were relatively 
small and this could have opened the door to sampling errors.  We also did not see why 
ethnicity or socioeconomic background by themselves would impact epistemic intuitions.  
We had some suspicion that language proficiency could have had an effect when 
examining ethnic background; however, further studies have ruled this out (Minsun & 
Yuan, ms).  Gender differences on scenarios such as Brain in the Vat or Twin-Earth did 
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not seem very plausible to us in the absence of a strong explanation or in fact any 
explanation, which the authors of the original study could not provide.  As another group 
has argued, there is evidence that Buckwalter & Stich (2013) conducted several studies 
and only reported those that yielded statistically significant differences (Adleberg et al., 
2014). 
 
The effects tested in this thesis represent a subset of the results of the experimental 
philosophy literature.  What other published and established findings are not reproducible 
has to be seen from future replications.  There may be many or only few other findings 
that are not reproducible.  Paper 4 gave some indication that it should not come as a 
surprise if it were the former.  However, that is an empirical question that needs to be 
tested.  It is not exactly clear how damning the failed replications presented in this thesis 
are for experimental philosophy.  We believe that at a minimum, these failed replications 
give some reason to be more careful going forward and to devise ways to assure the 
reproducibility of published findings (see Paper 5). 
  
The Research-Publication System 
After presenting our empirical findings in Papers 1-3, Paper 4 reviewed some of the 
shortcomings of the current research-publication system that allows for the publication of 
high rates of false-positive results.  In Paper 4, we also tried to give a sense of how long 
lasting these problems have been by citing discussion of the issue going as far back as 
1830.  
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In light of the problems discussed in Paper 4, Paper 5 reviewed some of the solutions that 
researchers have suggested over the years.  We believe that replications will be an 
important component of any sustainable solution; however, we also believe that incentive 
structures need to change to make conducting replications more appealing.  Researchers 
in general and philosophers in specific will not simply start conducting more replications 
merely because of their dedication to science or true results.  The last century in 
experimental psychology and the last decade and a half (the entire lifespan) of 
experimental philosophy have demonstrated this.  The components that we believe to be 
important for any sustainable solution are: more checks on published findings through 
increased rates of replications, more incentives to conduct replications through co-
citations, centralization of information on replications, and increased transparency in 
order to facilitate replications. 
 
Conclusion 
Various fields in the natural and social sciences currently face a ‘crisis of confidence’.  
This crisis amounts to a pervasiveness of false-positive results in the published literature.  
To mention just a few, areas that have recently received attention include biomedicine 
(Begley & Ellis, 2012a; Ioannidis, 2005; Prinz et al., 2011b), economics and political 
science (Dafoe, 2013; Gherghina & Katsanidou, 2013; Herndon, Ash, & Pollin, 2014) as 
well as psychology (Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012).  
 
The importance of the issue seems difficult to overemphasize.  In biomedicine, potential 
treatments may be delayed or completely missed, scarce funding wasted, and in general 
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the pace of progress slowed as researchers embark on paths that later turn out to be non-
replicable (Begley & Ellis, 2012a; Prinz et al., 2011b).  In economics and political 
science, policies may be based on flawed findings, wasting resources and potentially 
slowing economic growth (Lowrey, 2013).  Some fields of psychology are at a risk of 
losing all credibility as a result of an excess of false-positive findings.  The state of 
publishing in psychology has led one prominent researcher to claim that “the prevalence 
of unchallenged fallacies may represent even up to 95% (if not more) of the significant 
findings in some areas of the psychological literature” (Ioannidis, 2012, p. 650).  Others 
who have studied the topic have similarly concluded that the majority of published 
findings may be false-positives (Pashler & Harris, 2012).  Concrete data that supports this 
estimate comes from the Reproducibility Project (Nosek, 2012).    
 
Recently, philosophers have started using the tools of experimental psychology to study 
philosophical questions.  Experimental philosophy has attracted great attention, 
essentially for producing results that seem highly counter-intuitive and at the same time 
question some of the fundamental methods used in philosophy.  For this thesis, we set out 
to systematically replicate some of the findings in the experimental philosophy literature 
and as it turned out, some of the most cited and attention grabbing papers in the field 
(Buckwalter & Stich, 2013; Weinberg et al., 2001) turned out to be non-reproducible 
(Seyedsayamdost, 2014, forthcoming).  
 
This development suggests several things.  First, the high occurrence of false positives in 
psychology and other fields does not seem related to localized issues such as research 
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culture or a few ‘bad apples’ (Sovacool, 2008).  The problem appears to be more 
systemic and is (most likely) related to the incentive structures and fundamental methods 
of empirical research as currently practiced, especially for areas that use statistical 
methods.  Experimental philosophy in itself provides a case study or an experiment for 
this hypothesis.  A very young field in its early stages, starting from scratch, quickly ran 
into the same problems that various fields of psychology had to deal with for decades.  
As it stands, current research practices keep the door open for non-replicable results; be it 
simply as a result of standard statistical procedures and publication practices (Ioannidis, 
2005; Pashler & Harris, 2012) or questionable research practices (Fanelli, 2009; John et 
al., 2012; Martinson et al., 2005). 
 
The second point is that experimental philosophy, like other empirical fields, needs a 
better system to test for robustness of published findings.  Replications, the most direct 
way of verifying published findings, are central for this purpose; however, currently 
replications are scarce.  Theoretical descriptions of scientific practice place a high value 
on replications and consider reproducibility integral to science (Collins, 1992; Lamal, 
1991; Nosek et al., 2012; Popper, 2002); however, in practice replications are often 
considered inferior to original findings (Collins, 1992; Hendrick, 1991; Makel et al., 
2012; Neuliep & Crandall, 1991).  In psychology, many agree that replications are critical 
in lowering the rate of false positives (Amir & Sharon, 1991; Koole & Lakens, 2012; 
Nosek et al., 2012; Pashler & Harris, 2012; Ritchie et al., 2012b) and calls for more 
replications have been made frequently during various crises of the past decades.  
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However, without changes to the incentive structures, these calls have remained 
unanswered.   
 
In closing this thesis, we draw two conclusions from the work presented in Papers 1 to 5.  
The first is that the instability of intuitions has been exaggerated by experimental 
philosophers.  Intuitions appear to be more uniform across demographic groups.  Whether 
intuitions should be considered legitimate data points in philosophical theorizing is a 
different question; however, the argument that intuitions need to be discarded because 
they depend on arbitrary factors such as ethnicity, socioeconomic background, or gender 
does not seem tenable anymore.   
 
The second conclusion is that experimental philosophy, like some other empirical fields, 
needs a better system to test for the reproducibility of published findings.  As it stands, 
current research and publication practices lead to an overproduction of false-positive 
findings in the published literature.  Unless changes are made to the research-publication 
system, this overproduction is likely to continue: in experimental philosophy as well as 
other disciplines. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A 
 
Data Set 1 
 
Participants 
In order to determine participants’ ethnic backgrounds, we used the relevant questions 
from Richard Nisbett's demographic instrument.  In the interest of keeping the survey 
short, we did not use all of the questions; for example, we did not ask about SAT or ACT 
scores or annual salary but instead restricted our questions mostly to those specifically 
aimed at identifying ethnic background.  These included the following questions: self-
identified ethnicity (if the response to this was white/Caucasian, we further inquired 
about specific origin, i.e. Eastern Europe, Middle East/West Asia), native language, place 
of birth, place of birth of parents and grandparents.   
 
In order to be classified as W, participants had to self-identify as white/Caucasian and be 
born in the EU (there were no participants from Iceland or Switzerland) or US (there 
were no participants from Australia or Canada).  We furthermore asked about family’s 
background and excluded participants who were of Eastern European and generally non-
Western (for example, West Asian) background.  At least one parent and two 
grandparents had to have EU or US as their place of birth.  In all, only eight participants 
did not indicate all their parents and grandparents to have been born in the EU/US.  
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Excluding these participants from analysis did not change the outcomes and in fact 
increased p values.  Two participants mistakenly indicated their birthplace as 1991 (their 
birth year); we included these among Ws since all their grandparents and parents were 
born in the EU or US and their native language was English.   
 
In order to be classified as EA or SC, participants had to self-identify as East Asian 
(China, Korea, Japan) or South Asian (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan – there were no 
participants from Nepal), respectively, in the ethnicity part of the questionnaire.  
Furthermore, at most one parent and one grandparent could have been born in the EU or 
US.  Among EAs, none of the participants had any parents or grandparents who were 
born in the EU or US; among SCs, four individuals had one parent born in EU/US and 
one participant had exactly one grandparent born in EU/US.  As before, excluding these 
participants did not change the final outcomes and in fact increased p values.  For the EA 
sample, nine participants were born in the West (Australia, UK, or US); however, 
excluding these participants increased p values slightly.  For the SC sample, out of 35 
participants (there was one non-response), 23 were born in the West (all in the UK), 
leaving only 12 participants born internationally.  Comparing the latter sample with the 
W sample is not very meaningful because of the small sample size.  Nevertheless, a 
comparison did not yield a significant difference, although p values did decrease.  
 
Data Set 2 
 
Participants 
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We tested two scenarios in this data set, namely Truetemp and Conspiracy.  For 
Truetemp, we used the same criteria as in Data Set 1 to categorize participants.  There 
were two Canadian individuals in this sample who were born in Canada with native 
language English/French whom we included as W.  None of the EA and SC individuals 
had either a parent or grandparent born in the EU or US with the exception of one EA 
who indicated one grandparent to have been born in the EU/US.  This participant was 
born in China with Chinese as her/his native language.  For the EA sample, two 
participants were born in the West (UK, US); excluding these from analysis did not 
change significance.  Five individuals in the SC sample were born in the West (all EU); 
excluding these from analysis did not make a difference and p-exact remained at 1.000.     
 
For Conspiracy, there was a problem with the database and about half of the participants’ 
birth places were not recorded.  We used the other pieces of information to categorize 
participants.  As before, participants had to self-identify as East Asian or South Asian to 
be included in these categories.  None of the EA and SC individuals had any parents or 
grandparents born in the EU or US with the exception of one individual who indicated 
that one of their parents and one of their grandparents were born in the EU or US.  For 
the available data, no EA participants were born in the West and in the SC sample only 
two were born in the West.  Excluding these from analysis did not change significance.  
 
Data Set 3 
 
Participants 
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SM collects demographic information on individuals who sign up to participate.  We 
asked SM to send out invitations to individuals of white/Caucasian background and 
individuals of Asian background.  SM does not classify among different regions of Asia, 
so we used our own demographic questionnaire to filter for East and South Asian 
participants.  Being in SM's white/Caucasian category did not automatically categorize 
respondents as Westerners.  For example, West Asians who were in SM's 
white/Caucasian category were not classified as Western.  We relied on our own 
questionnaire to categorize participants; however, we used SM’s categorization to narrow 
down the target audience.  Ethnicity was self-identified as a response to the question 
“how would you describe your ethnic background?”  Additionally, we asked for native 
language and used this information for categorizing participants as well.  For example, if 
someone self-identified as East Asian, however, indicated their native language as Hindi 
or Vietnamese, this person was classified as South Asian or Southeast Asian, respectively.  
Only one participant among the white/Caucasian group indicated their native language as 
non-English (it was German); all others indicated English as their native language. 
 
Data Set 4 
 
Participants  
For this data set we used similar criteria to Data Set 3; we used self-identification to 
categorize participants and further used information on birthplace and native language 
wherever available to correct for obvious mistakes.  
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Appendix B 
 
Breakdown of the individual SurveyMonkey Surveys 
 
Brain in the Vat 
 
Survey 1 (longer survey) 
N = 56, Male = 26, Female = 30.  Male: M = 6.12, SD = 1.71.  Female: M = 5.50, SD = 
1.78.  Independent-samples t-test: t(54) = 1.317, p = 0.193. 
 
Survey 2 (shorter survey) 
N = 44, Male = 23, Female = 21.  Male: M = 5.39, SD = 1.994.  Female: M = 5.76, SD = 
1.921.  Independent-samples t-test: t(42) = -0.627, p = 0.534. 
 
Twin Earth 
 
Survey 1 
N = 54, Male = 26, Female = 28.  Male: M = 6.00, SD = 1.81.  Female: M = 5.07, SD = 
2.62.  Independent-samples t-test: t(48) = 1.522, p = 0.134. 
 
Survey 2 
N = 31, Male = 14, Female = 17.  Male: M = 5.64, SD = 2.53.  Female: M = 5.47, SD = 
2.53.  Independent-samples t-test: t(29) = 0.189, p = 0.852. 
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Chinese Room 
 
Survey 1 
N = 49 (Male = 21, Female = 28).  Male: M = 3.62, SD = 2.61.  Female: M = 3.39, SD = 
2.32.  Independent-samples t-test: t(47) = 0.320, p = 0.750.   
 
Survey 2 
N = 31 (Male = 14, Female = 17).  Male: M = 3.71, SD = 2.64.  Female: M = 4.53, SD = 
2.38.  Independent-samples t-test: t(29) = -0.904, p = 0.374. 
 
Plank of Carneades 
 
Survey 1 
N = 54 (Male = 26, Female = 28).  Male: M = 6.04, SD = 1.43.  Female: M = 5.54, SD = 
1.71.  Independent-samples t-test: t(52) = 1.168 (equal variances not assumed), p = 0.248. 
 
Survey 2 
N = 44 (Male = 22, Female = 22).  Male: M = 5.64, SD = 1.50.  Female: M = 5.73, SD = 
1.75.  Independent-samples t-test: t(42) = -0.185, p = 0.854.  
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Appendix C 
 
This appendix contains the analyses as carried out in section 2.2.2 with the exception that 
participants who indicated that they had seen the scenarios were excluded.  The data 
presented here is from the Mechanical Turk samples.  Our samples from the 
SurveyMonkey data sets were not large enough after filtering.   
 
Brain in the Vat 
N = 108 (Male = 52, Female = 56).  Male: M = 5.12, SD = 2.27.  Female: M = 5.93, SD = 
1.76.  Independent-samples t-test: t(96) = -2.07 (equal variance not assumed), p = 0.041.   
 
Twin Earth 
N = 114 (Male = 63, Female = 51).  Male: M = 5.22, SD = 2.38.  Female: M = 5.43, SD = 
2.12.  Independent-samples t-test: t(112) = -0.490, p = 0.625. 
 
Chinese Room 
N = 99 (Male = 46, Female = 53).  Male: M = 3.41, SD = 2.19.  Female: M = 3.30, SD = 
2.00.  Independent-samples t-test: t(97) = 0.264, p = 0.792. 
 
Plank of Carneades 
N = 141 (Male = 64, Female = 77).  Male: M = 5.23, SD = 1.55.  Female: M = 5.48, SD = 
1.47.  Independent-samples t-test: t(139) = 0.335, p = 0.335. 
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Appendix D 
 
Zebra Case 
Mike is a young man visiting the zoo with his son, and when they come to the 
zebra cage, Mike points to the animal and says, “that’s a zebra.” Mike is right –– 
it is a zebra.  However, as the older people in his community know, there are lots 
of ways that people can be tricked into believing things that aren’t true.  Indeed, 
the older people in the community know that it’s possible that zoo authorities 
could cleverly disguise mules to look just like zebras, and people viewing the 
animals would not be able to tell the difference.  If the animal that Mike called a 
zebra had really been such a cleverly painted mule, Mike still would have thought 
that it was a zebra.  Does Mike really know that the animal is a zebra, or does he 
only believe that it is? 
 
    REALLY KNOWS    ONLY BELIEVES 
 
Conspiracy Case 
It’s clear that smoking cigarettes increases the likelihood of getting cancer.  
However, there is now a great deal of evidence that just using nicotine by itself 
without smoking (for instance, by taking a nicotine pill) does not increase the 
likelihood of getting cancer.  Jim knows about this evidence and as a result, he 
believes that using nicotine does not increase the likelihood of getting cancer.  It 
is possible that the tobacco companies dishonestly made up and publicized this 
evidence that using nicotine does not increase the likelihood of cancer, and that 
the evidence is really false and misleading.  Now, the tobacco companies did not 
actually make up this evidence, but Jim is not aware of this fact.  Does Jim really 
know that using nicotine doesn’t increase the likelihood of getting cancer, or does 
he only believe it? 
 
    REALLY KNOWS   ONLY BELIEVES 
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